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Diplomatic assurances issued by states declaring that they 
will not mistreat individuals returned to them occupy a strange 
middle ground between being legal and non-legal obligations. 
The question of their value forces us to re-evaluate our 
understanding of the law of treaties, which, like law in general, 
requires a binary approach to obligation: either there is a legal 
obligation or not, even if the fit with either of these categories 
is not precise. This study concludes that some of the obligations 
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in certain assurances can be understood as legal obligations, 
and some cannot; and it will state a methodology for 
determining which obligations are legal under the law of 
treaties. The examination of this particular type of 
international communication can shed light on the larger 
phenomenon of soft law instruments and similar instruments 
whose legal value is unclear. 
The paper begins in Section I with relevant background of 
the legal environment of diplomatic assurances and their use in 
cases of expulsion. The next sections discuss the legal nature of 
diplomatic assurances. Section II discusses diplomatic 
assurances as treaties; Section III discusses diplomatic 
assurances as binding unilateral statements; and Section IV 
discusses diplomatic assurances as subsequent practice that 
would inform treaty interpretation.1
The lengthiest of these examinations is Section II on 
whether diplomatic assurances could be considered treaties. 
This is because the claim that diplomatic assurances—which 
purport to not be legally binding—could qualify as treaties is 
the most controversial of the questions considered by this 
paper. Although there are strong arguments on both sides, in 
the end, they prove to be unsatisfactory. 
 
I. BACKGROUND 
In many instances a state may have an obligation not to 
return an individual to a state from which he came even where 
the person is otherwise lawfully deportable. This obligation is 
termed the “non-refoulement” obligation. The obligation arises 
in instances where an individual faces some risk of poor 
treatment upon return. The most common risks are persecution 
and torture, but the risk of other human rights violations may 
also trigger the non-refoulement obligation.2
 
 1. This paper will not examine the legal value of diplomatic assurances 
under customary international law other than the way in which customary 
international law might further refine the definition of treaty. 
 
 2. See, e.g., Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 
art. 1, 189 U.N.T.S. 150 as amended by Protocol Relating to the Status of 
Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 606 U.N.T.S. 267 [together hereinafter Refugee 
Convention] (“No Contracting State shall expel or return (‘refouler’) a refugee 
in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or 
freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, 
membership of a particular social group or political opinion.”); Geneva 
Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, art. 
31, 32, 45, 147, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287; Convention for 
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 
art. 2–3, 6, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter European Convention on Human 
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This non-refoulement obligation sometimes inhibits a state 
that wishes to remove a person who presents a security risk or 
danger to society. There are limited exceptions to the non-
refoulement obligation, but they are neither universal nor 
absolute.3 In cases where the expelling state cannot invoke an 
exception to non-refoulement, it may ask the receiving state for 
assurances that the person will not face the feared problematic 
treatment—i.e. that the person will not be tortured or will not 
face persecution by the receiving state.4
 
Rights or ECHR]; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 
16, 1966, art. 6–7, 14, S. TREATY DOC. No. 95–20, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 
[hereinafter ICCPR]; Organization for African Unity, Convention Governing 
the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, Sept. 10, 1969, art. II(3), 
1001 U.N.T.S. 45; American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, art. 
4, 5(2), 8, 22(8), 1144 U.N.T.S. 143; African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights, June 27, 1981, art. 4, 5, 7, 1520 U.N.T.S. 363; Cartagena Declaration 
on Refugees, Nov. 22, 1984, § III(5), reprinted in 2 COLLECTION OF 
INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS AND OTHER LEGAL TEXTS CONCERNING 
REFUGEES AND DISPLACED PERSONS 206, 208 (1995); Convention Against 
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 
Dec. 10, 1984, art. 1, 3, 16, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Convention Against 
Torture or CAT]; Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture, 
Dec. 9, 1985, art. 2, O.A.S.T.S. No. 67; Arab Charter on Human Rights, Sept. 
15, 1994, art. 13, reprinted in 18 HUM. RTS. L.J. 151, 152 (1997); Arab Charter 
on Human Rights, May 22, 2004, art. 5, 6, 7, 8, 14, 16, reprinted in 12 INT’L 
HUM. RTS. R. 893, 896–97 (2005). See generally U.N. High Commissioner for 
Refugees [UNHCR], UNHCR Note on Diplomatic Assurances and 
International Refugee Protection, ¶ 15 (Aug. 2006), available at 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/pdfid/44dc81164.pdf [hereinafter UNHCR Note] 
(“The principle of non-refoulement as enshrined in Article 33 of the 1951 
Convention is part of customary international law. As such, it is binding on all 
States, including those which have not yet become party to the 1951 
Convention and/or its 1967 Protocol.”) (citation omitted). 
 These are termed 
 3. Compare Refugee Convention, supra note 2, art. 33(2) (prohibiting 
refugees from claiming the protection of non-refoulement if they are deemed a 
“danger to the security of the country” or who have been convicted of serious 
crimes), with Rep. of the U.N. Comm. Against Torture, U.N. GAOR, 52d Sess., 
Supp. No. 44, A/52/44, Commc’n No. 39/1996, ¶ 14.5 (Apr. 28, 1997) (“The 
Committee considers that the test of article 3 (the non-refoulement principle of 
the CAT) is absolute. Whenever substantial grounds exist for believing that an 
individual would be in danger of being subjected to torture upon expulsion to 
another State, the State party is under obligation not to return that person 
concerned to that State. The nature and activities in which the person 
concerned engaged cannot be a material consideration when making a 
determination under article 3 of the [CAT].”). 
 4. It is also possible that the receiving state might, in some situations, 
assure the expelling state that the relevant person would not face persecution 
by non-state agents. The credibility of these kinds of assurances would simply 
fall into the general assessment of credibility for any assurances. The 
existence of non-state agent persecution, where it is recognized as a valid basis 
for non-refoulement, would not per se bar the state from issuing assurances. 
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“diplomatic assurances.”5 They can take the form of a blanket 
agreement (usually called a “Memorandum of Understanding”), 
a case-by-case agreement, or a combination of the two.6
Diplomatic assurances were initially used without much 
scholarly comment in extradition cases for common crimes, and 
in non-expulsion matters.
 
7
 
 5. See generally UNHCR Note, supra note 
 Assurances were usually sought to 
assure the expelling state that the individual would not face an 
2, ¶ 1 (“The term ‘diplomatic 
assurances’, as used in the context of the transfer of a person from one State to 
another, refers to an undertaking by the receiving State to the effect that the 
person concerned will be treated in accordance with conditions set by the 
sending State or, more generally, in keeping with its human rights obligations 
under international law.”). 
 6. See Memorandum of Understanding Between the Gov’t of the U.K. 
and the Gov’t of Eth. Concerning the Provision of Assurances in Respect of 
Persons Subject to Deportation, Dec. 12, 2008, available at 
http://www.fco.gov.uk/resources/en/pdf/3849543/mou-ethiopia-combined 
[hereinafter U.K.–Eth. MOU]; Memorandum of Understanding Between the 
Gov’t of the U.K. and the Gov’t of Leb. Concerning the Provision of Assurances 
in Respect of Persons Subject to Deportation, Dec. 23, 2005, available at 
http://www.fco.gov.uk/resources/en/pdf/lebanon-mou [hereinafter U.K.–Leb. 
MOU]; Memorandum of Understanding Between Gov’t of Libya and the Gov’t 
of the U.K. Concerning the Provision of Assurances in Respect of Persons 
Subject to Deportation, Oct. 18, 2005, available at 
http://www.fco.gov.uk/resources/en/pdf/libya-mou [hereinafter Libya–U.K. 
MOU]; Memorandum of Understanding Between the Gov’t of the U.K. and the 
Gov’t of Jordan Regulating the Provision of Undertakings in Respect of 
Specified Persons Prior to Deportation, Aug. 10, 2005, available at 
http://www.fco.gov.uk/resources/en/pdf/jordan-mou [hereinafter U.K.–Jordan 
MOU]. For a helpful history of the negotiation of the U.K.–Jordan MOU, see 
Othman v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, [2007] S.I.A.C. No. SC/15/2005, 
¶¶ 171–174 (Eng.), available at 
http://www.siac.tribunals.gov.uk/Documents/QATADA_FINAL_7FEB2007.pdf. 
 7. See, e.g., Early Warning System, U.S.–Isr., Sept. 1, 1975, 26 U.S.T. 
2271; Memorandum of Agreement Concerning Assurances, Consultations, and 
U.S. Policy on Matters Related to Middle East Peace., U.S.–Isr., Sept. 1, 1975, 
32 U.S.T. 2150. The United States appears to regard the MOU as a treaty 
because it has recorded it in the United States Treaties and Other 
International Agreements series (U.S.T.) and referenced it in U.S. Department 
of State, Treaties in Force: A list of Treaties and Other International 
Agreements of the United States in Force on January 1, 2011. See U.S. DEP’T 
OF STATE, TREATIES IN FORCE 138 (2011), available at 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/169274.pdf; see also Noriega v. 
Pastrana, 564 F.3d 1290, 1298 (11th Cir. 2009) (relying on diplomatic 
assurances regarding the application of the Third Geneva Convention); Eain v. 
Wilkes, 641 F.2d 504, 512 n.8, 519 (7th Cir. 1981) (assurances from Israel for a 
fair trial); M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, Judgment, App. No. 30696/09, Eur. 
Ct. H.R. (Jan. 21, 2011), 
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/search.asp?skin=hudoc-en (search case name 
“M.S.S.” and respondent state “Belgium) (regarding assurances that an 
asylum hearing would be conducted). 
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unfair trial or the death penalty.8 Beginning with the Soering 
case, however, the European Court of Human Rights 
(“European Court”) held that extradition could result in a 
violation of article 3 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights (“ECHR”) on the part of the expelling state.9 Because 
this violation would be reviewable by the European Court, 
assurances became even more important.10
Increased attention on diplomatic assurances was also 
created by the policies, collectively known as the “War on 
Terror,” that were adopted by the United States subsequent to 
the terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 
2001, because assurances have been used in connection with 
the extradition of persons suspected of terrorism offenses.
 
11
 
 8.  See, e.g., ECHR, supra note 
 
2, art. 2; Protocol No. 6 to the ECHR 
Concerning the Abolition of the Death Penalty Apr. 28, 1983, 1496 U.N.T.S. 
281, as amended by Protocol No. 11 to the ECHR, May 11, 1994, 2061 U.N.T.S. 
7; Protocol No. 13 to the ECHR Concerning the Abolition of the Death Penalty 
in All Circumstances, May 3, 2002, 2246 U.N.T.S. 110; Cipriani v. Italy, 
Admissibility Decision, App. No. 22142/07, Eur. Ct. H.R. (Mar. 30, 2010), 
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?item=2&portal=hbkm&action=html
&highlight=cipriani&sessionid=89743436&skin=hudoc-en; Koktysh v. 
Ukraine, Final Judgment, App. No. 43707/07, Eur. Ct. H.R. (Dec. 10, 2009), 
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?item=1&portal=hbkm&action=html
&highlight=43707/07&sessionid=89536360&skin=hudoc-en; Kaboulov v. 
Ukraine, Final Judgment, App. No. 41015/04, Eur. Ct. H.R. (Nov. 19, 2009), 
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?item=1&portal=hbkm&action=html
&highlight=kaboulov%20|%20ukraine&sessionid=89536360&skin=hudoc-en; 
Einhorn v. France, Admissibility Decision, App. No. 71555/01, Eur. Ct. H.R. 
(Oct. 16, 2001), 
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?item=1&portal=hbkm&action=html
&highlight=einhorn%20|%20france&sessionid=89536360&skin=hudoc-en; 
United States v. Burns, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 283 (Can.) (regarding assurances from 
the United States that the death penalty would not be applied), X v. The 
Netherlands, Admissibility Decision, App. No. 15216/89, Eur. Comm’n H.R. 
(Jan. 16, 1991), 
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?item=1&portal=hbkm&action=html
&highlight=15216/89&sessionid=89536360&skin=hudoc-en; Soering v. United 
Kingdom, Final Judgment, App. No. 14038/88, Eur. Ct. H.R. (July 7, 1989), 
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?item=3&portal=hbkm&action=html
&highlight=soering%20|%20united%20|%20kingdom&sessionid=89536360&s
kin=hudoc-en; Bamohamed v. France, Admissibility Decision, App. No. 
13706/88, Eur. Ct. H.R. (Dec. 9, 1988), 
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?item=1&portal=hbkm&action=html
&highlight=Bamohamed&sessionid=89743436&skin=hudoc-en. 
 9. Soering, App. No. 14038/88, ¶¶ 44–45. 
 10. See, e.g., Cipriani, App. No. 22142/07; Einhorn, App. No. 71555/01, X 
v. The Netherlands, App. No. 15216/89, Bamohamed, App. No. 13706/88. 
 11. See, e.g., Othman v. United Kingdom, Judgment, App. No. 8139/09, 
Eur. Ct. H.R. (Jan. 17, 2012), 
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?item=1&portal=hbkm&action=html
&highlight=8139/09&sessionid=89743436&skin=hudoc-en, Sellem v. Italy, 
258 MINNESOTA JOURNAL OF INT’L LAW [Vol 21:2 
 
This attention on assurances was heightened when several 
persons were extradited on the basis of assurances from states 
well known for employing torture and then were tortured 
notwithstanding these assurances.12
As an initial matter, it does not appear to be a violation of 
international law either to issue or to solicit and receive 
diplomatic assurances. Amnesty International and Human 
Rights Watch have criticized the use of diplomatic assurances 
 
 
Final Judgment, App. No. 12584/08, Eur. Ct. H.R. (May 5, 2009), 
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/search.asp?sessionid=89743436&skin=hudoc
-en (search “12584/08” in application number field); Cherif v. Italy, Final 
Judgment, App. No. 1860/07, Eur. Ct. H.R. (Apr. 7, 2009), 
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/search.asp?sessionid=89743436&skin=hudoc
-en (search “1860/07” in application number field), Abdelhedi v. Italy, Final 
Judgment, App. No. 2638/07, Eur. Ct. H.R. (Mar. 24, 2009), Ben Salah v. Italy, 
Final Judgment, App. No. 38128/06, Eur. Ct. H.R. (Mar. 24, 2009), 
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?item=2&portal=hbkm&action=html
&highlight=38128/06&sessionid=90121775&skin=hudoc-en; C.B.Z. v. Italy, 
Final Judgment, App. No. 44006/06, Eur. Ct. H.R. (Mar. 24, 2009), 
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?item=2&portal=hbkm&action=html
&highlight=44006/06&sessionid=90121775&skin=hudoc-en; Darraji v. Italy, 
Final Judgment, App. No. 11549/05, Eur. Ct. H.R. (Mar. 24, 2009), 
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?item=2&portal=hbkm&action=html
&highlight=11549/05&sessionid=90121775&skin=hudoc-en; Hamraoui v. 
Italy, Final Judgment, App. No. 16201/07, Eur. Ct. H.R. (Mar. 24, 2009), 
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?item=2&portal=hbkm&action=html
&highlight=16201/07&sessionid=90121775&skin=hudoc-en; O. v. Italy, Final 
Judgment, App. No. 37257/06, Eur. Ct. H.R. (Mar. 24, 2009), 
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?item=2&portal=hbkm&action=html
&highlight=37257/06&sessionid=90121775&skin=hudoc-en; Soltana v. Italy, 
Final Judgment, App. No. 37336/06, Eur. Ct. H.R. (Mar. 24, 2009), 
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?item=2&portal=hbkm&action=html
&highlight=37336/06&sessionid=90121775&skin=hudoc-en; Ben Khemais v. 
Italy, Final Judgment, App. No. 246/07, Eur. Ct. H.R. (Feb. 24, 2009), 
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?item=4&portal=hbkm&action=html
&highlight=246/07&sessionid=90121775&skin=hudoc-en; Gasayev v. Spain, 
Admissibility Decision, App. No. 48514/06, Eur. Ct. H.R. (Feb. 17, 2009), 
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?item=1&portal=hbkm&action=html
&highlight=48514/06&sessionid=90121775&skin=hudoc-en; Boumediene  v. 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Admissibility Decision, App. No. 38703/06, Eur. Ct. 
H.R. (Nov. 18, 2008), 
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?item=1&portal=hbkm&action=html
&highlight=38703/06&sessionid=90121775&skin=hudoc-en. 
 12. See, e.g., Alzery v. Sweden, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/88/D/1416/2005 (U.N. 
Human Rights Comm., Nov 10, 2006), 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/47975afa21.html.; Agiza v. Sweden, U.N. 
Doc. CAT/C/34/D/233/2003 (U.N. Comm. Against Torture, May 20, 2005), 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/42ce734a2.html; Daniel J. Wakin, 
Tempers Flare After U.S. Sends a Canadian Citizen Back to Syria on Terror 
Suspicions, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 2002, at A9 (reporting on the situation of 
Maher Arar). 
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to relieve the expelling state of its non-refoulement obligations13 
but have not argued that the solicitation, issuance, or receipt of 
assurances is itself unlawful. Without a rule of international 
law prohibiting them, their request and issuance must be per se 
lawful.14
Receipt of assurances may diminish or alleviate the risk 
that an expelled person will face problematic treatment, so that 
the individual may be returned without violating domestic or 
international law prohibiting his or her return. It is not 
entirely clear, however, which legal element of the non-
refoulement obligation is directly affected by assurances. 
Instead, it appears that the receipt of assurances contributes to 
defeating the application of several elements collectively.
 
15
The assurances, in and of themselves, are not sufficient to 
relieve the state of its non-refoulement obligation.
 
16
 
 13. See generally Amnesty Int’l, Dangerous Deals: Europe’s Reliance on 
‘Diplomatic Assurances’ Against Torture, AI Index EUR 01/012/2010 (Apr. 
2010); Human Rights Watch, Still at Risk: Diplomatic Assurances No 
Safeguard Against Torture, Vol. 17, No. 4(D) (Apr. 2005). 
 Rather, the 
 14. See The Case of the S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 
10 (Sept. 7). This author has already concluded elsewhere that the request, 
issuance, and use of diplomatic assurances is permissible under customary 
international law, see William Thomas Worster, The Evolving Definition of the 
Refugee in Customary International Law, 30 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 
(forthcoming 2012); Rep. of the U.N. Comm. Against Torture, U.N. GAOR, 52d 
Sess., Supp. No. 44, A/52/44, Commc’n No. 39/1996, ¶ 14.5 (Apr. 28, 1997). 
 15. See Hilal v. United Kingdom, Final Judgment, App. No. 45276/99, 
Eur. Ct. H.R. (Mar. 6, 2001), 
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?item=1&portal=hbkm&action=html
&highlight=45276/99&sessionid=90121775&skin=hudoc-en. But see Svazas v. 
Sec’y of State for the Home Dept., [2002] EWCA (Civ) 74 (Eng.) (holding in a 
Refugee Convention case that the test is whether there exists sufficient 
protection in respect of the acts of rogue state agents measured in a general or 
systemic manner, and may co-exist with a real risk of prohibited ill 
treatment); Regina v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dept., [2005] UKHL 38 
(Eng.) (applying the Svazas test to ECHR art. 3). 
 16. See Othman, App. No. 8139/09; Rep. of the U.N. Comm. Against 
Torture, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties under Article 19 
of the Convention, ¶ 4, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/CR/33/3 (Dec. 10, 2004) (expressing 
concern at the U.K.’s reliance on diplomatic assurances in the refoulement 
context); UNHCR, No. 30 (XXXIV) The Problem of Manifestly Unfounded or 
Abusive Applications for Refugee Status or Asylum* (1983), in CONCLUSIONS 
ADOPTED BY THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE ON THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION 
OF REFUGEES 1975–2009 (CONCLUSION NO. 1–109) 39 (2009) (“Recognized the 
substantive character of a decision that an application for refugee status is 
manifestly unfounded or abusive, the grave consequences of an erroneous 
determination for the applicant and the resulting need for such a decision to 
be accompanied by appropriate procedural guarantees.”); Rep. of the Special 
Rapporteur of the Comm’n on Human Rights, Torture and Other Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, transmitted by Note of the 
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state must complete an individualized assessment of the person 
being expelled to determine whether the assurances overcome 
the reasons for non-refoulement. This evaluation must include 
an assessment of the credibility and reliability of the 
assurances, taken in light of such factors as the receiving 
state’s history of human rights abuses, its history of honoring 
assurances, and the ability of the expelling state or a third 
party to monitor compliance with the assurances.17
 
Secretary-General, ¶ 51, U.N. Doc. A/60/316 (Aug. 30, 2005) (“It is the view of 
the Special Rapporteur that diplomatic assurances are unreliable and 
ineffective in the protection against torture and ill-treatment.”). 
 
 17. See Agiza v. Sweden, Commc’n No. 223/2003, ¶ 13.4 U.N. Doc. 
CAT/C/34/D/233/2003 (Comm. Against Torture 2005): 
The Committee considers at the outset that it was known, or should 
have been known, to the State party’s authorities at the time of the 
complainant’s removal that Egypt resorted to consistent and 
widespread use of torture against detainees, and that the risk of such 
treatment was particularly high in the case of detainees held for 
political and security reasons. . . . In the Committee’s view, the 
natural conclusion from these combined elements, that is, that the 
complainant was at a real risk of torture in Egypt in the event of 
expulsion. . . . The procurement of diplomatic assurances, which, 
moreover, provided no mechanism for their enforcement, did not 
suffice to protect against this manifest risk. 
Suresh v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2002] 1 S.C.R. 
3, ¶ 124 (Can.) (“A distinction may be drawn between assurances given by a 
state that it will not apply the death penalty (through  a legal process) and 
assurances by a state that it will not resort to torture (an illegal process) . . . . 
The former [death penalty] are easier to monitor and generally more reliable 
than the latter [torture].”); Mahjoub v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and 
Immigration), [2005] 3 F.C.R. 334 (Can.); Hof 's-Gravenhage 20 januari 2005, 
NJF 2005, 106 m. nt. BPV (De Staat der Nederlanden (Ministerie van 
Justitie)/Geïntimeerde) (Neth.); HR 7 mei 2004, NJ 2007, 276 m. nt. A.H. Klip 
(Advies inzake [de opgeëiste persoon]) (Neth.); Youssef v. Home Office, [2004] 
EWHC (QB) 1884 (Eng.); Russia v. Akhmed Zakaev, [2003] Bow Street 
Magistrates’ Court (unreported decision) (Eng.); Khouzam v. Att’y Gen., 549 
F.3d 235 (3d Cir. 2008): 
Prior to removal on the basis of diplomatic assurances, Khouzam 
must be afforded notice and an opportunity to test the reliability of 
those assurances in a hearing . . . . The alien must have an 
opportunity to present, before a neutral and impartial decisionmaker, 
evidence and arguments challenging the reliability of diplomatic 
assurances proffered by the Government, and the Government's 
compliance with the relevant regulations. The alien must also be 
afforded an individualized determination of the matter based on a 
record disclosed to the alien. 
(citations omitted); In re Ashraf Al-Jailani, File A73 369 984 – York, 2004 WL 
1739163 (BIA June 28, 2004); Human Rights Comm., Consideration of Reports 
Submitted by States Parties under Article 40 of the Covenant, ¶ 12, 
CCPR/CO/74/SWE, 74th Sess. (Apr. 24, 2002) (“[Assurances may be accepted 
provided the state] institute[s] credible mechanisms for ensuring compliance 
of the receiving State with these assurances from the moment of expulsion.”); 
Rep. of the Special Rapporteur of the Comm’n on Human Rights, Torture and 
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Additionally, the expelling state must consider whether the 
state is even able to ensure compliance with the assurances.18 
Strangely, although the seeking of assurances itself appears to 
be an admission of risk that the individual could face unlawful 
treatment upon expulsion,19
There are many cases where, even after the expelling state 
sought and received assurances that an expelled person would 
not be tortured, the receiving state tortured the person anyway. 
This article will set aside questions of attribution and whether 
the state’s obligation is one of conduct or result, to focus on the 
question of whether the failure to honor the assurances is a 
violation of a legal obligation under international law. 
 courts do not appear to consider 
that fact as actually weighing against an expulsion. 
 
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, transmitted by 
Note of the Secretary-General, ¶ 35 U.N. Doc. A/57/173 (July 2, 2002) 
(Assurances may be accepted provided “the Government of the receiving 
country has provided an unequivocal guarantee to the extraditing authorities 
that the persons concerned will not be subjected to torture or any other forms 
of ill-treatment upon return, and that a system to monitor the treatment of 
the persons in question has been put into place with a view to ensuring that 
they are treated with full respect for their human dignity.”). 
 18. See, e.g., Chahal v. United Kingdom, Final Judgment, App. No. 
22414/93, Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶¶ 104–05 (Nov. 15, 1996), 
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?item=1&portal=hbkm&action=html
&highlight=22414/93&sessionid=90121775&skin=hudoc-en: 
[T]he United Nations' Special Rapporteur on torture has described 
the practice of torture upon those in police custody as "endemic" and 
has complained that inadequate measures are taken to bring those 
responsible to justice. The NHRC [Indian National Human Rights 
Commission] has also drawn attention to the problems of widespread, 
often fatal, mistreatment of prisoners and has called for a systematic 
reform of the police throughout India . . . . Although the Court does 
not doubt the good faith of the Indian Government in providing the 
assurances mentioned above, it would appear that, despite the efforts 
of that Government, the NHRC and the Indian courts to bring about 
reform, the violation of human rights by certain members of the 
security forces in Punjab and elsewhere in India is a recalcitrant and 
enduring problem . . . . Against this background, the Court is not 
persuaded that the above assurances would provide Mr Chahal with 
an adequate guarantee of safety. 
(citations omitted). 
 19. See U.N. Comm. on Human Rights, Promotion and Protection of 
Human Rights, transmitted by Note of the High Comm’r for Human Rights, 
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2005/103, ¶ 56 (Feb. 7, 2005) (by Robert K. Goldman) (“[T]he 
mere fact that such assurances are sought is arguably a tacit admission by the 
sending State that the transferred person is indeed at risk of being tortured or 
ill-treated.”); Rep. of the Comm’r for Human Rights, on His Visit to Sweden 
21–23 April 2004, C.O.E. Doc. CommDH(2004)13 (July 8, 2004) (“The 
weakness inherent in the practice of diplomatic assurances lies in the fact that 
where there is a need for such assurances, there is clearly an acknowledged 
risk of torture and ill-treatment.”). 
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One difficulty with examining particular assurances is that 
their text is most often confidential, and in some cases the 
executive has even misrepresented the nature of the 
assurances to the judiciary.20 But on occasion the texts of some 
assurances are made public. Assurances between Jordan and 
the United Kingdom took the form of a blanket Memorandum 
of Understanding (“MOU”) under which individual assurances 
were issued. The MOU with Jordan was made public as an 
annex to the judgment in the Othman case21 (sometimes 
alternatively referred to as “Abu Qatada”.) Similarly, the MOU 
between Ethiopia and the United Kingdom was reprinted in 
the XX case, which, like the Othman case, was heard before the 
U.K. Special Immigration Appeals Commission (“SIAC”).22 
Additional U.K. MOUs have also now been published on the 
website of the U.K. Foreign and Commonwealth Office 
(“FCO”).23
The legal nature of diplomatic assurances is disputed. It 
has been argued that diplomatic assurances are not binding in 
the sense of giving rise to state responsibility for violations,
 Many other assurances and MOUs regarding 
expulsion cases remain confidential, however. 
24
 
 20. See, e.g., United States v. Pileggi, 361 F. App’x 475, 476–77 (4th Cir. 
2010): 
  
At sentencing, the Government made the following misrepresentation 
about the assurances it provided to Costa Rica: “the United States, we 
gave a sentencing assurance to the government of Costa Rica that we 
would not seek a sentence in excess of 50 years.” When the court 
asked if this bound the court or the executive branch, the Government 
responded, “I think technically what it says is that the United States, 
the executive branch will not seek a sentence in excess of fifty years 
or death.” 
(citations omitted). Executive Branches have even disregarded the judiciary’s 
holding regarding assurances altogether. See Labsi v. Slovakia, Statement of 
Facts, App. No. 33809/08, Eur. Ct. H.R. (July 18, 2008), 
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?item=1&portal=hbkm&action=html
&highlight=33809/08&sessionid=90362720&skin=hudoc-cc-en (alleging the 
Slovakian Executive expelled Labsi despite a stay entered by the Slovakian 
Constitutional Court). 
 21. See Othman v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, [2007] S.I.A.C. No. 
SC/15/2005, Annex 1A (Eng.), available at 
http://www.siac.tribunals.gov.uk/Documents/QATADA_FINAL_7FEB2007.pdf. 
 22. See XX v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, [2007] S.I.A.C. No. 
SC/61/2007, ¶ 20 (Eng.). 
 23. See U.K.–Leb. MOU, supra note 6; U.K.–Eth. MOU, supra note 6; 
Libya–U.K. MOU, supra note 6; U.K.–Jordan MOU, supra note 6. 
 24. See Thomas Hammarberg, Commissioner for Human Rights, Council 
of Europe, Torture Can Never, Ever Be Accepted, (June 27, 2006), 
http://www.coe.int/t/commissioner/viewpoints/060626_en.asp: 
[Diplomatic assurances] are not credible and have also turned out to 
be ineffective in well-documented cases. The governments concerned 
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and even that assurances have no legal value at all.25  It has 
also been suggested, however, that diplomatic assurances are 
not “mere piece[s] of paper,”26 and specifically that they are 
“irrevocable”27 or “formal,” 28 may be “binding”29
 
have already violated binding international norms and it is plain 
wrong to subject anyone to the risk of torture on the basis of an even 
less solemn undertaking to make an exception in an individual case. 
In short, the principle of non-refoulement should not be undermined 
by convenient, non-binding promises of such kinds. 
 or may even be 
See Human Rights Watch, supra note 13, at 21–22:  
Diplomatic assurances against torture represent a set of 
“understandings” agreed in principle between two governments. They 
have no legal effect and the person who they aim to protect has no 
recourse if the assurances are breached . . . . It is unlikely that 
governments that practice torture unconstrained by international 
legal commitments will rein in abuse on the basis of non-binding 
assurances. 
 25. See Alzery v. Sweden, Commc’n No. 1416/2005, ¶ 4.11, U.N. 
Doc.CCPR/C/88/D/1416/2005 (Human Rights Comm., Nov. 10, 2006): 
In May 2004, when Sweden unsuccessfully sought an investigation, 
the Egyptian authorities were unsympathetic to the suggestion that 
the claims of mistreatment be investigated by any foreign 
independent person or body. The Swedish authorities, while 
expressing their disappointment, were unable to further act. The 
author notes in this regard that the assurance is of no legal value in 
Egypt and cannot be enforced or utilised as a legal document by him. 
See Human Rights Watch, supra note 13, at 21 (“Diplomatic assurances 
against torture represent a set of “understandings” agreed in principle 
between two governments. They have no legal effect and the person who they 
aim to protect has no recourse if the assurances are breached.”). 
 26. Othman, [2007] S.I.A.C. No. SC/15/2005, ¶ 501: 
The significance of the MOU against that political background, is first 
in the fact of its negotiation. It plainly did require some political 
thought at all levels, political, security and diplomatic. This is an 
agreement which we accept has been supported and agreed to not just 
at the highest level but also by the GID which has to operate within 
it. It is not a mere piece of paper which some ordinary official could 
sign and then leave others to ignore, hoping that that was enough to 
satisfy an old friend. 
 27. Alzery v. Sweden, Commc’n No. 1416/2005, ¶ 3.12, U.N. 
Doc.CCPR/C/88/D/1416/2005 (Human Rights Comm., Nov. 10, 2006): 
In its follow-up report of 6 May 2003 to the Human Rights 
Committee, the Swedish Government also stated that it: “[i]s the 
opinion of the Swedish Government that the assurances obtained 
from the receiving State are satisfactory and irrevocable and that 
they are and will be respected in their full content. The Government 
has not received any information which would cast doubt at this 
conclusion.” 
(citations omitted). 
 28. See Othman, [2007] S.I.A.C. No. SC/15/2005, ¶ 283: 
Mr Oakden however said that failure to comply with formal political 
commitments in an MOU could do serious damage to diplomatic 
relations between the signatory states, and would harm a state's 
reputation as a reliable international partner. The Appellant was a 
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“legally binding.”30
 
well known figure in the United Kingdom and in Jordan, and his case 
had been well publicised. Allegations of a breach of the conditions in 
the MOU in his case would inevitably attract considerable publicity 
and damage the international reputations of both governments. 
 Moreover, some authorities seem to shift 
(emphasis added). 
 29. See UNHCR Note, supra note 2, ¶¶ 5, 21: 
Diplomatic assurances given by the receiving State do not normally 
constitute legally binding undertakings. . . . In determining the 
weight which may be attached to diplomatic assurances, the sending 
State must consider a number of factors, including the degree and 
nature of the risk to the individual concerned, the source of the 
danger for the individual, and whether or not the assurances will be 
effectively implemented. This will depend, inter alia, on whether the 
undertaking provided is binding on those State organs which are 
responsible for implementing certain measures or providing 
protection, and whether the authorities of the receiving State are in a 
position to ensure compliance with the assurances given. 
(emphasis added). 
There is no inherent reason why diplomatic assurances, or the frameworks in 
which they might be applied, could not be legally binding. The Council of 
Europe had proposed to draft an instrument, apparently proposed to be 
binding, on the use of diplomatic assurances in expulsion cases, although the 
project was dropped. Compare Steering Comm. for Human Rights, Rep. on its 
52nd Meeting, Nov. 6–9, 2001, app. VIII ¶ 4, Doc. No. CDDH(2001)035 (Nov. 
19, 2001), and Steering Comm. for Human Rights, Group of Specialists on 
Human Rights and the Fight Against Terrorism, Rep. on its 1st Meeting, Dec. 
7–9, 2005, app. III ¶ 4, Doc. No. DH-S-TER(2005)018 (Dec. 16, 2005) (“[T]he 
Group . . . is called to . . . (ii) consider the appropriateness of a legal 
instrument, for example a recommendation on minimum 
requirements/standards of such diplomatic assurances, and, if need be, 
present concrete proposals.”) (emphasis added), with Steering Comm. for 
Human Rights, Group of Specialists on Human Rights and the Fight Against 
Terrorism, Rep. on its 2nd Meeting, Mar. 29–31, 2006, app. III ¶¶ 12–17, Doc. 
No. DH-S-TER(2006)(005) (Apr. 3, 2006) (recommending against such an 
instrument). 
 30. See Yin Fong v. Australia, ¶¶ 7.4, 9.7, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/97/D/1442/2005 (Human Rights Comm., Nov. 23, 2009), 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4b1d223d2.html (summarizing the 
submissions of Australia on the legally binding nature of assurances and 
possibility endorsing that view): 
The State party submits that a legally binding assurance is one given 
by the part of the government or the judiciary that would usually 
have the responsibility of carrying out the act or enforcing the 
assurance . . . . 
 
For all of the above reasons and while recognizing the State party’s 
assertion (para.7.1) that it currently has no plans to remove her from 
Australia, the Committee considers that an enforced return of the 
author to the Peoples’ Republic of China, without adequate 
assurances, would constitute violations by Australia, as a State party 
which has abolished the death penalty, of the author’s rights under 
art.6 and art.7 of the Covenant. 
In the alternative, or additionally, assurances could be legally binding under 
domestic law. See, e.g., United States v. Pileggi, 361 F. App’x. 475, (4th Cir., 
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their perspective over time from non-binding to legally binding, 
or the reverse.31
Disagreements over the legal value of assurances and 
similar communications are not just isolated to academia. 
Disagreements occur there,
  
32 but disagreements also play out 
between States on a case-by-case basis.33
 
Jan. 20, 2010) (enforcing U.S. assurances given to Costa Rica that Pileggi 
would not be subjected to the death penalty or life imprisonment by requiring 
resentencing). 
 This paper will first 
 31. Compare MANFRED NOWAK, U.N. COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL 
RIGHTS, CCPR COMMENTARY 150 (2d ed. 2005) (“If a real risk [of the 
imposition of the death sentence] exists . . . Governments are prohibited from 
expelling or extraditing the person concerned unless the Government which 
has requested extradition provides a legally binding assurance not to execute 
the person.”), with Rep. of the Special Rapporteur of the Comm’n on Human 
Rights, Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, transmitted by Note of the Secretary-General, supra note 16, ¶ 51 
(“[D]iplomatic assurances are not legally binding, therefore they carry no legal 
effect and no accountability if breached; and the person whom the assurances 
aim to protect has no recourse if the assurances are violated.”), in Sultanov v. 
Russia, App. No. 15303/09, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 58 (Nov. 4, 2010), 
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?item=1&portal=hbkm&action=html
&highlight=15303/09&sessionid=90849272&skin=hudoc-en, also in Yuldashev 
v. Russia, App. No. 1248/09, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 70 (July 8, 2010), 
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?item=1&portal=hbkm&action=html
&highlight=1248/09&sessionid=90849272&skin=hudoc-en. It is not clear why 
this type of shift would occur. 
 32. In favor of the legally binding nature of assurances, MOUs and 
similar communications, see Rep. of the Int’l Law Comm’n, 18th sess, May 4–
19, 1966, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/186 and Add.1-7, 188, reprinted at II(2) YB. INT’L 
L. COMM’N 188 (1966) (“[T]he use of the term ‘treaty’ as a generic term 
embracing all kinds of international agreements in written form is accepted by 
the majority of jurists.”); Eduardo Jimenez de Arechaga, International Law in 
the Past Third of a Century, 159 REC. DES COURS HAGUE ACAD. 1, 37 (1978). 
See generally JAN KLABBERS, THE CONCEPT OF TREATY IN INTERNATIONAL 
LAW (1996); ARNOLD D. MCNAIR, THE LAW OF TREATIES 15 (1961). For those 
authorities not in favor of the binding nature of assurances and similar 
communications, see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF 
THE UNITED STATES § 301 cmt. e (1987); ANTHONY AUST, MODERN TREATY 
LAW AND PRACTICE 32–57 (2d ed. 2007); OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW 
1201–03, 1209 n.8 (Robert Jennings & Arthur Watts ed., 9th ed. 1992). 
 33. See generally Arbitration Concerning Heathrow Airport User Charges 
(U.S./U.K.), Award on the First Question, XXIV R.I.A.A. 3 (1992) [hereinafter 
Heathrow Airport Arbitration Award]. For a discussion of the divergent 
opinions of the United States and China in connection with communiqués that 
China believes to be binding and the United States does not, see Jerry Z. Li, 
The Legal Status of Three Sino-US Joint Communiqués, 5 CHINESE J. INT'L L. 
617 (2006). Li analyzes the countries’ interpretations of three agreements. See 
Shanghai Communiqué, Feb. 27, 1971, 66 DEP’T OF ST. BULL. NO. 1708, 435 
(1972); Joint Communiqué on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations, Dec. 
15, 1978, 79 DEP’T OF ST. BULL. NO. 2022, 25 (1979); Joint Communiqué on US 
Arms Sales to Taiwan, Aug. 17, 1982, 82 DEP’T OF ST. BULL. NO. 2067, 20 (Oct. 
1982). For further analysis of these agreements, see ZHU QIWU, ZHONGGUO 
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examine whether assurances and similar communications 
might qualify as treaties and then consider whether they might 
otherwise qualify as binding unilateral statements or 
subsequent practice.34
II. DIPLOMATIC ASSURANCES AS TREATIES 
 
The Vienna Convention provides that: 
For the purposes of the present Convention:  
(a) ‘Treaty’ means an international agreement concluded between 
States in written form and governed by international law, whether 
embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related 
instruments and whatever its particular designation.
35
 
GUOJIFA DE LILUN YU SHIJIAN [INTERNATIONAL LAW – THEORY AND PRACTICE 
IN CHINA] 368 (1998); MU YAPING ET AL., DANGDAI GOUJIFA LUN [MODERN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW] 474 (1998) (evidencing that China has recorded the 
communiqués in its domestic treaty register); John H. McNeill, International 
Agreements: Recent US–UK Practice Concerning the Memorandum of 
Understanding, 88 AM. J. INT’L L. 821, 821–22 (1994). 
 
 34. A preliminary observation is that law must be categorical in a binary 
fashion—either some act is legal or not legal—at least insofar as international 
law is currently structured. This is a fact which literary writers have 
frequently observed that binary categorization of situations with legal value is 
not satisfactory. See e.g., Mary Gaitskill, On Not Being a Victim: Sex, Rape, 
and the Trouble With Following Rules, HARPER’S MAG. (Mar. 1, 1994), at 35, 
reprinted in HERE AND NOW: CURRENT READINGS FOR WRITERS 167 (Gilbert 
Muller ed.,1998) (arguing that the categories of rape and non-rape are 
insufficient). This does not necessarily mean that obligations are truly binary 
in a moral or social sense—they rarely are—but it does mean that we can only 
apply them legally in that way, so every rule must be forced into either the 
obligatory or optional categories. The act of forcing a rule that might not be 
clearly obligatory or not into one of these binary categories is somewhat 
fictional, based partly on our degree of certainty that the norm is either 
obligatory or not. Our certainty is in turn based on the assessment of evidence 
pointing in one direction or the other. If we wish to move to a graduated 
system of obligation then we can, but it does not appear to be the case today. 
 35. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 2(1), opened for 
signature May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter Vienna Convention on 
Treaties]. See Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of 
Treaties art. 2(1)(a), Aug. 23, 1978, 1946 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Vienna 
Convention on Succession of States] (‘“treaty’ means an international 
agreement concluded between States in written form and governed by 
international law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more 
related instruments, and whatever its particular designation”); Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and International 
Organizations or between International Organizations art. 2(1)(a), Mar. 20, 
1986, 25 I.L.M. 543, 578 [hereinafter Vienna Convention on Treaties between 
States] (‘“treaty’ means an international agreement governed by international 
law and concluded in written form: (i) between one or more States and one or 
more international organizations; or (ii) between international 
organizations.”). 
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Most of the states to which a discussion of diplomatic 
assurances is applicable have adhered to this convention, which 
provides that agreements qualifying under its terms will be 
governed by it.36 Of the states which are parties to the 
diplomatic assurances discussed here, the following are also 
parties to the Vienna Convention37: Algeria38, Australia39
 
 36. It must be acknowledged that the Vienna Convention does not 
specifically purport to define what a treaty is. It merely provides for the use of 
terms for its own purposes. See Vienna Convention on Treaties, supra note 
, 
35. 
Additionally, the Vienna Convention applies only to agreements between 
states. This article exclusively analyzes the legal nature of inter-state 
diplomatic assurances, but an MOU could also be concluded inter-agency. See 
e.g., Memorandum of Understanding between the Secretaries of State and 
Homeland Security Concerning Implementation of Section 428 of the 
Homeland Security Act of 2002, H.R. Doc. No. 108-131 (2003) [hereinafter 
DOS-DHS MOU], available at 
http://www.nafsa.org/uploadedFiles/dos_dhs_mou_on_respective.pdf (effective 
on Sept. 30, 2003, in accordance with Report to the Congress on the 
Memorandum of Understanding Between the Secretaries of State and 
Homeland Security Concerning Implementation of Section 428 of the 
Homeland Security Act of 2002, 68 Fed. Reg. 56,519 (Sept. 29, 2003)) 
(providing a method to determine which agency would undertake tasks 
relating to visa adjudication, classification, admission documentation, refusal, 
and revocation; coordinating the issuance of legal advisory opinions; staffing 
consular posts and evaluating and training staff; and maintaining records 
databases). In these cases, the precise legal value of the MOU can also be 
questioned. See e.g., id. ¶ 14 (providing for a dispute resolution mechanism); 
id. ¶ 15 (providing for terms of modification of termination of the MOU); id. ¶ 
16 (providing for an “effective date”). However, the DOS-DHS MOU explicitly 
states that “[n]othing in this MOU is intended, or should be construed, to 
create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law by 
any person against the United States, or any of its agencies, officers, or 
employees.” although it does not say anything about Legal rights and 
obligations between the Departments of State and Homeland Security. Id. ¶ 
18. 
 37. The current status of states as parties to the Vienna Convention can 
be found on the UN Treaty Database. See UNITED NATIONS TREATY 
COLLECTION, 
http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetailsIII.aspx?&src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=X
XIII~1&chapter=23&Temp=mtdsg3&lang=en (last visited Apr. 5, 2012). 
Bosnia and Herzegovina succeeded to adherence since the former Soviet 
Federal Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia and its successor were parties. 
Although the Republic of China, now on Taiwan Island only, signed in 1970, 
the People’s Republic later acceded in 1997. Russia succeeded to adherence 
since the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics was a party. Slovakia 
succeeded to adherence since the former Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and 
its successor were parties. Turkmenistan acceded in its own right. The USSR 
was party to the Vienna Convention, but the successor states to the USSR 
largely regarded themselves as not succeeding to the treaty, with many of 
them later acceding in their own right. Armenia, Estonia, Georgia, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Lithuania and Uzbekistan are parties. Ukraine 
acceded in 1986 separately from the USSR. Since Azerbaijan has not 
confirmed that it has succeeded to it, we can presume it is not a party. There 
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Austria40, Belgium41, Bosnia and Herzegovina42, Canada43, 
China44, Colombia45, Denmark46, Egypt47, Germany48, Italy49
 
are also two other Vienna Conventions regarding treaties that are relevant. 
See Vienna Convention on Succession of States, supra note 
, 
35; Vienna 
Convention on Treaties between States, supra note 35, (not yet in force). 
 38.  See e.g., Moloud Sihali v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, (2010) No. 
SC/38/2005 (S.I.A.C.)[6]–[7] (U.K.); MT, RB, & U v. Sec’y of State for the Home 
Dep’t, [2007] E.W.C.A. (Civ) 808, [125]–[129], [168], [2008] Q.B. 533, 583–585, 
593; 
 39.  See, e.g., Amnesty Int’l, Dangerous Deals, supra note 13, at 33 n.3; 
 40.  See, e.g., Amnesty Int’l, Europe and Central Asia: Summary of 
Concerns in the Region, January-June 2004, Sept. 1, 2004, at 6 [hereinafter 
Amnesty Int’l, Central Asia] (regarding the case of Akhmed A., expelled to 
Uzbekistan). But see Amnesty Int’l, Dangerous Deals, supra note 13, at 18 
(noting that Austria appears to have ceased relying on assurances). 
 41.  See, e.g., M.S.S. v. Belg., App. No. 30696/09, Judgment Eur. Ct. H.R. 
(2011). 
 42.  See, e.g., Al Hanchi v. Bosnia & Herzegovina, App. No. 48205/09 Eur. 
Ct. H.R. ¶ 27 (2011); Amnesty Int’l, Bosnia and Herzegovina: 
Deportation/Fear of Torture and Other Ill-Treatment: Awad Aiman, AI Index 
EUR 63/004/2009 (May 6, 2009); Amnesty Int’l, Bosnia and Herzegovina: 
Forcible Return/Fear of Torture or Ill-Treatment: Imad Al Husin, AI Index 
EUR 63/005/2008 (Oct. 20, 2008). 
 43.  See, e.g., Suresh v. Minister of Citizenship & Immigration, 2002 SCC 
1, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 3 (Can.); Mahjoub v. Minister of Citizenship & Immigration, 
2006 FC 1503, [2007] 4 F.C.R. 247, paras. 39, 53 (Can. Fed. Ct.); Sing v. 
Minister of Citizenship & Immigration, 2006 FC 672, para. 6 (Can. Fed. Ct.). 
 44.  See, e.g., Amnesty Int’l, USA: Fear of Forcible Return / Fear of 
Torture / Fear of Execution: Uighers Held in Guantanamo Bay, AI Index AMR 
51/147/2003 (Dec. 4 2003). 
 45.  See, e.g., Klein v. Russia, App. No. 24268/08 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 21, 37–
40 (2010). 
 46.  See, e.g., Special Rapporteur on Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Report on His Mission to Denmark, 
Human Rights Council, ¶ 69, U.N. Doc. No. A/HRC/10/44/Add.2 (Feb. 18, 
2009). 
 47.  See, e.g., Mahjoub, 2006 FC at ¶¶ 39, 53; Youssef v. Home Office, 
[2004] EWHC (QB) 1884 (Eng.); See Agiza v. Sweden, Commc’n No. 233/2003, 
U.N. Doc. CAT/C/34/D/233/2003 (Comm. Against Torture 2005); Attia v. 
Sweden, Commc’n No. 199/2002, U.N. Doc. No. CAT/C/31/D/199/2002 (U.N. 
Comm. Against Torture, Nov. 24, 2003); Alzery v. Sweden, Commc’n No. 
1416/2005, ¶¶ 3.6–3.9, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/88/D/1416/2005 (Human Rights 
Comm. 2006). 
 48.  See, e.g.,  Gemeinsames Ministerialblatt (“GMBl”) 42-61, S. 877ff, sec. 
60(2)(3) (Oct. 30, 2009); Verwaltungsgericht Düsseldorf [VG] [Administrative 
Trial Court for Düsseldorf] Mar. 4, 2009, available at 
http://www.asyl.net/index.php?id=185&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=34308&cHash=51
8e0da6f1; VG Düsseldorf, Jan 16, Case No. 21 K 3263/07.A, available at 
http://www.asyl.net/index.php?id=185&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=33716&cHash=7a
95fe16d8. 
 49.  See, e.g., Saadi v. Italy, App. No. 37201/06 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 51 (2009); 
Ben Khemais v. Italy, App. No. 246/07 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2009). 
2012] DIPLOMATIC ASSURANCES 269 
 
Kyrgyzstan50, Morocco51, the Netherlands52, Russia53, Slovakia54, 
Spain55, Sweden56, Syria57, Tunisia58, Turkmenistan59, the 
United Kingdom60, Uzbekistan61, and possibly Azerbaijan.62
 
 50.  Maksudov, et al. v. Kyrgystan, Comm. Nos. 1461, 62, 76, 77 2006, 
¶12.5, UN Doc. CCPR/C/93/D/1461, 1462, 1476 & 1477/2006 (Human Rights 
Comm. July 30, 2008) 
 
 51.  See, e.g., In re Charkaoui, [2005] FC 1670, [2006] 3 F.C.R. 325, para. 
14 (Can. Fed. Ct.). 
 52.  See, e.g., HR 7 mei 2004, NJ 2007, 276 m.nt. AHK (Kesbir) (Neth.) 
(rejecting reliance on assurances); Ramzy v. Netherlands, App. No. 25424/05, 
Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 106, 126 (2008). 
 53.  See, e.g., Klein v. Russia, App. No. 24268/08 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 21, 37–
40 (2010); Ryabikin v. Russia, App. No. 8320/04 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 109 (2008); 
Ismoilov v. Russia, App. No. 2947/06 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 30–31 (2008); Shamayev 
v. Georgia, App. No. 36378/02 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 20, 62 (2005); Amnesty Int’l, 
Dangerous Deals, supra note 13 (discussing Spain’s extradition of Murad 
Gasayev, a Chechen, to Russia); Amnesty Int’l, Central Asia, supra note 40 
(regarding the case of Akhmet A.). 
 54.  See, e.g., Amnesty Int’l, Slovakia: Constitutional Court Upholds the 
Absolute Ban on Torture, AI Index EUR 72/005/2008 (June 27, 2008) 
(reporting the case of Mustapha Labsi in the Constitutional Court of Slovakia 
(June 2008), which rejected reliance on Algerian assurances). 
 55.  See, e.g., Amnesty Int’l, Dangerous Deals, supra note 13, at 25-27. 
 56.  See, e.g., Agiza v. Sweden, Commc’n No. 223/2003, ¶ 4.12 U.N. Doc. 
CAT/C/34/D/233/2003 (Comm. Against Torture 2005);  Alzery v. Sweden, 
Commc’n No. 1416/2005, ¶¶ 3.6–3.9 (Hum Rts. Comm., Nov. 10, 2006); 
Switzerland, see e.g., Khouzam v. Hogan, 529 F. Supp. 2d 543, 547, 565–66 
(M.D. Pa. 2008) (“Austria, Canada, Germany, Netherlands, Russia, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Turkey and the United Kingdom, all parties to [the Convention 
Against Torture], provide for judicial review of the reliability and sufficiency of 
diplomatic assurances.”); see also Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 604–05 
(2005) (indicating it is proper to consider the legislation of other countries in 
US Constitutional interpretation). 
 57.  See, e.g., Diplomatic Assurances and Rendition to Torture: The 
Perspective of the State Department’s Legal Adviser: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. On International Organizations, Human Rights, and Oversight of 
the H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 110th Cong. 1–2, 35–40 (2008) (discussing 
the torture of Maher Arar after transfer to Syria based on diplomatic 
assurances); 29-B DEPARTMENT OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN 
RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 2004: SYRIA 1979 (2005). 
 58.  See, e.g., Verwaltungsgericht Düsseldorf  [VG] [Administrative Trial 
Court for Düsseldorf] Mar. 4, 2009, Case No. 11 K 4716/07.A, available at 
http://www.asyl.net/index.php?id=185&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=34308&cHash=5
18e0da6f1; Al Hanchi v. Bosnia & Herzegovina, App. No. 48205/09 Eur. Ct. 
H.R. ¶ 27 (2009); Ben Khemais v. Italy, App. No. 246/07 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 26–
28 (2009); Saadi v. Italy, App. No. 37201/06 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 51–55 (2009). 
 59.  See, e.g., Ryabikin v. Russia, App. No. 8320/04 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 109–
19 (2008). 
 60.  See, e.g., id.; U.K.–Eth. MOU, supra note 6, U.K.–Jordan MOU, supra 
note 6, U.K.–Leb. MOU, supra note 6; Libya–U.K. MOU, supra note 6; Youssef 
v. Home Office, [2004] EWHC (QB) 1884 (Eng.); AS & DD v. Sec’y of State for 
the Home Dep’t, [2008] EWCA (Civ) 289, [2008] H.R.L.R. 28; MT, RB, & U v. 
Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, [2007] EWCA (Civ) 808, [125]–[129], [168], 
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Additionally, Ethiopia63 and the United States64 have signed 
the Convention but have not ratified it.65 By contrast, the 
following states which are parties to diplomatic assurances 
discussed here are neither signatories nor parties to the 
Convention: France66, India67, Jordan68, Lebanon69, Libya70, Sri 
Lanka,71 Turkey,72 the United Arab Emirates,73 and Yemen.74
 
[2008] Q.B. 533, 583–85, 593; DD & AS v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, 
(2007) Nos. SC/42/2005 and SC/50/2005 (S.I.A.C.); Moloud Sihali v. Sec’y of 
State for the Home Dep’t, (2010) No. SC/38/2005 (S.I.A.C.); Chahal v. United 
Kingdom, 1996-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 1831, ¶ 37 (1996); Othman (Abu Qatada) v. 
United Kingdom, App. No. 8139/09 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2012); Comm. Against 
Torture, Consideration of Reports Submitted By States Parties Under Article 
19 of the Convention: Conclusions and Recommendations of the Committee 
Against Torture, ¶ 4(d), U.N. Doc. CAT/C/CR/33/3 (Dec. 10, 2004). 
   
 61.  See, e.g., Ismoilov v. Russia, App. No. 2947/06 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 30–31 
(2008); Mamatkulov & Askarov v. Turkey, 2005-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 295 ¶¶ 28–31; 
and Yemen, see e.g., Abdah v. Bush, No. 04-1254 (D.D.C. Mar. 12, 2005) 
(temporary restraining order); Abdah v. Bush, No. 04-1254 (D.D.C., Mar. 29, 
2005) (prohibiting transfer of detainees to foreign jurisdictions without notice). 
 62.  See, e.g., Pelit v. Azerbaijan, Commc’n No. 281/2005, ¶ 4.8, U.N. Doc. 
No. CAT/C/38/D/281/2005 (Comm. Against Torture 2007). 
 63.  See, e.g., U.K.–Eth. MOU, supra note 6. 
 64.  See, e.g., 8 C.F.R. § 208.18(c); Yusupov v. Attorney Gen., 518 F.3d 185, 
189 n.4 (2008) (indicating assurances could be sufficient but not relying on 
them). 
 65.  Id. 
 66.  See e.g., Amnesty Int’l, Russian Federation: Rule without Law: 
Human Rights Violations in the North Caucasus, at 11, AI Index EUR 
46/012/2009 (July 2009) (Russian assurances to France). 
 67.  See e.g., Chahal v. United Kingdom, 1996-V Eur. Ct. Hum. Rts. 1831, 
¶ 37 (1996); Iraq, see, e.g., Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 702 (2008) (Iraqi 
assurances to U.S.). 
 68.  See, e.g., U.K.–Jordan MOU, supra note 6; VG Düsseldorf, Jan. 16, 
Case No. 21 K 3263/07.A, available at 
http://www.asyl.net/index.php?id=185&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=33716&cHash=7a
95fe16d8; Othman (Abu Qatada) v. United Kingdom, App. No. 8139/09 Eur. 
Ct. H.R. (2012). 
 69.  See, e.g., U.K.–Leb. MOU, supra note 6. 
 70.  See, e.g., Libya–U.K. MOU, supra note 6; AS & DD v. Sec’y of State 
for the Home Dep’t, [2008] EWCA (Civ) 289, [2008] H.R.L.R. 28 (U.K.); DD & 
AS v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, (2007) Nos. SC/42/2005 and 
SC/50/2005 (S.I.A.C.) (U.K.). 
 71.  See, e.g., Suresh v. Minister of Citizenship & Immigration, 2002 SCC 
1, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 3, (Can.). 
 72.  See, e.g., HR 7 mei 2004, NJ 2007, 276 m.nt. AHK (Kesbir) (Neth.); 
Pelit v. Azerbaijan, Commc’n. No. 281/2005, ¶ 4.8, U.N. Doc. No. 
CAT/C/38/D/281/2005 (Comm. Against Torture 2007); Mamatkulov & Askarov 
v. Turkey, 2005-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 295. 
 73. See, e.g., Lodhi v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, [2010] EWHC 
(Admin) 567, [62]–[67] (Eng.) (rejecting reliance on assurances). 
 74.  See, e.g., Abdah v. Bush, No. 04-1254 (D.D.C. Mar. 12, 2005) 
(temporary restraining order); Abdah v. Bush, No. 04-1254 (D.D.C., Mar. 29, 
2012] DIPLOMATIC ASSURANCES 271 
 
However, the Vienna Convention definition may not be 
limited to only those agreements undertaken by signatories to 
it.75 The convention’s terms have also been held to constitute a 
definitive definition of a treaty and have otherwise inspired 
domestic definitions of a treaty.76 Many terms of the Vienna 
Convention have also been found to restate customary 
international law, and while it is not clear that the convention’s 
definition of treaty is such a term, the International Court of 
Justice (“ICJ”) has reached a conclusion suggesting that it is.77
There are several elements of the Vienna Convention’s 
definition that, when met, demand that a given instrument be 
regarded as a treaty, at least for purposes of the convention’s 
rules on reservations, invalidity, and interpretation. Those 
elements are (1) that the agreement be concluded between 
States; (2) that the agreement be made in writing; and (3) that 
it be governed by international law. Additionally, in case of any 
doubt, two factors are specifically designated as irrelevant to 
this inquiry: (a) its form in two or more related instruments; 
and (b) its particular designation. 
 
 
2005) (prohibiting transfer of detainees to foreign jurisdictions without notice). 
 75.  See generally Certain Questions of Mutual Assistance in Criminal 
Matters (Djib. v. Fr.), 2008 I.C.J. Reps. 177 (June 4) (where neither France nor 
Djibouti objected or argued against the application of the Vienna Convention 
to their dispute, despite the fact that neither is a party). 
 76. See, e.g. Harksen v. President of the Republic of South Africa & Others 
1999 (A) (S. Afr.) (“The term ‘international agreement’, according to Mr. 
Seligson, is wider than ‘treaty’ and includes ad hoc agreements of an informal 
nature entered into between South Africa and other States. He referred in this 
regard to [art. 2.1 (a) of] the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969) 
as being declarato[r]y of customary international law and hence becoming part 
of South African law in terms of s 232 of the Constitution.”), aff’d, 2000 (2) SA 
825 (CC), reprinted in 132 I.L.R. 529, 541 (S. Afr. (A) 1999). See also Federal 
Law of Russian Federation on International Treaties of the Russian 
Federation, 1995, art. 2 (Russ.), in WILLIAM E. BUTLER, RUSSIAN LAW OF 
TREATIES 13 (1997) (defining “treaty” under domestic law as “an international 
agreement concluded by the Russian Federation with a foreign State(s) or with 
an international organization in written form and regulated by international 
law, irrespective of whether such agreement is contained in one or in several 
related documents, and also irrespective of its specific name.”); Constitutional 
Reform & Governance Act, 2010, c. 25 (Eng.) (defining “treaty” in the sense of 
treaties that must be laid before Parliament, as “(1) a written agreement — (a) 
between States or between States and international organisations, and (b) 
binding under international law.  (2) But ‘treaty’ does not include a regulation, 
rule, measure, decision or similar instrument made under a treaty (other than 
one that amends or replaces the treaty (in whole or in part)).”). 
 77. See Case Concerning Mar. Delimitation & Territorial Questions 
Between Qatar & Bahrain (Qatar v. Bahr.), 1995 I.C.J. Reps. 6 (Feb. 15); Case 
Concerning Mar. Delimitation & Territorial Questions Between Qatar & 
Bahrain (Qatar v. Bahr.), 1994 I.C.J. Reps. 112 (July 1). 
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A. AN AGREEMENT CONCLUDED BETWEEN STATES 
1. In General 
The first question is whether assurances amount to 
agreements at all.78 Not all pledges amount to agreements. For 
example, in the Nicaragua case, the ICJ held that the letter 
sent by Nicaragua to the Organization of American States was 
a “political pledge” only, without legal effects. However, before 
we jump to the conclusion that pledges and similar promises 
are not legally binding, we should observe that the ICJ appears 
to have reached that conclusion because the pledge contained 
no concrete commitments.79
 
 78. See Vienna Convention on Treaties, supra note 
 In short, Nicaragua did not agree 
35; Vienna Convention 
on Succession of States, supra note 35; Vienna Convention on Treaties 
between States, supra note 35. For purposes of this discussion we will omit an 
analysis of whether the entities are states or not. See e.g. Wei Wang, CEPA: A 
Lawful Free Trade Agreement Under One Country, Two Customs Territories?, 
10 L. & BUS. REV. AMS. 647, 656–57 (2004) (arguing that the CEPA does not 
qualify as a treaty because it does not satisfy the Vienna Convention 
requirement of an agreement between states). 
 79. See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua 
(Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶ 261 (June 27): 
However, the Court is unable to find anything in these documents, 
whether the resolution or the communication accompanied by the 
‘Plan to secure Peace’, from which it can be inferred that any legal 
undertaking was intended to exist. Moreover, the Junta made it plain 
in one of these documents that its invitation to the Organization of 
American States to supervise Nicaragua's political life should not be 
allowed to obscure the fact that it was the Nicaraguans themselves 
who were to decide upon and conduct the country's domestic policy. 
The resolution of 23 June 1979 also declares that the solution of their 
problems is a matter “exclusively” for the Nicaraguan people, while 
stating that that solution was to be based . . . on certain foundations 
which were put forward merely as recommendations to the future 
government. This part of the resolution is a mere statement which 
does not comprise any formal offer which if accepted would constitute 
a promise in law, and hence a legal obligation. Nor can the Court take 
the view that Nicaragua actually undertook a commitment to 
organize free elections, and that this commitment was of a legal 
nature. The Nicaraguan Junta of National Reconstruction planned 
the holding of free elections as part of its political programme of 
government following the recommendation of the XVIIth Meeting of 
Consultation of Foreign Ministers of the Organization of American 
States. This was an essentially political pledge, made not only to the 
Organization, but also to the people of Nicaragua, intended to be its 
first beneficiaries. But the Court cannot find an instrument with legal 
force, whether unilateral or synallagmatic, whereby Nicaragua has 
committed itself in respect of the principle or methods of holding 
elections. . . . It is evident that provisions of this kind are far from 
being a commitment as to the use of particular political mechanisms. 
Also note that the terms of the Vienna Convention defining a treaty as an 
agreement between states have been complemented by the Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties between States and International Organizations or 
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to anything.80
What it means for a country to make an agreement is a 
question that can be analyzed by reference to domestic contract 
law.
 The concept of “agreement” appears, therefore, to 
contemplate bilateral (at least) communication regarding a 
commitment. 
81
 
between International Organizations, which provides the same definition for 
agreements with international organizations. See Vienna Convention on 
Treaties between States, supra note 
 We can and should consider private law contract 
analogies in our analysis of the law of treaties, especially 
because every legal system selects certain agreements to be 
35. Arguably, its terms restate customary 
international law. 
 80. Also, the communication from Nicaragua was unilateral and, without 
reliance by any other state, did not satisfy the Nuclear Tests standard for 
binding unilateral statements. But see infra Sec. III (discussing the 
questionable nature of reliance in the Nuclear Tests cases). 
 81. Hersch Lauterpacht argued that we can look to private law to assist in 
resolving issues of international law, and the practice that has since become 
almost axiomatic. See generally Second Report on the Law of Treaties, 1954 II 
Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 
125, ¶ 10, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1954/Add.1; HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, THE 
FUNCTION OF LAW IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY 115, 205 (1933); 
HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, PRIVATE LAW SOURCES AND ANALOGIES OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW (1927). In the Second Report on the Law of Treaties, 
Lauterpacht cited Rose & Frank Co. v. R. Crompton Bros. Ltd., [1923] 2 K. B. 
261, 293 (Eng.): 
“To create a contract there must be a common intention of the parties 
to enter into legal obligations . . . Such an intention ordinarily will be 
inferred when parties enter into an agreement which in other 
respects conforms to the rules of law as to the formation of contracts. 
It may be negative impliedly by the nature of the agreed promise or 
promises.” 
Lauterpacht also cited Balfour v. Balfour, [1919] 2 K.B. 571 (Eng.): 
“[such agreements] are not sued upon, not because the parties are 
reluctant to enforce their legal rights when the agreement is broken, 
but because the parties, in the inception of the arrangement, never 
intended that they should be sued upon.” 
See also Wolfgang Friedmann, The Uses of ‘General Principles’ in the 
Development of International Law, 57 AM. J. INT'L L. 279 (1963); MCNAIR, 
supra note 32; WOLFGANG FRIEDMANN, LAW IN A CHANGING SOCIETY 383 
(1959). It is now commonplace to observe that many aspects of the law of 
treaties have come to us from principles of domestic contract law. See Law of 
Treaties, [1953] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 90, art. 1, comments, U.N. Doc. 
A/CN.4/63 (noting that a treaty embodied contractual elements). 
Admittedly contract law is not a perfect parallel to treaty law, so we must 
remain mindful of the important differences, but the parallels between 
treaties and private contract law have been highlighted many times.  See e.g. 
ANTHONY CARTY, THE DECAY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW?: A REAPPRAISAL OF 
THE LIMITS OF LEGAL IMAGINATION IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS (1986); 
SHABTAI ROSENNE, DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LAW OF TREATIES 1945–1986 
(1989). 
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legally binding and certain agreements not to be.82 Domestic 
contract law looks for a consensus ad idem83—an objective 
assessment of whether the parties agreed to the same thing. 
This assessment is, of course, partly a legal fiction;84 the 
interpreter of the instrument will look for evidence that the 
parties “said the same thing,” not for what they subjectively 
understood or intended.85
 
 82. See e.g. Herbert Bernstein & Joachim Zekoll, The Gentleman's 
Agreement in Legal Theory and in Modern Practice: United States, 46 AM. J. 
COMP. L. SUPP. 87, 88 (1998); Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: 
Extralegal Contractual Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 
115 (1992). In addition to agreements that are intentionally removed from the 
legal system, most legal systems also provide for contracts that are non-
binding despite their intent to be governed by law. See, e.g., Comm’n on 
European Contract Law, Principles of European Contract Law: Excessive 
Benefit or Unfair Advantage, art. 4:109 (1999) [hereinafter PECL], available at 
http://frontpage.cbs.dk/law/commission_on_european_contract_law/PECL%20e
ngelsk/engelsk_partI_og_II.htm (providing that a lawfully concluded contract 
is not enforceable in certain circumstances). 
 Proving intent to create a new 
 83. See generally FRIEDRICH KARL VON SAVIGNY, SYSTEM DES HEUTIGEN 
RÖMISCHEN RECHTS (1840). 
 84. See generally Anne de Moor, Intention in the Law of Contract: Elusive 
or Illusory?, 106 L. Q. REV. 632, 648 (1990) (‘“[T]he intent of man cannot be 
tried, for the devil himself knows not the intent of man.”’). It is arguable that 
knowing the intent of a state is perhaps even more difficult than knowing the 
intent of a man. Contract law in continental Europe is similar. For example, 
the PECL states that “[t]he intention of a party to be legally bound by contract 
is to be determined from the party's statements or conduct as they were 
reasonably understood by the other party.” PECL, supra note 82, at art. 2:102. 
 85. See Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 
457, 464 (1897): 
From the time of the Romans down to now, this mode of dealing has 
affected the language of the law as to contract, and the language used 
has reacted upon the thought. We talk about a contract as a meeting 
of the minds of the parties, and thence it is inferred in various cases 
that there is no contract because their minds have not met; that is, 
because they have intended different things or because one party has 
not known of the assent of the other. Yet nothing is more certain than 
that parties may be bound by a contract to things which neither of 
them intended, and when one does not know of the other's assent. . . . 
The parties are bound by the contract as it is interpreted by the court, 
yet neither of them meant what the court declares that they have 
said. In my opinion no one will understand the true theory of contract 
or be able even to discuss some fundamental questions intelligently 
until he has understood that all contracts are formal, that the making 
of a contract depends not on the agreement of two minds in one 
intention, but on the agreement of two sets of external signs — not on 
the parties' having meant the same thing but on their having said the 
same thing . . . . 
See also Jan Klabbers, How to Defeat a Treaty’s Object and Purpose Pending 
Entry Into Force: Toward Manifest Intent, 34 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 283, 305 
(2001) (“Nothing is particularly novel about a manifest intent test. One could 
argue that in many cases when trying to determine whether a violation of 
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obligation can be problematic, but courts and commentators are 
always attempting to discover the intent of the parties to 
agreements. A similar problem occurs in cases in which the 
international legal personality of an international organization 
is disputed and the organization’s constitutive instrument is 
silent on the question of personality. Courts address the 
problem by looking to what the constitutive instrument 
objectively did, rather than to the subjective understandings of 
its signers.86
Thus, the Vienna Convention’s requirement of an 
agreement should not be read to mean that a pledge cannot 
result in legal effects; rather it means that a mutual agreement 
to some commitment must be made before a communication 
may be called an agreement. It also does not mean that only 
synallagmatic agreements are agreements, as there does not 
appear to be any quid pro quo requirement in the Vienna 
Convention. Instead, the parties must simply, objectively, 
communicate an identical promise that in the future one or 
both will do a certain thing.  
 
If an agreement stating commitments if found, the next 
question is whether the assurances are creating new, 
 
international law has taken place, intent is ‘constructed’ or implied from the 
nature of the acts themselves’.  Much the same applies to reconstructing the 
terms of an agreement.  In the context of determining whether there is an 
intent to be bound by a treaty, a manifest intent test also is involved.”) 
(internal citations omitted) (citing Martti Koskenniemi, Evil Intentions or 
Vicious Acts? What is Prima Facie Evidence of Genocide?, in LIBER AMICORUM 
BENGT BROMS 180, 196 (Matti Tupamaki ed., 1999); FRIEDRICH V. 
KRATOCHWIL, RULES, NORMS, AND DECISIONS: ON THE CONDITIONS OF 
PRACTICAL AND LEGAL REASONING IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND 
DOMESTIC AFFAIRS 235 (1989)). Comparisons to finding objective intent in the 
field of tort law can also be drawn. See John Finnis, Intention in Tort Law, in 
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW 229, 229 (David G. Owen ed., 
1995) (“[Intention is] the linking of means and ends in a plan or proposal-for-
action adopted by choice in preference to alternative proposals (including to do 
nothing).”). See H.L.A. Hart, Negligence, Mens Rea, and Criminal 
Responsibility, in PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN THE 
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 136 (1968), for an argument that negligence is an 
emanation of subjective intent rather than of inadvertence. 
 86. See e.g. Tarcisio Gazzini, NATO’s Role in the Collective Security 
System, 8 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 231, 240–41 (2003) (citing IAN 
BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 678–80 (1998)): 
The Washington Treaty is silent on the international legal status of 
the Alliance. A specific norm in the constituent treaty, however, is 
neither sufficient nor necessary to establish the international 
personality of the organization. What needs to be demonstrated is the 
exercise, based on an autonomous decision-making process, of powers 
not limited to the national systems of one or more member states. 
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additional obligations, and are thus an agreement, or whether 
they constitute a re-statement of existing obligations that are 
obligatory by force of a different source of law. 
Several examples will illustrate the possibility that an 
obligation may be doubly owed by force of different sources of 
law. One way in which a subsequent, additional obligation 
might be incurred, in addition to the pre-existing obligation, is 
through the law of international organizations and the legal 
effect of their acts. A recent example is the Chapter VII 
resolution by the UN Security Council regarding the violence in 
Libya.87 In the resolution, the Security Council reiterated its 
referral of the situation to the International Criminal Court 
and established a flight ban, among other measures.88 It also 
demanded that attacks on civilians cease,89 and that Libya 
comply with its legal obligations under international law, 
specifically international humanitarian law, human rights law 
and refugee law.90
Another illustrative example of legal duties made 
obligatory by different sources of law occurs in the context of 
“umbrella clauses” in Bilateral Investment Treaties (“BITs”) 
and similar agreements.
 Of course, Libya was already held to those 
obligations under international law, notwithstanding the UN 
Security Council Resolution, but now it has the additional 
obligation under the UN Charter to comply with a Chapter VII 
resolution of the Security Council regarding those obligations. 
Its obligations were doubly owed, due to having been made 
obligatory by two different sources. 
91
 
 87. See S.C. Res. 1973, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1973 (Mar. 17, 2011). It is, 
however, doubtful that the Security Council finding that “the widespread and 
systematic attacks currently taking place in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya 
against the civilian population may amount to crimes against humanity” and 
the affirmation of the conclusions by other international organizations that 
“serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law . . . 
have been and are being committed in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya” is in any 
way binding on the International Criminal Court, the Court not being a party 
to the UN Charter, among other considerations. See id. 
 The language of such a clause varies 
 88. See S.C. Res. 1973, supra note 87, ¶¶ 6–12, 17–18 (regarding the flight 
ban); id. ¶¶ 19–21 (regarding freezing assets); id. ¶¶ 22–23 (regarding 
designated certain individuals). 
 89. See id. ¶ 1 (“Demands the immediate establishment of a cease-fire and 
a complete end to violence and all attacks against, and abuses of, civilians”). 
 90. See id. ¶ 3. (“Demands that the Libyan authorities comply with their 
obligations under international law, including international humanitarian 
law, human rights and refugee law . . . .”). 
 91. In the literature, these clauses are also referred to as ‘elevator,’ 
‘mirror’ or ‘parallel’ clauses, among other names. See Thomas W. Wälde, The 
“Umbrella” Clause in Investment Arbitration: A Comment on Original 
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from “[e]ach Party shall observe any obligation it may have 
entered into with regard to investments”92 to “[e]ach 
Contracting Party shall observe any contractual obligation it 
may have entered into towards an investor of the other 
Contracting Party with regard to investments approved by it in 
its territory,”93 and all the way to the extreme of “[a] 
Contracting Party shall, subject to its law, do all in its power to 
ensure that a written undertaking given by a competent 
authority to a national of the other Contracting Party with 
regard to an investment is respected.”94 Treaties also situate 
these provisions in varying sections, such as in sections 
providing for protections and commitments,95 or in sections 
divorced from specific obligations and dispute resolution 
mechanisms.96
The question that arbitral tribunals have to address when 
 That these provisions are slightly different from 
each other, and are stated in different contexts, suggests 
differing degrees of commitment. 
 
Intentions and Recent Cases, 6 J. WORLD INVESTMENT & TRADE 183, 185 
(2005); Anthony C. Sinclair, The Origins of the Umbrella Clause in the 
International Law of Investment Protection, 20 ARB. INT’L 411, 412 (2004). An 
example of such a provision in a multilateral treaty would be the Energy 
Charter Treaty. See Energy Charter Treaty art. 10(1), Dec. 17, 1994, 2080 
U.N.T.S. 100 (“Each Contracting Party shall observe any obligations it has 
entered into with an Investor or an Investment of an Investor of any other 
Contracting Party.”). 
 92. Treaty Between United States of America and the Argentine Republic 
Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment, 
U.S.–Arg., art. 2(2)(c), Nov. 14, 1991, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 103–2 (1993). See 
also Agreement Between the Lao People’s Democratic Republic and the 
Federal Republic of Germany Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal 
Protection of Investments, Laos–Ger., art. 8(2), Aug. 9, 1996, 2109 U.N.T.S. 32 
[hereinafter German Model BIT] (“Each Contracting Party shall observe any 
other obligation it has assumed with regard to investments in its territory by 
nationals or companies of the other Contracting Party.”). 
 93. Agreement Between the Republic of Austria and the Republic of 
Croatia for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, Austria–Croat., art. 
8(2), Feb. 19, 1997, 2098 U.N.T.S. 517, 529 [hereinafter Austrian Model BIT]. 
 94. Agreement Between Australia and the Republic of Poland on the 
Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments, Austl.–Pol., art. 10, May 
7, 1991, 1680 U.N.T.S. 235. 
 95. See, e.g., Agreement Between the Belgo-Luxemburg Economic Union 
and the Government of the United Mexican States on the Reciprocal 
Promotion and Protection of Investments, Lux.–Mex., art. 10, Aug. 27, 1998, 
223 U.N.T.S. 3, 21; Agreement on Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of 
Investments Between the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Socialist 
Republic of Vietnam, Neth–Viet., art. 3, Mar. 10, 1994, 2240 U.N.T.S. 355, 365 
[hereinafter Netherlands Model BIT]. 
 96. See e.g. German Model BIT, supra note 92, at art. 8. It is not entirely 
clear whether the placement of a clause and the section headings and 
groupings constitute context for purposes of treaty interpretation. 
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determining their jurisdiction under such treaties is whether 
such a clause serves to transform existing obligations in a 
contract between a state and an investor into additional 
obligations under a BIT. If so, any violation of the investment 
contract by the state would necessarily result in a violation of 
the treaty in addition to any violation under domestic contract 
law. Not all investment treaties include such a provision,97 so 
where one is included, its presence appears to be meaningful, 
suggesting a meaning beyond simply restating the binding 
nature of the contract. Scholarly opinion tends to favor the 
opinion that the clause creates new, additional obligations 
under international law.98 The case law of investment arbitral 
tribunals is divided, but there is an observable trend away from 
a very restrictive reading of these clauses toward a more 
expansive reading.99
 
 97. Compare Agreement Between the Government of the Kingdom of 
Sweden and the Government of the Republic of Albania on the Promotion and 
Reciprocal Protection of Investments, Swed.–Alb. art. 10, Mar. 31, 1995, 2087 
U.N.T.S. 291, 307 [hereinafter Swiss Model BIT] and United Kingdom of 
Great Britain and Northern Ireland and Argentina Agreement for the 
Promotion and Protection of Investments, U.K.–Arg., art. 2(2), Dec. 11, 1990, 
1765 U.N.T.S. 33, 35 [hereinafter U.K. Model BIT] (where it is included) with 
Agreement Between the Government of Hong Kong and the Government of 
the Republic of France for the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of 
Investments, H.K.–Fr., art. 3, Nov. 30, 1995, 2053 U.N.T.S. 221, 237 and 
Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of Peru and the 
Government of the Republic of France on the Reciprocal Promotion and 
Protection of Investments, Fr.–Peru, art. 2, 1992 and Agreement Between the 
Government of the Republic of France and the Government of the Russian 
Federation on the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments, Fr.–
Russ., art. 8, 1989; Agreement Between the Government of Hong Kong and 
the Government of Japan for the Promotion and Protection of Investment, 
H.K.–Japan, art. 2(3), 1997; Agreement Between the Government of Japan 
and the Government of the Russian Federation Concerning the Promotion and 
Protection of Investments, Japan–Russ., art. 3(3), 1998, (where it is missing). 
 Nonetheless, factors such as the clause’s 
 98. See Christoph Schreuer, Travelling the BIT Route: Of Waiting Periods, 
Umbrella Clauses and Forks in the Road, 5 J. WORLD INVESTMENT & TRADE 
231 (2004); F.A. Mann, British Treaties for the Promotion and Protection of 
Investments, 52 BRIT. YB INT’L L. 241, 246 (1981). But see Wälde, supra note 
91 (taking a middle position that only very large investments would suggest 
the exercise of sovereign functions); Charles N. Brower, The Future of Foreign 
Investment — Recent Developments in the International Law of Expropriation 
and Compensation, in PRIVATE INVESTORS ABROAD – PROBLEMS AND 
SOLUTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS IN 1975 93, 105 (Virginia S. Cameron 
ed., 1976). 
 99. See LG & E Energy Corp. v. Argentine Republic, I.C.S.I.D. Case No. 
ARB/02/1, Decision on Liability, ¶¶ 169–75 (2006); Noble Ventures, Inc. v. 
Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/11, Award, (Oct. 12, 2005), 
http://italaw.com/documents/Noble.pdf; Eureko B.V. v. Republic of Poland, 
Partial Award (Aug. 19, 2005), 12 ICSID Rep. 331 (2007); Sempra Energy Int’l 
v. Argentine Republic, I.C.S.I.D. Case No ARB/02/16, Decision on Objections to 
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precise text and location in the treaty instrument may play 
some role in particular interpretations, because each clause 
must be assessed on its own merits.100
This means that even where an instrument restates 
existing obligations, it may still constitute a binding agreement 
to re-impose those obligations under another source of law. 
 However, this individual 
variance does not detract from the general conclusion that a 
treaty provision creating an obligation of the state to observe 
undertakings can operate to create international legal 
responsibility for a violation of a contract with a private 
investor. 
101
2. Application to Diplomatic Assurances 
 
In other cases, however, an instrument might simply restate 
obligations that already exist under international law in a non-
binding way. Thus the instrument as a whole would only serve 
as a subsidiary source of law. 
The conclusion that additional obligations are being 
undertaken by givers of diplomatic assurances is borne out in 
state practice. Diplomatic assurances often contain obligations 
that are additional to and distinct from a state’s pre-existing 
obligations under international law. These additional pledges 
are often very clear—e.g. the obligation to permit monitors102
 
Jurisdiction (May 11, 2005); Waste Mgmt Inc. v. United Mexican States, 
I.C.S.I.D. Case No. ARB(AF)/00/3, Award, ¶ 73 (Apr. 30, 2004); SGS Société 
Générale de Surveillance S.A. v. Republic of Philippines., I.C.S.I.D. Case No. 
ARB/02/6, Decision on Objections to Jurisdiction, ¶¶ 130–135 (Jan. 29, 2004). 
—
 100. See SGS Société Générale de Surveillance, S.A. v. Islamic Republic 
Pakistan, I.C.S.I.D. Case No. ARB(AF)/00/3 (where the tribunal concluded 
that the section of the treaty where the umbrella clause was situated 
suggested that it was not an additional, enforceable undertaking). But see SGS 
Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v. Republic of Philippines, I.C.S.I.D. 
Case No. ARB/02/6 (concluding the opposite—that situation of the clause was 
not determinative). 
 101. See e.g. UNHCR, Manual on Effective Investigation and 
Documentation of Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment 
or Punishment (“Istanbul Protocol”), (Aug. 9, 1999), U.N. Doc. No. 
HR/P/PT/8/Rev.1 [hereinafter Istanbul Protocol] (restating obligations under 
international law regarding torture, although for purposes of this analysis, 
this document is assumed to be non-legally-binding). 
 102. See Alzery v. Sweden, Commc’n No. 1416/2005, ¶ 3.28, U.N. 
Doc.CCPR/C/88/D/1416/2005 (Human Rights Comm., Nov. 10, 2006): 
On 21 September 2005, Parliament's Standing Committee on the 
Constitution reported on an investigation that had been initiated in 
May 2004 at the request of five members of Parliament . . . . With 
respect to the assurances procured, the Committee was of the view 
that a more detailed plan for a monitoring mechanism had not been 
agreed with the Egyptian authorities and appears not to have existed 
at all prior to the decision to expel. This shortcoming was reflected in 
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and they indicate that some additional agreement is being 
reached already. Additionally, where diplomatic assurances re-
affirm existing international obligations, they usually contain 
very strong language normally reserved for binding 
commitments—e.g. that the assuring state “will” comply with a 
certain pre-existing obligation.103
 
the actual monitoring of the guarantee, which was not consistent with 
the recommendations issued later on by the UN Special Rapporteur 
on issues relating to torture or the practice established by the Red 
Cross. 
 A restatement of pre-existing 
obligations might constitute a new, supplementary obligation if 
the new instrument produces separate and independent legal 
Regarding the provision for an independent monitoring body, there is a 
discrepancy between the Libyan and Lebanese MOUs on the one hand and the 
Jordanian MOU on the other. The Libyan and Lebanese MOUs provide for it 
in the “Application and Scope” section while the Jordanian and Ethiopian 
provides for it in the “Understandings” section. In all three cases, though, 
there does not appear to already be an obligation under international law to 
provide for monitoring bodies, so it must be seen as an additional obligation, 
and thus an agreement to do something. See, e.g., Libya–U.K. MOU, supra 
note 6. 
An independent body (“the monitoring body”) will be nominated by 
both sides to monitor the implementation of the assurances given 
under this Memorandum, including any specific assurances, by the 
receiving state. The responsibilities of the monitoring body will 
include monitoring the return of, and any detention, trial or 
imprisonment of, the person. The monitoring body will report to both 
sides. 
See also U.K.–Jordan MOU, supra note 6, ¶ 4; U.K.–Leb. MOU, supra note 6 
at 2; XX v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, [2007] S.I.A.C. No. SC/61/2007, ¶ 
20 (Eng.) (Mitting, J.): 
Having clarified that the parties will comply with their existing 
international obligations and will permit the creation and operation 
of an independent monitoring body, the agreements proceed to lay 
out several obligations on the states – which are understood to 
already bind the states under international law – but here are 
affirmed to apply to circumstances where a person is being returned 
under the agreement. Each provision in turn uses the phrasing “will 
be afforded adequate accommodation, nourishment, and medical 
treatment . . . .” See U.K.–Jordan MOU, supra note 6,¶ 1 (“will be 
brought promptly before a judge”); id. ¶ 2 (“will be informed promptly 
. . . of any charge against him”); id. ¶ 3 (“will be entitled to contact . . . 
from the representative of an independent body”); id. ¶ 4 (“the 
receiving state will not impede . . . access . . . to the consular posts”); 
id. ¶ 5 (“will be allowed to follow his religious observance”); id. ¶ 6 
(“will receive a fair and public hearing”); id. ¶ 7 (“will be allowed 
adequate time and facilities to prepare his defence”); id. ¶ 8. None of 
these understandings appear to be simply political statements in the 
sense of Nicaragua’s pledges to the OAS in the Nicaragua case, but 
are instead statements of the parties obligations under international 
law, applied to the particular case. 
 103. But see AUST, supra note 32, at 27 (arguing that “will” is less 
obligatory than “shall”). 
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effects. The precise content of some of the additional pledges 
may be somewhat unclear,104 but objectively speaking it 
appears that states believe that giving an assurance imposes 
some obligations, additional to those already existing under 
international law.105
Some courts have agreed that diplomatic assurances create 
additional binding obligations. For instance, SIAC concluded 
that the MOU between Jordan and the United Kingdom did 
create its own obligations, so that it was not merely a 
restatement of existing international law.
  
106
 
 104. For example, what the steps are for investigating purported 
violations, See Othman v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, [2007] S.I.A.C. 
No. SC/15/2005, ¶ 505 (Eng.) 
 SIAC also noted 
It is right that the MOU does not specify the steps which are to be 
taken in order to investigate an allegation of a breach; indeed there is 
no provision for an investigation as such at all. Mr Oakden could only 
say that an investigation would be consonant with the MOU. 
However, in reality, if an allegation of a breach were made or if the 
Centre were to be hindered in the way in which it went about its work 
. . . the most obvious starting point for any diplomatic response would 
be to try to find out or to require that the Jordanians find out what 
had happened and to do so quickly. 
 105. See id. ¶¶ 502–03. 
Second, the level of scrutiny which Jordan has accepted, through 
giving another individual state with which it has close relations a real 
interest in the way in which one of its own nationals is treated, 
cannot but show that it is willing to abide by the terms and spirit of 
the MOU. The MOU was not the result of a desire by Jordan to obtain 
the return of the Appellant. It gives standing to the UK and to 
another body to intervene, ultimately through diplomatic measures, 
in what it has done or might do. It knows that a failure on its part to 
observe the MOU and the monitoring arrangements would lead to a 
diplomatic response at all levels and quickly. 
 
[H]ere there is a specific agreement, which has a specific purpose 
engaging the self-interest of the UK and, in differing ways, of Jordan. 
We accept that there must be a limit, albeit undefined, as to how far 
the UK Government would go in taking measures against Jordan in 
the event of a breach or a failure to investigate a well-founded 
allegation of a breach, or in the event of obstruction of the monitors. 
There is an obvious problem about the UK taking steps which would 
harm itself in the apparent interest of this Appellant. But there is 
scope and an incentive for measures to be taken by the UK and an 
incentive to take steps to obviate such a response on the part of the 
Jordanians. 
 106. See id. ¶ 176.  
The MOU is couched as a document the obligations in which apply 
equally to removals from Jordan to the UK, and to those from the UK 
to Jordan. Each is obliged to “comply with their human rights 
obligations under international law regarding a person returned 
under this arrangement”. A monitoring body is envisaged. There are 
eight specific provisions which govern the proper treatment of those 
in custody . . . . 
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that, in contrast to the MOU, the “side letter” on the 
enforcement of the death penalty did not have the same gravity 
as the MOU on compliance with other human rights norms.107 
It used the expression “formal undertaking” to refer to the 
MOU, but not to the “side letter.”108
In addition, the European Court also appears to 
contemplate the possibility that diplomatic assurances may 
create additional binding obligations. In general, the Court 
appears to consider diplomatic assurances as a part of the 
factual assessment of the risk of ill treatment, and on occasion, 
the Court has found diplomatic assurances to be insufficient. 
The Court’s position on the legally binding nature of 
assurances is more equivocal, but in some cases, the Court has 
suggested that real obligations may need to be undertaken in 
assurances in order to render them valid. In Saadi, the Court 
cited the text of assurances in that case given by Algeria, and 
found fault with them:
  
109
The note [verbale] in question, written in French, reads as follows: 
 
. . . - please give assurances that the fears expressed by Mr Saadi 
of being subjected to torture and inhuman and degrading 
treatment on his return to Tunisia are unfounded;  
- please give assurances that if he were to be committed to prison 
he would be able to receive visits from his lawyers and members 
of his family.  
In addition, the Italian embassy would be grateful if the Tunisian 
authorities would keep it informed of the conditions of Mr Saadi’s 
detention if he were to be committed to prison. 
. . . On 4 July 2007 the Tunisian Ministry of Foreign Affairs sent a 
note verbale to the Italian embassy in Tunis. Its content was as 
follows:  
“The Minister of Foreign Affairs . . . has the honour to inform the 
ambassador that the Tunisian Government confirm that they are 
 
 107. See id. ¶ 177. 
The side letter on the death penalty, whilst containing the UK 
Government's policy on return where execution is a significant risk, 
recognises that "for constitutional reasons" Jordan is not able to give a 
formal undertaking in the MOU itself. It records that if someone 
returned were sentenced to death, "the British Government would 
consider asking the Jordanian Government to commute the sentence". 
There was no formal response from the Jordanians; there was a 
debate over whether one had been expected. The terms of the UK 
letter had been discussed with them beforehand and agreed. 
 108. Id. The question of whether the agreement is governed by 
international law or not will be addressed in the section on that point. 
 109. Saadi v. Italy, Application No. 37201/06, Judgment, Eur. Ct. H.R.¶¶ 
51–55 (2008), reprinted in (2009) 49 E.H.R.R. 30 (ECHR (Gr. Ch.)); Ben 
Khemais v. Italy, Application No. 246/07, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2009), reviewed in 3 
Eur. Hum. Rts L. Rev. 450–54 (2009). 
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prepared to accept the transfer to Tunisia of Tunisians 
imprisoned abroad once their identity has been confirmed, in 
strict conformity with the national legislation in force and under 
the sole safeguard of the relevant Tunisian statutes.” 
. . . A second note verbale, dated 10 July 2007, was worded as follows: 
“. . . The Minister of Foreign Affairs hereby confirms that the 
Tunisian laws in force guarantee and protect the rights of 
prisoners in Tunisia and secure to them the right to a fair trial. 
The Minister would point out that Tunisia has voluntarily 
acceded to the relevant international treaties and conventions. ..” 
The Court held that the assurances were not sufficient because 
. . . the Tunisian authorities did not provide such assurances. At 
first they merely stated that they were prepared to accept the 
transfer to Tunisia of Tunisians detained abroad . . . It was only 
in a second note verbale . . . that the Tunisian Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs observed that Tunisian laws guaranteed prisoners’ rights 
and that Tunisia had acceded to “the relevant international 
treaties and conventions” . . . In that connection, the Court 
observes that the existence of domestic laws and accession to 
international treaties guaranteeing respect for fundamental 
rights in principle are not in themselves sufficient to ensure 
adequate protection against the risk of ill-treatment where, as in 
the present case, reliable sources have reported practices resorted 
to or tolerated by the authorities which are manifestly contrary to 
the principles of the Convention.”
110
This decision, and others like it, reaffirm the requirement 
that for assurances to even be considered in the assessment of 
risk to the person—i.e. to even constitute assurances in the 
first place—they must be individualized to that person or 
otherwise provide for specific promises regarding procedures 
and potential sentences in the particular case, which by 
implication is a pledge to respect that person’s individual 
human rights.
 
111
 
 110. Id. ¶ 147. 
 Where the assurances merely confirm already 
 111. See Kaboulov v. Ukraine, Final Judgment, ¶¶ 33–34, 113, App. No. 
41015/04, Eur. Ct. H.R. (Nov. 19, 2009), 
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?item=1&portal=hbkm&action=html
&highlight=kaboulov%20|%20ukraine&sessionid=89536360&skin=hudoc-en, 
(holding that the assurances, to be considering in reaching the factual 
determination of risk of maltreatment, must contain specific and explicit 
promises regarding the particular individual, not be merely blanket, non-
individualized pledges). Also see Khaydarov v. Russ., Application No. 
21055/09, Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 111 (2010); Klein v. Russ., Application No. 
24268/08, (Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 55 (2010); Hamraoui v. It., Application No. 
16201/07, Eur. Ct. H.R.,  ¶ 15 (2009); Bouyahia v. It., Application No. 
46792/06, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 16 (2009); C.B.Z. v. It., Application No. 44006/06, 
Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 17 (2009); Ben Salah v. It., Application No. 38128/06, Eur. Ct. 
H.R. ¶ 14 (2009); Soltana v. It., Application No. 37336/06, Eur. Ct. H.R.,  ¶ 20  
(2009); O v. It., Application No. 37257/06, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 18 (2009); Darraji v. 
It., Application No. 11549/05, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 35 (2009); Sellem v. It., 
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existing domestic and international obligations, there is no 
additional substance to the assurances. There was no 
imperative to act using mandatory language such as “will 
comply”. There was not even a statement by the state issuing 
the assurances, Algeria that it would comply with its own laws. 
The Court was quite right in holding that there was no 
agreement to anything. 
The European Court again considered assurances in MSS 
v. Belgium and upheld its assessment in Saadi.112
. . . The Belgian Government argued that in any event they had 
sought sufficient assurances from the Greek authorities that the 
applicant faced no risk of treatment contrary to the Convention in 
Greece. In that connection, the Court observes that the existence of 
domestic laws and accession to international treaties guaranteeing 
respect for fundamental rights in principle are not in themselves 
sufficient to ensure adequate protection . . .
 
113
The Court added that the content necessary must include 
an additional undertaking regarding the specific person. 
 
. . . Secondly, [the Court] notes that the agreement document . . . 
contains no guarantee concerning the applicant in person. No more 
did the information document the Belgian Government mentioned, 
provided by the Greek authorities, contain any individual guarantee; 
it merely referred to the applicable legislation, with no relevant 
information about the situation in practice.
114
Other courts and foreign affairs ministries appear to hold 
the same opinion that additional undertakings, beyond mere 
restatements of the merely pre-existing obligations of 
international law, are included in assurances.
 
115
 
Application No. 12584/08, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 18(2009); Cherif, Application No. 
1860/07, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 17, 26 (2009); Ben Khemais v. It., Application No. 
246/07, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 27–28 (2009); Muminov v. Russ., Application 
No.42502/06, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 12, 79, 97–8 (2008). 
 The conclusion 
 112. M.S.S. v. Belg., Application No. 30696/09, Judgment (Eur. Ct. H.R. 
2011). 
 113. Id. at ¶ 353. 
 114. Id. at ¶ 354. 
 115. See Gasayev v. Spain, Application No. 48514/06, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 2–3 
(2009) (observing that the assurances from Russia provided that the CAT 
Committee would be able to have private visits with the applicant); John R. 
Crook, ed., State Department Legal Advisor Testifies Regarding Diplomatic 
Assurances, 102 AM. J. INT'L L. 882 (2008) (providing transcript of testimony of 
John Bellinger before the US Congress). 
. . . [T]he Department may obtain arrangements by which U.S. 
officials or an agreed upon third party will have physical access to the 
individual . . . in the custody of the foreign State for purposes of 
verifying the treatment he or she is receiving. In addition, . . . we . . . 
pursue any credible report and take appropriate action if we have 
reason to believe that those assurances will not be, or have not been, 
honored. 
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to be drawn is that in order to constitute a fact that might 
overcome a risk of ill treatment, an assurance must contain a 
new undertaking, which is an agreement between the states.116
In sum, assurances can provide for additional, mutual 
pledges to do some act. Similar to pledges undertaken in 
umbrella clauses, those pledges are made in addition to already 
existing obligations under general international law and do not 
result in mere restatement. Furthermore, some of the pledges 
are new and not elsewhere covered by pre-existing promises or 
international law, such as the provision for monitoring bodies. 
These assurances then must be seen as new obligations that 
the parties have agreed to, and thus we have an agreement in 
the sense of the Vienna Convention. 
 
B. IN WRITING 
The second element of the treaty definition is that the 
agreement be made in writing.117
 
 116. Also see M.S.S. v. Belg., Application No. 30696/09, Judgment Eur. Ct. 
H.R.(2011) (Bratza, J., partly dissenting, at ¶ 12). 
 Assurances are issued in 
The diplomatic assurances given by Greece to the Belgian authorities 
are found in the judgment not to amount to a sufficient guarantee 
since the agreement of Greece to take responsibility for receiving the 
applicant under the Dublin Regulation was sent after the order to 
leave Belgium had been issued and since the agreement document 
was worded in stereotyped terms and contained no guarantee 
concerning the applicant in person. 
 
It is true that the assurances of the kind sought by the United 
Kingdom authorities in the K.R.S. case after interim measures had 
been applied and after specific questions had been put by the Court to 
the respondent Government, were not sought by the Belgian 
authorities in the present case. However, the assurances given in 
K.R.S. were similarly of a general nature and were not addressed to 
the individual circumstances of the applicant in the case . . . . 
Also see Ismoilov et al. v. Russ., Application. No. 2947/06, Judgment, Eur. Ct. 
H.R., ¶ 127 (2008) 
Finally, the Court will examine the Government's argument that the 
assurances of humane treatment from the Uzbek authorities provided 
the applicants with an adequate guarantee of safety. . . . Given that 
the practice of torture in Uzbekistan is described by reputable 
international experts as systematic . . . the Court is not persuaded 
that the assurances from the Uzbek authorities offered a reliable 
guarantee against the risk of ill-treatment. 
 117. Vienna Convention, supra note 35 art. 2(1); Vienna Convention on 
Succession of States in respect of Treaties, supra note 35 art. 2(1)(a); Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and International 
Organizations or between International Organizations, supra note 35 art. 
2(1)(a). Also see UN, TREATY SECTION OF THE OFFICE OF LEGAL AFF’RS, 
TREATY HANDBOOK 23–6 (2006), available at 
http://untreaty.un.org/English/TreatyHandbookEng.pdf (hereinafter “UN 
TREATY HANDBOOK”); IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 610 
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either written118 or oral119 form. It would appear, however, that 
oral agreements could nonetheless qualify as treaties where 
there is a written documentation of the oral agreement. In such 
a case, the written documentation of the agreement is binding 
in its own right, notwithstanding the legal force of the oral 
agreement.120
Clearly for those assurances that have been documented in 
public writing, the second element is satisfied. As noted 
above,
 
121
Lack of publication does present itself as an issue with 
respect to deposit or registration, however. Failure to deposit a 
treaty with a depository does not render the agreement non-
 however, many assurances are secret. In fact, 
assurances are often used for the very reason that they are 
secret; as well as because they are informal and are not subject 
to domestic, parliamentary scrutiny. The Vienna Convention, 
however, does not appear to require publicity of the writing as 
an inherent aspect of the written element of the definition of 
treaty. 
 
(1998). 
 118. See, e.g., Abdelhedi v. It., Application No. 2638/07, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 17 
(2009); Hamraoui v. It., Application No. 16201/07, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 15 (2009); 
Bouyahia v. It., Application No. 46792/06, ¶ 16 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 16 (2009); 
C.B.Z. v. It., Application No. 44006/06, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 17 (2009); Ben Salah v. 
It., Application No. 38128/06, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶14 (2009); Soltana v. It., 
Application No. 37336/06, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 20  (2009); O v. It., Application No. 
37257/06 Eur. Ct. H.R. , ¶ 18(2009); Darraji v. It., Application No. 11549/05, 
Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 35 (2009); Sellem v. It., Application No. 12584/08, Eur. Ct. 
H.R. ¶ 18(2009); Cherif v. It., Application No. 1860/07, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 26 
(2009); Ben Khemais v. It., Application No. 246/07, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 27 , (2009). 
 119. See, e.g., Shamayev v. Geor. & Russ., Eur. Ct. H.R. (2005) 153, 243 
(court considers oral assurances, supplemented by written assurances, as 
relevant evidence). 
 120. This assumes that the parties have the intent to reduce their 
agreement to writing. We can imagine a situation where a written document, 
e.g. a politician’s memoirs, personal negotiation notes or a secretly 
documented transcript of an oral agreement, contains a written agreement, 
but where the documentation in writing was performed against the will of the 
other party. We will limit our discussion in this paper to agreements where 
neither party argues that it was written without its consent. Surely in the 
cases of exchanges of notes the writing can be presumed to be intentional. 
 121. The secret nature of some of the diplomatic assurances is not, in itself, 
determinative of the statement’s legal value.  See e.g. Becker v. Préfet de la 
Moselle (=[Trib. de Sarreguemines] June 22, 1948 (Fr.) reprinted at Ann. Dig. 
321-2 (1948) (holding that an unpublished, and therefore confidential, 
agreement was still an agreement under international law). In one case, a 
court held that the secret nature of the assurances was itself a bar to their use 
since the court would be prohibited from examining them, and thus could not 
examine whether the non-refoulement obligation was overcome). Also see 
Khouzam v. Hogan, et al., 529 F.Supp.2d 543 (M.D.Pa. 2008). 
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legal, though it may have effects on the ability to cite the 
agreement before a dispute settlement body.122 Where certain 
documents have declared that they are not eligible for 
registration,123 some authors have taken this language to mean 
that the instrument was not legally binding.124 The Helsinki 
Accords are often cited as an example of this practice, which 
supposedly leads to a non-legally binding instrument.125 This 
conclusion is a stretch, especially since drafters have been 
known to include explicit language that an agreement is not 
legally binding when that result is sought.126
 
 122. Cf. Covenant of the League of Nations, art. 18, June 28, 1919, 
available at 
http://foundingdocs.gov.au/resources/transcripts/cth10_doc_1919.pdf (“Every 
treaty or international engagement entered into hereafter by any Member of 
the League shall be forthwith registered with the Secretariat and shall as soon 
as possible be published by it. No such treaty or international engagement 
shall be binding until so registered.”) with Charter of the United Nations, art. 
102, June 26, 1945, available at http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter 
(“[e]very treaty and every international agreement entered into by any 
Member of the United Nations after the present Charter comes into force shall 
as soon as possible be registered with the Secretariat and published by it.”) 
 Given that a more 
clear formulation that attempts to exempt an agreement from 
law is available, the statement that an agreement may not be 
registered should be taken at face value. It means quite simply 
that the parties to the agreement may not register the 
agreement, the consequence of which is that they might not be 
able to invoke the agreement in a dispute between them. It is 
true that states party to the UN Charter have an obligation to 
register their treaties with the organization, but the 
consequences of failure to register are not that the treaty is 
non-binding, but rather that the treaty cannot be invoked in 
 123. See, e.g. Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in 
Europe [Helsinki Final Act], Aug. 1, 1975, reprinted at 14 INT’L L. MATS. 1292.  
 124. See AUST, supra note 32 at 34 (substituting the language of “not 
eligible for registration under Article 102 of the Charter” to “not eligible for 
registration [i.e. as a treaty] under Article 102 of the Charter”) 
 125. See Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, Charter of 
Paris for a New Europe, Nov. 19–21, 1990, at 13, available at 
http://www.osce.org/documents/mcs/1990/11/4045_en.pdf (declaring the 
charter “not eligible for registration”). The conclusion that the Helsinki 
Accords are not legally binding because they are not eligible for registration is 
not particularly satisfactory. The condition states simply that the Accords 
cannot be registered; it does not say anything, other than an attenuated 
implication, about their legal value. 
 126. See e.g. Declaration on Trade in Services, Isr.–U.S., Apr. 22, 1985 
available at  
http://www.sice.oas.org/Trade/US-Israel/DECLARATION%20.doc (“the 
principles set forth below shall not be legally binding”). 
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the UN.127 Beyond this, there does not appear to be any 
obligation for states to otherwise publicize their treaties in 
order for them to be considered as creating legal rights and 
obligations.128
C. GOVERNED BY INTERNATIONAL LAW 
 But prohibiting registration does not necessarily 
mean that the instrument is non-legally binding. Based on this 
argument, even if diplomatic assurances are kept secret, as 
long as they are documented in some kind of writing, such as 
through the exchange of notes, they will satisfy this element of 
the treaty definition. 
A written agreement must be governed by international 
law in order to be a treaty,129 but it is unclear whether intent 
plays a role in this element. UN practice as a depositary of 
treaties does not seem to understand intent as an aspect of the 
“governed by international law” element in the definition of 
treaty.130 The European Union, on the other hand, appears to 
understand the opposite.131
 
 127. See D.N. Hutchinson, The Significance of the Registration or Non-
Registration of an International Agreement in Determining Whether or not it is 
a Treaty, 46 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 257 (1993); R.B. Lillich, The Obligation 
to Register Treaties and International Agreements with the United Nations, 65 
AM. J. INT’L L. 771, 772 (1971). 
 The ICJ specifically stated in the 
 128. Special Rapporteur, Second Rep. on the Law of Treaties, II YB INT’L L. 
COMM’N 126, ¶ 13, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1954/Add.l (1954),  (by Hersch 
Lauterpacht). 
[the Special Rapporteur] continues to believe that the mere fact of 
registration is not decisive. In particular, it cannot be admitted that 
the Secretary-General can be entrusted with the function of giving, by 
complying with the request for registration, the complexion of a legal 
instrument to something which otherwise would not possess that 
character. 
 129. Vienna Convention, supra note 35 art. 2(1); Vienna Convention on 
Succession of States in respect of Treaties, supra note 35 art. 2(1)(a); Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and International 
Organizations or between International Organizations, supra note 35 art. 
2(1)(a). 
 130. See UN TREATY HANDBOOK, supra note 117 at 61 
The term memorandum of understanding (M.O.U.) is often used to 
denote a less formal international instrument than a typical treaty or 
international agreement. . . . The United Nations considers M.O.U.s 
to be binding and registers them if submitted by a party or if the 
United Nations is a party. 
 131. See EU, TREATIES OFFICE, GLOSSARY, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/world/agreements/glossary/glossary.jsp?internal=true 
In order to speak of a “treaty” in the generic sense, an instrument has 
to meet various criteria. First of all, it has to be a binding instrument, 
which means that the contracting parties intended to create legal 
rights and duties. Secondly, the instrument must be concluded by 
states or international organizations with treaty-making power. 
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Qatar/Bahrain Delimitation case, that 132
The Court does not find it necessary to consider what might have 
been the intentions of the Foreign Minister of Bahrain or, for that 
matter, those of the Foreign Minister of Qatar. The two Ministers 
signed a text recording commitments accepted by their Governments, 
some of which were to be given immediate application. Having signed 
such a text, the Foreign Minister of Bahrain is not in a position 
subsequently to say that he intended to subscribe only to a “statement 
recording a political understanding”, and not to an international 
agreement. 
 
The two major figures in the debate over the role of intent 
to be “governed by international law” are Anthony Aust133 and 
Jan Klabbers.134
1. Anthony Aust 
 Generally speaking, Aust favors the intent 
element being determinative and Klabbers is against it. This 
paper concludes that both arguments have their shortcomings 
and neither is satisfactory. 
Anthony Aust argues, based on his considerable experience 
with the FCO, that there are a large number of agreements 
which he generically calls “Memoranda of Understanding” (or 
“MOUs”) that are made between states but which are not 
legally binding. Instead, they are merely politically binding, 
and thus are enforceable only through the diplomatic process. 
Aust argues that states demonstrate the practice of not 
intending to create international legal relations and therefore 
intent must be an element, albeit an implied element, of the 
definition in the law of treaties. Based on the massive volume 
of MOU examples supporting this practice, he concludes that it 
is permissible.135
Professor Jan Klabbers has expressed doubts whether the distinction 
between MOUs and treaties is legally valid . . . This sweeping 
assertion immediately runs up against the fact that when states do 
not intend to enter into a legally binding instrument they generally 
make this clear by a deliberate and careful choice of words. Klabbers 
 He states his position most succinctly in his 
response to the argument of Jan Klabbers: 
 
Thirdly, it has to be governed by international law. Finally the 
engagement has to be in writing. 
However, in the EU’s understanding the intent aspect is not a part of the 
element “governed by international law”, rather it is an aspect of the 
“agreement” element. As we will see this is not so different from the UN’s 
position after all. 
 132. Mari. Delimitation & Territorial. Questions (Qatar v. Bahr.), 1994 
I.C.J. Reps. 112, ¶ 27 (July 1). 
 133. See generally AUST, supra note 32. 
 134. See e.g. KLABBERS, supra note 32. 
 135. See generally AUST, supra note  32. 
290 MINNESOTA JOURNAL OF INT’L LAW [Vol 21:2 
 
argues that intention is not decisive. But to argue so ignores, first, the 
history behind the definition of treaty in the [Vienna] Convention . . . 
Secondly, Klabbers’ theory is incompatible with the basic principle 
that a sovereign state is free to exercise (or not to exercise) its treaty-
making power . . . Moreover, there is no principle or rule in the law of 
treaties or in general international law that requires that every 
transaction between states has to be legally binding, or, more 
particularly, to be a treaty. Thirdly, the hypothesis is just not 
supported by the extensive practice of states . . . Klabbers’ theory, 
though thought-provoking, relies heavily on academic writing, 
interpretations of judicial decisions and philosophical arguments.
136
There are, however, several shortcomings with his 
argument. Aust sets up a straw man argument with his 
assertion that “there is no principle or rule . . . that requires 
that every transaction between states has to be legally 
binding”. The problem with this argument is that it is not clear 
what he means by “transaction”. Certainly characterizing the 
relations of states in that way would lead to the conclusion that 
not all interactions in the realm of foreign relations are legally 
binding. “Transactions” could involve anything from the gift of 
a pen set to a visiting ambassador to inter-state loans. The 
difficulty is that we are not discussing “transactions”, but 
rather agreements to undertake commitments. Where there is 
no agreement to undertake a commitment, then, of course, the 
state is not legally bound. 
 
Aust is quite right to look to state practice, and there is 
considerable evidence of the practice of using assurances and 
similar communications.137
 
 136. See AUST, supra note 
 Certainly it is possible for this 
extensive practice to create customary international law that 
clarifies, or even amends, the definition of treaty in the Vienna 
32 at 49-51. Aust also notes that one of the 
principle reasons that states claim that an instrument is non-binding is to 
avoid constitutional requirements of parliamentary approval. This assessment 
comes dangerously close to permitting reference to domestic constitutional 
practice regarding treaties to be determinative of their value under 
international law. Whether an agreement is governed by international law 
should be determined by international law. See also Othman v. Sec’y State 
Home Dep’t, (2007) No. SC/15/2005 (S.I.A.C.), ¶ 500 (U.K.). This author will 
omit a response to Aust’s pejorative references to “academic writing” and 
“philosophic arguments” other than to wonder how either of these expressions 
constitute a critique. 
 137. See Nicaragua judgment, supra note 79 at ¶ 261; Border and 
Transborder Armed Acts (Nicar. v. Hond.), Juris. Ct. & Admission Application, 
Judgment, 1988 I.C.J. ¶ 69,  70 (Dec. 20); Land, Island & Maritime Frontier 
Dispute (El Sal./Hond.; Nic. intervention), 1992 I.C.J. 351, ¶¶ 99–101 (Sept. 
11); Sultanov v. Russ., Application No. 15303/09, Judgment, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 58 
(2010) (request for referral to the Grand Chamber pending); Yuldashev v. 
Russ., Application No. 1248/09, Judgment, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 70 (2010); Human 
Rights Watch, Still at Risk, supra note 13; NOWAK, supra note 31. 
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Convention; however, the practice of using these kinds of 
instruments began before the Vienna Convention was adopted 
and continues after, and parties continue to refer to the Vienna 
Convention in their dispute settlement. This practice does not 
suggest that the definition in the Vienna Convention has been 
significantly modified or eclipsed by custom. Even if it does not 
change the definition, it is also possible that this practice 
merely aids in our interpretation of the Vienna Convention 
definition as subsequent practice;138
The practice of states is far more equivocal than Aust 
presents it.
 however, that practice 
would have to establish agreement and it seems in many 
situations the parties were in disagreement about the 
normative value of the assurances. In any event, before we 
even reach these analyses, we might consider the practice and 
opinio juris, if any, that is being expressed and manifested. 
139 Although the FCO may be an exception, there 
does not appear to be “deliberate and careful choice of words” in 
all treaty drafting.140 On many occasions, states have indeed 
argued that certain instruments are not legally binding,141
 
 138. Vienna Convention on Treaties, supra note 
 
35 art. 31(3)(b). 
 139. However, Aust does cite, e.g., an instance of the inclusion of a terms in 
a treaty that claim to replace one MOU and preserve another. See AUST, supra 
note 32 at 33 (citing the UK-US Maritime and Aerial Operations to Suppress 
Illicit Trafficking by Sea in the Waters of the Caribbean and Bermuda 
Agreement, 1998, 2169 U.N.T.S. 252). 
 140. Perhaps many cases of complex, multi-party diplomatic negotiations 
with parties of varying degrees of legal sophistication prevented the careful 
choice of words in favor of deliberately vague constructions. It might be that 
the Helsinki Accords suffered this fate, though there is no evidence to suggest 
sloppy draftsmanship in that case. 
 141. See e.g. U.S. Dept. of State, Cable 10-PARIS-183 ¶ 1 (Feb. 17, 2010) 
available at http://wikileaks.org/cable/2010/02/10PARIS183.html# (emphasis 
added): 
French Environment Minister Jean-Louis Borloo told the Ambassador 
that the key to advancing climate negotiations is to drop the notion of 
a legally binding TREATY in favor of a system of national 
commitments . . . Borloo attributed the European obsession with 
legally binding treaties to its post-war history and experience in 
creating the EU by progressively ceding sovereignty via TREATY. 
U.S. Dept. of State, Cable N10-RIYADH-184, ¶ 11 (Feb. 12, 2010) available at 
http://wikileaks.org/cable/2010/02/10RIYADH184.html# ([Prince Abdulaziz 
told the Minister that Saudi Arabia had missed a real opportunity to submit 
“something clever,” like India or China, that was not legally binding but 
indicated some goodwill towards the process without compromising key 
economic interests]. U.S. Dept. of State, Cable 10-MADRID-174,¶¶. 8–11 (Feb. 
12, 2010) available at http://wikileaks.org/cable/2010/02/10MADRID174.html# 
(discussing the 1998 Washington Conference on Nazi Confiscated Art and 
2009 Prague Conference on Nazi Confiscated Art, and the US signature on the 
“Declarations of Principles” in the context of the Cassirer claim to a Pissarro 
painting; acknowledging the signature on the Declaration of Principles but 
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although they are frequently confused or deliberately vague, 
stating in the same document that an agreement is not legally 
binding, but then arguing that the agreement “authorized” a 
certain act and demanded “compliance”.142
 
stating that Spain could rely on its internal law to bar the claim – not possible 
if the agreement was concluded under international law – and seek alternate 
“creative solutions” amounting to “gestures to the family and to the Los 
Angeles Jewish community”); U.S. Dept. of State, Cable 09-KYIV-1942, ¶¶ 6, 
54 (Nov. 9, 2009) available at 
http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/11/09KYIV1942.html# (discussing “security 
assurances”) 
 There are several 
The first item Nykonenko raised during the one-on-meeting was an 
appeal for additional security assurances for Ukraine, beyond those 
the U.S. had provided in the 1994 Budapest Declaration . . . Legally 
binding assurances were best, he concluded, but he said he 
understood this was very difficult. 
 
Couch asked Nykonenko to explain why Ukraine needed additional, 
legally binding security assurances, . . . Nykonenko responded that 
Ukraine had no doubts about the commitment of the United States; 
however, Ukraine had serious concerns about Russia’s commitment. . 
. . Nykonenko explained that if the United States would agree to new 
security assurances with Ukraine, then Russia would likely agree to 
join in the document . . . . 
 142. See e.g. U.S. Dept. of State, Cable 10-THE HAGUE-7, ¶ 3 (Jan. 8, 
2010) available at http://wikileaks.org/cable/2010/01/10THEHAGUE7.html# 
(discussing the US-Dutch Agreement of Cooperation . . . . Concerning Access 
To and Use of Facilities In the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba For Aerial 
Counter-Narcotics Activities (“FOL”)) (“This bilateral agreement allows the 
USG access to and use of the Hato International Airport in the Netherlands 
Antilles and the Reina Beatrix International Airport in Aruba . . . solely in 
connection with aerial counter-narcotics detection and monitoring . . . .”); id. at 
¶2 (“The MFA has requested a letter signed by the Ambassador confirming 
that the U.S. abides by the provisions of the March 2, 2000 Agreement . . . .”); 
id. at ¶ 5 (“Nonetheless, the MFA [Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the 
Netherlands] has requested a letter from the U.S. Ambassador stating the 
airfields are only being used as authorized in the FOL Agreement.”); id. at ¶ 6 
(“Still, it is to our benefit to assist the Dutch Government to state explicitly 
that confirmation of compliance with the FOL Agreement has been received 
from the U.S.”); U.S. Dept. of State, Cable 08-MADRID-1280, ¶ 8 (Dec. 4, 
2008) available at http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/12/08MADRID1280.html#at 
¶ 8 (discussing the Agreement on Defence Cooperation (“ADC”) between US 
and Spain) 
The ADC provides us the extremely valuable use of two military bases 
in southern Spain midway between the continental U.S. and the 
theaters of operation in Afghanistan and Iraq. . . . By unfortunate 
coincidence, the ADC was already in the press in recent weeks thanks 
to MOD Chacon’s repeated references to her hope that the U.S. would 
elevate it to the level of a TREATY (septel). 
But see id. at ¶ 3. (“. . . El Pais published a February 2007 letter from the 
Spanish President of the joint Permanent Committee which manages 
implementation of the ADC, asking the U.S. section to confirm that the U.S. 
was in compliance with Article 25.2 of the ADC with respect to U.S. military 
flights to and from Guantanamo”); ¶ 9 (“When we do speak publicly on the 
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instances in which parties disagreed about the binding nature 
of the instrument.143
States are indeed negotiating and concluding agreements  
and inserting language in those agreements that is slightly 
different from the language of instruments that are more 
clearly considered treaties. But states are also not commencing 
legal dispute settlement following violations of MOUs.
 Given the extensive and rigorous nature of 
negotiating practice, this author can only conclude that these 
vague constructions on legal value are intentional.  
144 That 
language and practice, as well as the other practices Aust cites, 
does not necessarily mean either that the law of treaties 
includes an element of intent. Nor does it mean that states 
engage in a practice and demonstrate opinio juris that some of 
their agreements are not legally binding. The only practice and 
opinio juris that can comfortably be found based on this 
examination is that violations of diplomatic assurances do not 
result in a legal enforcement action.145
 
issue, our mantra is that we have not violated Spanish law and have complied 
fully with the ADC.”); ¶ 10: 
 It is not clear that this 
“Thus far, the MOD and MFA have done a reasonably good job in 
their public affairs efforts of making clear that they do not believe we 
have violated the ADC. The MOD issued a December 2 statement 
saying it knew of no U.S. military flights that were either illegal or in 
violation of our bilateral agreements (this echoes what MOD officials 
have told us privately -- e.g. ref b).”  
U.S. Dept. of State, Cable 08-TRIPOLI-308, ¶ 3 (Apr. 10, 2008) available at 
http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/04/08TRIPOLI308.html (discussing the 
military cooperation MOU between US and Libya) 
Section Six: Dispute Resolution Any disputes that might arise 
between the two parties regarding the interpretation or the 
implementation of this MOU shall be resolved through negotiations 
between the two parties solely . . . 
Section Nine: Entry into Force, its Scope and Termination  
1- This MOU shall enter into force upon its signature by both 
parties.  
2- This MOU does not include any provisions that entail 
commitments under International Law  
3- This MOU shall remain effective unless terminated by a 
mutual agreement, or by either party, upon 90-day written notice 
submitted in advance to the other party. 
 143. See Mari. Delimitation & Territorial. Questions, supra note 132. 
 144. But see Heathrow Airport Arbitration Award, supra note 33 (where 
the US claimed that an MOU was binding in arbitration). 
 145. See Hum. Rts. Watch, Still at Risk, supra note 13 (citing Written 
Declaration of Samuel M. Witten, Assistant Legal Adviser for Law 
Enforcement and Intelligence in the Office of the Legal Adviser of the U.S. 
Department of State, Cornejo-Barreto v. Seifert, Case No. 01-cv-662-AHS, ¶¶ 
11–13 (C.D. Cal. 2001) available at 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/16513.pdf. (“For example, in an 
October 2001 statement, a United States Department of State legal advisor 
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failure of enforcement means that there is no legal obligation.  
In addition, it would seem that the history of the definition 
of treaty in the Vienna Convention is not quite as clear as 
argued by Aust. Although the delegates to the Vienna 
Conference may have used the word “intent” on occasion, the 
context in which they used the word does not suggest the 
meaning Aust attributes to it.  
On first glance, the International Law Commission (“ILC”), 
the framers of the Vienna Convention, did not seem to embrace 
any notion of an agreement that was not legally binding, but 
the ILC’s final position is less clear. Hersch Lauterpacht, the 
Special Rapporteur, argued in his second report that the 
Vienna Convention project should have as one of its objectives 
the establishment of the legal character of obligations whose 
legal value had previously been questioned.146
 
argued that seeking, securing, and monitoring diplomatic assurances must be 
done on a strictly confidential basis, with no public or judicial scrutiny, in 
order not to undermine foreign relations and to reach ‘acceptable 
accommodations’ with the requesting state . . . .”). 
 It is questionable 
 146. Second Report on the Law of Treaties, 2YB Int’l L. Comm’n 126-27, ¶. 
14 (1954), U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1954/Add.l  
The Special Rapporteur has devoted further study to — and has to 
some extent modified his view on — this question for the reason that, 
in his opinion, the codification of the law of treaties ought to provide 
an opportunity not for devitalising such legal element as is contained 
in international instruments but for salvaging from them any existing 
element of legal obligation. There are, in addition to the types of 
instrument referred to above, other categories of treaties whose legal 
importance and beneficence may be jeopardized unless that principle 
is adopted. Thus the numerous agreements between the United 
Nations and the specialized agencies, as well as the agreements of the 
specialized agencies inter se, have been regarded by some as purely 
administrative arrangements of coordination devoid of legal 
character. It is not believed that that view is substantiated either by 
their content or form. The same applies to the numerous inter-State 
treaties for cultural co-operations; for technical assistance; for co-
operation between Governments and public international 
organizations of a humanitarian character, such as the Agreement of 
19 July 1950 between the United Nations International Children's 
Emergency Fund and the Government of the Republic of China 
concerning the activities of the former in China; and agreements 
relating to military co-operation by way of establishment of military 
missions and otherwise. (internal citations omitted)  
(citing, inter alia, Agreement relating to a naval mission to Haiti, Haiti–U.S., 
Apr. 14, 1949, 80 U.N.T.S. 38; Agreement for the establishment of a United 
States army mission to Honduras, Hond.–U.S., Mar. 6, 1950, 80 U.N.T.S. 72; 
Agreement concerning a military advisory mission to Argentina, Arg.–U.S., 
Oct. 6, 1948, 80 U.N.T.S. 92; Agreement relating to a military advisory 
mission to Brazil, Braz.–U.S., July 29, 1948, 80 U.N.T.S.112; Agreement 
relating to a military mission to Ecuador, Ecuad.–U.S., June 29, 1944, 80 
U.N.T.S. 284; Agreement between Thailand and the United States of America 
of July 1950, Thai. – U.S., July 1950, 81 U.N.T.S. 62; Basic Agreement 
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whether this goal was achieved, though the members of the 
ILC must have surely been aware of the problem. The ILC 
stated that “[t]he term ‘treaty’ is used throughout the draft 
articles as a generic term covering all forms of international 
agreement in writing concluded between States”,147
Although the term “treaty” in one sense connotes only the single 
formal instrument, there also exist international agreements, such as 
exchanges of notes, which are not a single formal instrument, and yet 
are certainly agreements to which the law of treaties applies. 
Similarly, very many single instruments in daily use, such as an 
“agreed minute” or a “memorandum of understanding”, could not 
appropriately be called formal instruments, but they are undoubtedly 
international agreements subject to the law of treaties.
 which, with 
Lauterpacht’s statement, suggests that the ILC meant to 
incorporate agreements of questionable legal value into the 
fold. In its proper context, however, this statement actually 
appears primarily to establish that the name of the instrument 
is not determinative; the ILC continues to state that: 
148
Also the ILC appears to clarify that there is no distinction 
in law between a treaty and a treaty in simplified form.
  
149
 
between the U.N., the Food and Agriculture Organization, the International 
Civil Aviation Organization, the International Labour Organisation, the 
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, the World 
Health Organization and France for the provision of technical assistance, Mar. 
20, 1951, 82 U.N.T.S. 174; Basic Agreement between the U.N., the Food and 
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, the International Civil 
Aviation Organization, the International Labour Organisation, the United 
Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, the World Health 
Organization and Colombia for the provision of technical assistance, Nov. 24, 
1950, 81 U.N.T.S. 190; Cultural Convention, Neths–U.K., July 7, 1948, 82 
U.N.T.S. 260; Agreement relating to the financing of certain educational 
exchange programmes, Fr.–U.S., Oct. 22, 1948,  84 U.N.T.S. 174; Exchange of 
notes constituting an agreement relating to anthropological research and 
investigation, Mex–U.S., June 21, 1949, 89 U.N.T.S. 4; Basic Agreement for 
the provision of technical assistance, Thai–U.S., June 11, 1951, 90 U.N.T.S. 
46). However, Lauterpacht’s argument to clarify the legal value of these 
instruments also appears to implicitly acknowledge that there are instruments 
that might not have legal value. 
 
Therefore, although the ILC appeared to refuse to recognize 
 147.  Draft  articles on the law of treaties with commentaries, Rep. of the 
Int’l L. Comm’n, 18th sess, May 4–July 19, 1966,  187–89, art. 2, cmt. 6; U.N. 
Doc. A/CN/.4/SER.A/1966/Add.l (1966).  
 148. Id.  
 149. Draft articles on the law of treaties with commentaries, Rep. of the 
Int’l L. Comm’n, 18th sess, May 4–July 19, 1966,  187–89, art. 2, cmt. 3; U.N. 
Doc. A/CN/.4/SER.A/1966/Add.l (1966).  
First, the treaty in simplified form, far from being at all exceptional, 
is very common, and its use is steadily increasing. Secondly, the 
juridical differences, in so far as they really exist at all, between 
formal treaties and treaties in simplified form lie almost exclusively 
in the method of conclusion and entry into force. 
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that a non-binding international agreement was possible, in 
fact, the ILC was simply distinguishing between forms of 
agreements, all of which are treaties. Although it does not 
provide for it, it does not exclude the possible existence of non-
legally binding agreements. Therefore, if an instrument 
qualifies under the Vienna Convention as a treaty, then it will 
be governed by those treaty rules. If it does not, then it may be 
a non-binding agreement. 
In the Vienna Convention commentaries, the ILC 
addressed the question of the intention of the state and 
whether intent was an aspect of the “governed by international 
law” element. The ILC commentaries state that the phrase was 
meant only “to distinguish between international agreements 
regulated by public international law and those which, 
although concluded between States, are regulated by the 
national law of one of the parties (or by some other national law 
system chosen by the parties).”150 By this language, the ILC 
appears to understand that all agreements between States are 
governed by some law in principle, the question only being 
whether the agreement is governed by national or international 
law. One finds no room for “political agreements”. Therefore, 
where an agreement clearly excludes domestic law, it must 
necessarily be governed by international law. The ILC observed 
that some international agreements would fall outside the 
definition in the Vienna Convention.151
 
 150. See Draft articles on the law of treaties with commentaries, [1966] 2 
Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n, 187, art. 2, cmt. 6, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1966/Add.l. 
The ILC continued: 
 Initially, this 
The Commission examined the question whether the element of 
“intention to create obligations under international law” should be 
added to the definition. Some members considered this to be actually 
undesirable since it might imply that States always had the option to 
choose between international and municipal law as the law to govern 
the treaty, whereas this was often not open to them. Others 
considered that the very nature of the contracting parties necessarily 
made an inter-State agreement subject to international law, at any 
rate in the first instance. The Commission concluded that, in so far as 
it may be relevant, the element of intention is embraced in the phrase 
“governed by international law”, and it decided not to make any 
mention of the element of intention in the definition. 
States can and do submit agreements between them to national law; however 
we must distinguish between an agreement under national law, and a treaty 
whose terms are interpreted or assessed with reference to some national law. 
 151. Vienna Convention, supra note 35, art. 3. The text reads: 
The fact that the present Convention does not apply to  international 
agreements concluded between States and other subjects of 
international law or between such other subjects of international law, 
or to international agreements not in written form, shall not affect:   
a. the legal force of such agreements;  
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understanding covered only unwritten, or oral, agreements,152 
but it later grew to consider agreements with or between 
international organizations.153 Even for those specific categories 
of international agreement that are exempted from the Vienna 
Convention, however, the ILC makes an effort to reiterate that 
they are still agreements under international law.154
When the negotiation of the Vienna Convention moved 
from the ILC to the Vienna Conference, the delegates had 
another opportunity to insert language regarding intent and 
the possibility of non-legal effects. As State representatives, 
rather than the independent experts that sit on the ILC, 
presumably the delegates would have had a stronger 
motivation to demand an intent element, if states truly 
understood that to be a part of the definition.
 Therefore, 
agreements will still be legally binding if they are oral and if 
they are between or with international organizations. Again, 
we find no room for agreements that are non-legal. 
155
 
b. the application to them of any of the rules set forth in the 
present Convention to which they would be subject under 
international law independently of the Convention. 
  
 152. See Draft articles on the law of treaties with commentaries, supra note 
150, art. 3, cmt. 1 (“The text of this article, as provisionally adopted in 1962, 
contained only the reservation in paragraph (b) regarding the force of 
international agreements not in written form.”); id. 2, cmt. 7 (“The restriction 
of the use of the term ‘treaty’ in the draft articles to international agreements 
expressed in writing is not intended to deny the legal force of oral agreements 
under international law or to imply that some of the principles contained in 
later parts of the Commission's draft articles on the law of treaties may not 
have relevance in regard to oral agreements . . . .”); id. art. 3, cmt.3.  
 153. Id. 3, cmt. 3 
The first reservation in sub-paragraph (a) regarding treaties 
concluded between States and other subjects of international law or 
between such other subjects of international law was added at the 
seventeenth session as a result of the Commission's decision to limit 
the draft articles strictly to treaties concluded between States and of 
the consequential restriction of the definition of “treaty’ in article 2 to 
“an international agreement concluded between States.” 
This understanding was also reflected in the discussion at the United Nations 
Conference on the Law of Treaties. See United Nations Conference on the Law 
of Treaties, 1st Session, Vienna, Austria, Mar. 26-May 24, 1968, 7th Meeting 
of the Committee of the Whole, at 36, paras. 5, 17, 55, 56, 68, 70, 72, 73 U.N. 
Doc. A/CONF.39/C.1/SR.63 (Apr. 1, 1968) [hereinafter Vienna Conv. O.R.]. 
 154. See Draft articles on the law of treaties with commentaries, supra note 
150, art. 3, cmt. 4. The article accordingly specifies that the fact that the 
present articles do not relate to either of those categories of international 
agreements is not to affect their legal force or the “application to them of any 
of the rules set forth in the present articles to which they would be subject 
independently of these articles.” 
   155. It should be recalled that supposedly non-legally-binding instruments 
had been concluded for some time prior to the Vienna Conference. 
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Some concern was expressed at the Vienna Conference that 
the ILC articles and commentary suggested that all 
agreements were subjected to either international or domestic 
law, without a choice for non-legal agreements.156 In the records 
of the Conference, it was suggested that the ILC omitted 
mention of intent to create legal relations because it was 
inherent in the phrase “governed by international law”.157 Some 
of the participants at the conference believed that states could 
reach agreements that did not produce legal effects.158
 
 156. See Vienna Conv. O.R., 5th mtg. at 24, para. 83 (Mar. 29, 1968) (“Mr. 
MUTUALE (Democratic Republic of the Congo) said that it would appear from 
the commentary that States were free to choose whether a treaty was to be 
governed by international law or by the internal law of a certain State . . . .”). 
 As a 
 157.  See id. at para. 63  
Mr. SMALL (New Zealand) . . . pointed out that the International 
Law Commission had regarded the intention to create a legal 
relationship as an essential element of its draft until 1962, but had 
since abandoned the idea of including an explicit reference to that 
intention. The Drafting Committee might consider whether such a 
reference was necessary; the New Zealand delegation believed that 
the element was already implicit in the phrase “governed by 
international law” in paragraph l(a).; 
Vienna Conv. O.R., 6th mtg. at 31, para. 26 (Apr. 1, 1968) 
Sir Humphrey WALDOCK (Expert Consultant) said . . . The only 
point regarding sub-paragraph (a) which the Commission had 
discussed at length was the question whether to mention the 
intention of establishing legal relations between States. The 
Commission had preferred not to mention that intention, as it 
believed that the words “governed by international law” were 
sufficient. He himself had some doubts on the point, since in many 
cases an instrument might have the characteristics of a treaty 
because of the intention with which it had been drawn up. Certain 
communiques now published at the end of important conferences 
were in fact agreements between ministers and had legal effects. 
 158.   See Vienna Conv. O.R., 4th mtg. at 21, para. 3 (Mar. 29, 1968) 
Lastly, the Chilean delegation thought it would be well to mention in 
sub-paragraph (a) that an agreement between States must produce 
legal effects. That idea had been included in the 1953 and 1956 drafts, 
but had been dropped from the latest draft. . . . [I]t appeared essential 
to include that idea in the definition, so as to distinguish between 
agreements between States which produced legal effects and those 
which did not and reserve the term “treaty” solely for the former. It 
often happened that declarations made on the international plane 
represented, like treaties, a concurrence of wills, but did not produce 
legal effects. Such declarations were often the preliminaries to a real 
agreement, which was concluded later when circumstances permitted. 
It would be dangerous to confuse them with treaties and to make both 
of them subject to the rules of the convention, thereby gravely 
restricting freedom of expression in international affairs. . . . 
Vienna Conv. O.R., 6th mtg. at 31, para. 16 (Apr. 1, 1968) 
Mr. RODRIGUEZ (Chile) explained the intended meaning of the 
expression “produces legal effects” in the Chilean amendment . . . [A] 
dividing line should be drawn between treaties intended to produce 
legal effects and agreements not intended to do so, even though they 
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result, some participants thought that the intention to create 
legal rights was crucial and was lacking in the Vienna 
Convention text.159 However, there was some understanding 
that establishing intent was often problematic,160
 
sometimes did. A definition of a treaty lato sensu, covering all 
agreements of whatever kind, would make the convention too wide in 
scope and might curtail the international dialogue which was the 
necessary preliminary to treaty-making. Some speakers had objected 
that the amendment was unnecessary because an agreement which 
did not produce legal effects was not a treaty. His reply to that was 
that if legal effects were implied in the term “treaty”, the definition 
should mention them. Others had maintained that the amendment 
would add to the text a condition for the validity of treaties. In fact, it 
was not a rule governing validity, which would be out of place in a 
definitions article, but merely a criterion for distinguishing treaties 
from agreements not intended to produce legal effects. 
 for, after all, 
 159.   See Vienna Conv. O.R., 4th mtg. at 21, para. 26 (Mar. 29, 1968) 
Mr. SEPULVEDA AMOR (Mexico), introducing the amendment . . . , 
pointed out that the International Law Commission’s draft omitted an 
important element, namely, the intention to create rights and 
obligations. That element had been present in the earlier drafts, but 
in 1959 the Commission had decided against including it in the 
definition of a treaty, on the ground that it would be preferable to 
omit any reference to the object of a treaty, since it was impossible to 
cover all cases. The Mexican delegation wished to point out, however, 
that the purpose of a treaty was to establish legal relations between 
the parties, which was not true of declarations of principle or political 
instruments such as the Atlantic Charter, which also constituted 
international agreements. The Mexican delegation therefore 
considered that the existence of a legal relationship between States 
which concluded a treaty should be regarded as an essential element 
of that legal act. (internal footnote omitted).  
Vienna Conv. O.R., 5th mtg. at 24, para. 65 (Mar. 29, 1968) 
Mr. ARIFF (Malaysia) said that the definition of “treaty” in 
paragraph 1 (a) was insufficiently comprehensive, since it failed to 
indicate the intention of the parties to a treaty. It was a generally 
accepted principle of municipal law that the intention of the parties 
was to establish a legal relationship, and he therefore supported the 
Mexican and Malaysian amendment . . . , with the possible insertion 
of the word “legal” before “relationship”. 
Vienna Conv. O.R., 5th mtg. at 24, para. 76 (Mar. 29, 1968) 
Mr. HARRY (Australia) said that one essential element of a treaty 
was the intention of the parties to create legal rights and obligations, 
and that was only implicitly suggested in the Commission’s text. . . .  
It would be preferable for the text to be more precise in the manner 
suggested in the first Chilean and the Mexican and Malaysian 
amendments. . . . 
 160.  See Vienna Conv. O.R., 31st mtg. at para. 64 (Apr. 19, 1968) 
Similarly, Sir Eric Beckett had claimed that there was a complete 
unreality in the references to the supposed intention. As a matter of 
experience, it often occurred that the difference between the parties to 
the treaties arose out of something which the parties had never 
thought of when the treaty was concluded and that, therefore, they 
had absolutely no common intention with regard to it. In other cases, 
the parties might all along have had divergent intentions with regard 
to the actual question in dispute. Each party had deliberately 
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if intent was so clear, then the parties never would have 
reached a dispute. An amendment by Chile to include intent 
language was proposed and debated,161
All of the foregoing does not mean that intent is entirely 
irrelevant. Although in the Qatar/Bahrain case, the ICJ held 
that the intent of the Foreign Ministers was not important 
where there is a “text recording commitments accepted by their 
Governments”,
 but was not adopted, 
suggesting, though not conclusively, that intent was not seen 
by a majority of the Vienna Conference delegates as necessary 
beyond what was inherent in the phrase “governed by 
international law” as drafted by the ILC, a phrase specifically 
acknowledged by the ILC to only contemplate intent to be 
governed by either international or domestic law. Upon 
signature and ratification or accession, none of the states 
parties to the Vienna Convention entered a reservation or even 
interpretative declaration concerning intent. In sum, it would 
seem that Aust is wrong about state practice and opinio juris, 
as well as the drafting history and background of the Vienna 
Convention definition. 
162
 
refrained from raising the matter, possibly hoping that the point 
would not arise in practice, or possibly expecting that, if it did, the 
text which had been agreed would produce the result which it desired. 
. . . 
 this is an assessment of the intent to reach an 
agreement, consensus ad idem. It is not the intent for the 
agreement to be governed by law or not, similar to the holding 
in Nicaragua regarding the “political pledge” to the OAS that 
See Vienna Conv. O.R., 1st sess., 33d mtg. at 164, para. 4 (Apr. 22, 1968) 
[Mr. SINCLAIR (United Kingdom)] . . . [T]he dangers of the 
alternative doctrine had been persuasively presented by Sir Eric 
Beckett at the Institute of International Law when he had stated that 
there was a complete unreality in the references to the supposed 
intention of the legislature in the interpretation of the statute when 
in fact it was almost certain that the point which had arisen was one 
which the legislature had never thought of at all; that was even more 
so in the case of the interpretation of treaties. As a matter of 
experience it often occurred that the difference between the parties to 
the treaties arose out of something which the parties had never 
thought of when the treaty was concluded and that, therefore, they 
had had absolutely no common intention with regard to it. In other 
cases the parties might all along have had divergent intentions with 
regard to the actual question which was in dispute; each party had 
deliberately refrained from raising the matter, possibly hoping that 
that point would not arise in practice, or possibly expecting that if it 
did, the text which was agreed would produce the result which it 
desired. (internal footnote omitted) 
 161. See Vienna Conv. O.R., 6th mtg. at 31, para. 16 (Apr. 1, 1968). 
 162.  Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions (Qatar v. Bahr.), 
1994 I.C.J. 112, ¶ 27 (July 1). 
2012] DIPLOMATIC ASSURANCES 301 
 
lacking an intent to agree to anything in the first place. This 
appears to be what the UN Office of Legal Affairs, Treaty 
Section, had in mind when it drafted the “Consent to be Bound” 
portion of the Treaty Handbook.163 Therefore, intent in this 
context cannot be determinative of whether an agreement is 
governed by law or not. The subjective intentions of States 
agreeing to treaties never have a role in interpreting the 
document. Were it otherwise, a signature and ratification of a 
treaty would not be definitive evidence of consent to the treaty. 
We can only look to the objective intent—i.e., to the document 
itself that the parties agreed on as the statement of their 
intentions. Therefore, it appears that intent—at least the kind 
of intent that Aust argues—is not an aspect of the “governed by 
international law” element, but rather an aspect of the 
“agreement” element. With respect to the “governed by 
international law” element, as the ILC states, intent is relevant 
only to whether the agreement is governed by international or 
domestic law.164
Aust clearly believes that States create international law, 
not the reverse. Since States created the law, the law is their 
creation, not a system that permeates (and perhaps precedes) 
everything they do. States are the masters of the law. Indeed 
Aust is correct to note that a sovereign state is free to enter 
into a treaty or not, but when a state has objectively concluded 
a treaty, the state is not then free to argue its sovereignty as an 
excuse. States are not “sovereign” to that degree or in that 
way.
 
165
 
 163. The Office of Legal Affairs does not appear to linger on the legally of 
the rights and obligations as something the state can entertain intent about, 
rather the state can only entertain intent to become a party to the agreement 
or not. We can see that the positions of the EU and UN are thus essentially 
the same. See UN TREATY HANDBOOK, supra note 
 
117 at 8, § 3.3.1 
In order to become a party to a multilateral treaty, a State must 
demonstrate, through a concrete act, its willingness to undertake the 
legal rights and obligations contained in the treaty. In other words, it 
must express its consent to be bound by the treaty. A State can 
express its consent to be bound in several ways, in accordance with 
the final clauses of the relevant treaty. . . .  
 164. U.S. v. Pileggi conceivably supports this proposition. U.S. v. Pileggi, 
No. 08-4237, 2010 WL 235144, at *476 n. 2 (4th Cir., Jan. 20, 2010) (“Both 
parties agree that diplomatic assurances reflecting agreement between parties 
to an extradition treaty are to be enforced by the courts.”). 
 165. We are forced to wonder what Aust’s position would be regarding the 
solemn assurances that Hissène Habré would be prohibited from travelling 
Senegal offered to Belgium, and apparently to the ICJ itself, in court session 
in the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite case. The court was unclear about 
the value it attached to the Senegalese assurance. Although the order of the 
court seems to consider the assurance a fact in the context of preliminary 
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The difficulty with such an extreme consent hypothesis is 
that, like many other theories, it creates an abstract “first 
world” existing prior to the creation of the first law. It would 
argue that states are not only the masters of the law, but they 
are even pre-legal entities. While history does matter in the 
 
measures (“there does not exist . . . any urgency”), the separate opinion of 
Koroma and Yusuf suggests it was viewed as a legal obligation assumed by 
that state comparable to an order of the Court. Compare Questions Relating to 
the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belg. v. Senegal), Order, 2009 I.C.J. 
139, ¶¶ 68, 69, 71, 73 (May 28) 
whereas the Co-Agent of Senegal, at the end of the hearings, solemnly 
declared, in response to a question put by a Member of the Court, the 
following: 
“Senegal will not allow Mr. Habré to leave Senegal while the present 
case is pending before the Court. Senegal has not the intention to 
allow Mr. Habré to leave the territory while the present case is 
pending before the Court.” 
 
Whereas the Co-Agent of Belgium, making clear that he spoke in the 
name of his Government, asserted at the hearings, in response to a 
question put by a Member of the Court, that such a solemn 
declaration given by the Agent of Senegal, in the name of his 
Government, to the effect that the latter would not allow Mr. Habré 
to leave Senegalese territory while the present case was pending 
before the Court, could be sufficient for Belgium to consider that its 
Request for the indication of provisional measures no longer had any 
object, provided that certain conditions were fulfilled . . . .  
 
Whereas the Court further notes that Senegal, both proprio motu and 
in response to a question put by a Member of the Court, gave a formal 
assurance on several occasions during the hearings that it will not 
allow Mr. Habré to leave its territory before the Court has given its 
final decision; 
 
Whereas the Court concludes from the foregoing that there does not 
exist, in the circumstances of the present case, any urgency to justify 
the indication of provisional measures by the Court; 
with id. (separate opinion of judges Koroma and Yusuf) at ¶ 10. 
In our view, Senegal’s solemn declaration . . . preserves the rights of 
the Parties and ensures against the risk of irreparable prejudice in 
exactly the same way as would an order indicating provisional 
measures. Accordingly, the purpose of Belgium’s request for the 
indication of provisional measures having been served, there was no 
further need for the Court to examine the judicial measure requested 
by Belgium. In our view, the Court should simply have declared that 
following the declaration by Senegal the request for the indication of 
provisional measures had ceased to have any object. 
Also see South West Africa cases (Ethiop. v. S.Afr.; Liber. v. S. Afr.), Prelim. 
Objs., Judgment, 1962 I.C.J. Reps. 319, 418 (Dec. 21) (Jessup, J. Sep. Op.) 
(“Surely a formal pledge of the kind just quoted made by the representative of 
a State to the Assembly of the League also constituted a binding international 
obligation. As quoted above from McNair, Law of Treaties, ‘a declaration 
contained in the minutes of a conference’ may embody a binding international 
engagement.”) 
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assessment of norms, a hypothetical history that probably 
never existed could confuse more than it clarifies.  Was there 
really ever a situation of neighboring States, in the modern 
sense of “State”, that one day decided to invent international 
law and conclude the first treaty? If not, and it is most likely 
not the case, then the theoretical exercise becomes “academic”, 
in the pejorative sense of that word. We should consider an 
analysis that begins with the common and contemporaneous 
development of modern states alongside international law, 
admitting that the label “international law” is a retroactive 
characterization of the relationships those proto-states had, 
precisely insofar as the label “state” is suffering the same 
weakness. Aust refuses to see that a legal conclusion can be 
assessed by a third-party, even a law professor, though without 
direct and immediate consequences. As such he embraces a 
kind of legal nihilism about international law that seems 
typical of officers of ministries of foreign affairs. 
Although it is commonly stated that international law 
emanates from the will of states,166 that absolute notion is not 
so easily theoretically reconciled with international law in 
practice.167 Acknowledging the freedom of treaty, the question is 
not sovereignty, but whether the state has objectively 
concluded a treaty. Deliberate and careful words have failed 
many a drafter. Consider, for example, the influence of the 
Draft Articles on State Responsibility. In Article 3 of the Draft 
Articles, the ILC adopted the following text: “The 
characterization of an act of a State as internationally wrongful 
is governed by international law. Such characterization is not 
affected by the characterization of the same act as lawful by 
internal law.”168 Although this provision is simply a 
restatement that internal law of a state is no defense,169
 
 166. The leading illustration of this consent continues to be S.S. “Lotus” 
(Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10 (Sept. 7) (holding that international 
legal rules emanate from the free will of states). 
 it 
 167.  See CHARLES G. FENWICK, INTERNATIONAL LAW 36 (4th ed., 1965) 
(“[consent is] inadequate to explain the assumption upon which governments 
appear to have acted from the beginning of international law”). See generally 
MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY TO UTOPIA: THE STRUCTURE OF 
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ARGUMENT (1989); DAVID KENNEDY, INTERNATIONAL 
LEGAL STRUCTURES (1987) (focusing on relationships among doctrines and 
arguments and their recurring theoretical structure). 
 168. See Draft articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally 
Wrongful Acts, with commentaries, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001), reprinted in 
[2007] 2-II Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 31, U.N. DOC. A/CN.4/SER.A/2001/ADD.1 
(PART 2). 
 169. See e.g. id. at art. 3, comm. (1) (“Secondly and most importantly, a 
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appears to inherently contemplate that all acts of states are 
governed by international law and are tested for compliance 
with international law. It could be argued that there is an 
implicit exception for those acts that are not acts of state or 
acts that are submitted to the exclusive competence of internal 
law, but the latter argument is difficult to sustain. In sum, the 
intent of a State for an instrument to be governed by 
international law cannot be the sole determinant of the legal 
value of the agreement. If a state concludes an agreement that 
is expressly legally binding, then that state could never succeed 
in arguing that it did not intend for that result. The document 
speaks for itself. 
2. Jan Klabbers 
Jan Klabbers has countered Aust’s argument.170
Klabbers is quite right to argue that there is no separate 
regime from international law and that the Permanent Court of 
International Justice (“PCIJ”) and ICJ have held that similar 
agreements are enforceable at law.
 He argues 
that if MOUs are not undertaken in the system of international 
law, but rather international politics, then international 
politics must be a separate regime from law. He concludes that 
there is no evidence of this regime, and no evidence that, if 
there was one, its rules would be any different from the rules of 
international law. Additionally, he argues that the consistent 
case law of international tribunals, chiefly the ICJ, 
demonstrates that agreements are binding and enforceable at 
international law, sometimes regardless of the legal force the 
parties intended. 
171
 
State cannot, by pleading that its conduct conforms to the provisions of its 
internal law, escape the characterization of that conduct as wrongful by 
international law.”); Vienna Convention, art. 27 (“A party may not invoke the 
provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty . 
. . .”); Treatment of Polish Nationals and Other Persons of Polish Origin or 
Speech in the Danzig Territory, Advisory Opinion, 1932 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 
44, at 4, 24, 25 (Feb. 4).  
 However, the 
 170. See generally KLABBERS, supra note 32 (favoring the legally binding 
nature of assurances, MOUs and similar communications).  
 171. See Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions, supra note 162 
¶ 27 (July 1) (rejecting the inquiry into the intentions of the Foreign Ministers 
in signing the “Minutes”); Land, Island & Maritime Frontier Dispute (El 
Salv./Hond.; Nic. interv.), 1992 I.C.J. 351 (Sept. 11) (finding the boundary 
agreement binding even though El Salvador had only signed ad referendum); 
Border and Transborder Armed Actions. (Nic. v. Hond.), Jurisdiction and 
Admissibility, Judgment, 1988 I.C.J. 69 (Dec. 20) (seeming to regard the 
Cancun Declaration as legally binding); Continental Shelf (Tunis./Libya), 1982 
I.C.J. 70, ¶¶ 93–95 (Feb. 24); Aegean Sea Continental Shelf Case (Greece v. 
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International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea appears to have 
held the opposite.172 It does not appear that Aust is actually 
arguing in favor of an alternate regime, but rather, implicitly, 
that all legal systems choose which agreements are enforceable 
at law and which are not. Aust is quite right in this assertion. 
For example, in common law systems some “contracts” are not 
enforceable, regardless of their status as an agreement, if they 
lack consideration. These kinds of agreements have only moral 
force, not legal force. Aust does not so clearly make this 
argument, although it can inferred from his writing. The 
difficulty is that international law is not so easily assimilated 
to municipal law that has this legal and non-legal distinction 
between types of agreements.173
Furthermore, Klabbers appears to believe, diametrically 
opposed to Aust, that international law governs States, 
regardless of whether they created it or not. The law now exists 
as a system and governs the international relations of States, 
even if States can modify it and change it. Arguably, States are 
the slaves to the law. The problem with master-slave analogies 
is that they are quickly prone to Hegelian breakdown. Arguing 
that states are slaves or masters of international law is 
unhelpful and has been shown through modern legal 
scholarship to be fruitless.
 This question will be addressed 
in more detail in the section below regarding private law 
analogies and intent. 
174
 
Turk.), Jurisdiction, 1978 I.C.J. 3 (Dec. 19) (no rule prohibiting a joint 
communiqué from being a legally binding instrument). 
 This author takes the perspective 
that States and international law developed into modern 
notions of States and law in concert (or alongside one another – 
in opposition to each other if the reader is prone to a Hobbesian 
view of the world). States are simultaneously master and slave. 
 172.  See Disp. Concerning Delimit. Of the Marit. Boundary Betw. 
Bangladesh & Myanmar in the Bay of Bengal (Bangl./Myan.), Case No. 16, 
Judgment, paras. 92–5 (Int’l Trib. Law Sea, Mar. 14, 2012) (where the signed 
“Agreed Minutes” were held not to be a treaty, partly because of the gravity of 
the subject matter of the minutes which suggesting that the parties could not 
have intended to create legal obligations).  
 173. We are reminded of Judge McNair’s caution about transposing 
municipal legal principles into international law “lock, stock and barrel”. See 
International Status of South-West Africa, Advisory Opinion, 1950 I.C. J. 128, 
148 (July 11):  
The way in which international law borrows from this source is not by 
means of importing private law institutions ‘lock, stock and barrel’, 
ready-made and fully equipped with a set of rules. It would be 
difficult to reconcile such a process with the application of ‘the general 
principles of law.’  
 174. See KOSKENNIEMI, supra note 167, at 265–66. 
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They create international law by act of will, but also submit 
themselves to it. Although holding such cognitive dissonance is 
not pleasant, it seems to best capture the essence of the 
international legal system. As a result the international legal 
system, to the degree to which we can call it a system, 
paradoxically accommodates the sovereign prerogatives of 
states while still demanding compliance. 
 The difficulty for Klabbers is that even if MOUs contain 
legal obligations, they have no enforcement mechanism. Does 
that not mean that the obligation is removed from law? And 
what shall we make of provisions that expressly state that the 
MOU is not governed by international law? Can these 
declarations be explained away as somehow inapplicable? We 
might argue that the principle of effectiveness should result in 
enforceability of any norm, but that conclusion is difficult to 
reach if the document expressly excludes legality and 
enforceability. Klabbers presumes that a violation of 
international law is just that, even without a complaint and 
assessment of a violation. Essentially he argues that a tree 
falling in the woods does make a sound, even though no one 
hears it. This author has considerable sympathy for Klabbers’ 
arguments, but believes Klabbers is not completely correct. 
Klabbers appears to hold a certain perspective on international 
law—i.e., that it is a completely coherent, unified and, 
moreover, formal legal system, where every act must be 
objectively discoverable as lawful or unlawful. It is not clear 
that international is.175 Klabbers appears to believe that an 
arguable violation of a legal right, perceived by a third-party, in 
this case a member of academia, is necessarily a violation of a 
legal right. Professors of law are not judges or diplomats, 
notwithstanding the conceit that they would be good ones. In 
the largely auto-interpretative system of international law,176
 
 175. The ICJ has found lacunae in the law. See e.g., Accordance with 
International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of 
Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, 2010 I.C.J. 141 (July 22) (esp. Decl. of Simma, J.); 
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory. Opinion, 1996 
I.C.J. 226, ¶105(2)(E) (July 8). But see Hersch Lauterpacht, Non Liquet and 
the Completeness of Law, in SYMBOLAE VERZIJL: SYMBOLAE VERZIJL: 
PRÉSENTÉES AU PROFESSEUR J.H.W. VERZIJL À L’OCCASION DE SON LXX-IÈME 
ANNIVERSAIRE 196, 205 (Le Baron F. M. Van Asbeck et. al eds., 1958) (arguing 
against lacunae). 
 a 
 176. Second Report on the Law of Treaties, [1954] 2 YB Int’l L. Comm’n 
123–24, ¶ 4, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1954/Add.l 
In the first instance, as already stated in the first report, the fact that 
the extent of the application of the instrument is left in some respects 
to the appreciation of the parties and that, as the result, the scope of 
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potential claim of a violation of international law can only be 
definitely settled as such where the parties consent to do so and 
a conclusive settlement is reached to classify a certain act as 
legally legitimate or not. Koskenniemi is correct to identify the 
need to remove and ignore the actor making the legal 
classification in order for international law to achieve a formal 
doctrine of sources,177
3. The Role of Formal Assessment and Enforcement 
 but it is not entirely clear that 
international law has concluded this operation fully. The actor 
making the classification of an act as lawful or not remains 
crucial in international dispute settlement. The UN Charter 
provides a number of modes for peaceful resolution of 
international disputes, without distinguishing which of those 
disputes are legal ones and, if that is a distinction that can be 
made, which disputes must be settled through legal means. A 
state might reach a negotiated settlement of a dispute over a 
diplomatic gaffe such as insulting the ambassador’s wife, and a 
state might similarly reach a negotiated settlement of a dispute 
over the purported “unlawful” use of force, without an 
admission of the act being unlawful. Until international law 
ceases to have voluntary, consensual dispute settlement that 
accepts non-legal settlement methods as equally valid, we are 
left with a system where relatively few dispute outcomes can 
conclusively inform us about the law and very few 
hypotheticals are clearly unlawful. 
This author is not willing to adopt either the Aust or 
Klabbers views in their entirety. Aust and Klabbers argue past 
each other because of their differing notions of the role of 
enforcement of international agreements, the master-slave 
dichotomy and the formality of international law generally.178
 
the obligation is indefinite and elastic, is not a decisive factor for 
denying that there is in existence a legal duty to be fulfilled in good 
faith. This is so even if, in what must be regarded as the typical case 
in treaties of this nature, the instrument contains no provisions, or 
purely nominal provisions, for the settlement of disputes arising out 
of the application or the interpretation of the treaty . . . .  
  
 177. See KOSKENNIEMI, supra note 167, at 265–66. 
 178. See Gregory C. Shaffer & Mark A. Pollack, Hard vs. Soft Law: 
Alternatives, Complements, and Antagonists in International Governance, 94 
MINN. L. REV. 706, 715 (Feb. 2010)  
The key difference, we believe, between scholars who evaluate hard 
and soft law in terms of a binary binding/nonbinding distinction and 
those who evaluate it based on characteristics that vary along a 
continuum depends on whether they address international law 
primarily from an ex post enforcement perspective or an ex ante 
negotiating one.  
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Many commentators, Aust and Klabbers included, seem to 
commingle the notion of whether an obligation is legal or not 
with whether the obligation is enforceable or not through third-
party adjudication based on the law.179 These are not the same 
thing.180
 
 179. See AUST, supra note 
 Lauterpacht, in his capacity of Special Rapporteur on 
32 at 34 (“when an instrument contains an 
article providing for the settlement of disputes by compulsory international 
judicial process, such a provision is hardly consistent with an intention not to 
enter into a legally binding instrument”) (citing Hugh Thirlway, The Law and 
Procedure of the International Court of Justice, 1991 BRIT. YB INT’L L. 1, 7–8); 
Citizens Trade Campaign, The Colombian Free Trade Agreement is an Affront 
to Human Dignity, Apr. 14, 2011, available at http://www.citizenstrade.org/ 
ctc/blog/2011/04/14/colombia-free-trade-agreement-an-affront-to-human-
dignity 
On April 7, Presidents Obama and Santos announced a new 
‘Colombian Action Plan Related to Labor Rights,’ paving the way for 
a vote on the U.S.-Colombia Free Trade Agreement . . . . More 
disturbing still, the ‘Action Plan’ is in no way legally binding.  It 
provides zero mechanisms for compliance once the Colombia FTA is 
implemented — making it in some ways weaker than even NAFTA’s 
ineffectual labor side agreement. 
UNHCR, Note, supra note 2, ¶ 5 
Diplomatic assurances given by the receiving State do not normally 
constitute legally binding undertakings. They generally provide no 
mechanism for their enforcement nor is there any legal remedy for 
the sending State or the individual concerned in case of non-
compliance, once the person has been transferred to the receiving 
State. . . . 
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 13 (arguing that assurances do not provide 
for enforcement mechanisms and that this fact has an effect on the legal value 
of the obligations undertaken). But see Ahmad, Aswat, Ahsan and Mustafa 
(Abu Hamza) v. U.K., Appls. Nos. 24027/07, 11949/08, and 36742/08, Partial 
Decision Admissibility, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 78 (Jul. 6, 2010) (“Amnesty 
[International] concluded that the assurances lacked a clear legal basis or 
mechanism by which the persons concerned could enforce them.”). Some 
authors also in turn commingle compliance with effectiveness or utility of the 
instrument. See Shaffer, supra note 178; Oscar Schachter, The Twilight 
Existence of Nonbinding International Agreements, 71 AM. J. INT’L L. 296, 304 
(1977) (“It would seem wiser to recognize nonbinding agreements may be 
attainable when binding treaties are not ...”).  
 180. See e.g., Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14, Judgement [sic] on 
the Req. of the Rep. of Croatia for Rev. of the Dec. of Tr. Ch. II of 18 July 1997, 
paras. 35–6 (Int’l Crim. Trib. former Yugoslavia, Appls. Ch., Oct. 19, 1997 
(distinguishing between legal obligation and power of enforcement of the 
obligation). Also see ICCPR, supra note 2, at arts. 6, 7, 14 (providing for what 
are undoubtedly legal obligations, but failing to provide third-party 
enforcement mechanisms); First Optional Protocol to the ICCPR, opened for 
signature Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) 
(providing for the right of individual complaint before a third-party, i.e., the 
Human Rights Committee). See generally Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan 
Snidal, Hard and Soft Law in International Governance, 54 INT'L ORG. 421, 
421 (2000) (“most international law is ‘soft’ in distinctive ways”); Lori Fisler 
Damrosch, Enforcing International Law Through Non-Forcible Measures, 269 
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the Law of Treaties, argued vigorously that neither 
enforcement mechanisms181 nor self-assessed discretion in 
compliance182 is the test for legal nature of obligations. It  could 
just as easily be claimed that the rulings of the European Court 
or the ICJ are not legally binding since the former relies on the 
Council of Ministers and the latter relies on the UN Security 
Council for enforcement of its judgments,183 both of which are 
“political” bodies that entertain discretion whether to act. 
Nevertheless, it is recognized that the enforcement mechanism 
is distinct and separate from the legal classification of the act 
as wrongful or not. In this author’s submission, whether an act 
is legal or not is a question of classification of an act as legally 
legitimate or not.184
 
HAGUE ACAD. REC. DES COURS 9, 19 (1997). 
 The Vienna Convention requires only that 
 181. Second Report on the Law of Treaties, [1954] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 
125–26, ¶ 12, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1954/Add.l 
In particular, there is probably no warrant for the suggestion that an 
instrument is not a treaty unless it contains provisions for the 
compulsory judicial or arbitral settlement of disputes as to its 
interpretation or application. While most multilateral treaties of a 
general character and many other treaties contain clauses of this 
nature, this is not the case in many treaties which clearly create legal 
rights and obligations. The legal nature of rules of customary 
international law does not depend upon the existence of compulsory 
machinery for their arbitral or judicial ascertainment. There is no 
reason for more stringent requirements in this respect in the matter 
of treaties. 
 182. Hersch Lauterpacht, Spec. Rapp., Second Report on the Law of 
Treaties, [1954] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 125, ¶ 9, U.N. Doc. 
A/CN.4/SER.A/1954/Add.l (arguing that “purely administrative agreements” 
could also have legally binding obligations notwithstanding “their nature and 
subject matter, [which] leave a considerable measure of discretion to the 
authorities in question [when they] exhibit the essential characteristics of an 
international treaty.”) (citing Agreement between the Post Office of the United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Shereefian Post and 
Telegraph Administration for the exchange of money orders, July 12 & Aug. 
28, 1948, 90 U.N.T.S. 84). 
 183. See, e.g., U.N. Charter, art. 94, para. 2. 
If any party to a case fails to perform the obligations incumbent upon 
it under a judgment rendered by the Court, the other party may have 
recourse to the Security Council, which may, if it deems necessary, 
make recommendations or decide upon measures to be taken to give 
effect to the judgment. 
See also ECHR, supra note 2, as amended by Protocol No. 14, June 1, 
2010, art. 46, para. 2 (providing for the Committee of Ministers to 
monitor and supervise implementation of judgments by the European 
Court). 
 184. James Crawford, Spec. Rapp., Report of the Commission to the General 
Assembly on the work of its fifty-third session: State Responsibility, [2001] 2 
Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 33, art. 1, cmt (3), U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/2001/Add.1 
(Part 2) [hereinafter Crawford, State Responsibility] (“[E]very internationally 
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the agreement be “governed by” international law, not that it 
be “enforced by” international legal mechanisms. The question 
of enforcement focuses on the compliance with the obligation 
following its legal classification. This notion is a distinct one 
from that of “governance” or the authoritative legal 
classification of the act as lawful or not. Indeed, sometimes the 
classification itself is enough to induce compliance, but not 
always, though these are separate phenomena. 
This analysis of the binding nature of agreements being 
measured by their enforcement provisions is difficult business 
and trends very close to analyses of why states comply with 
international law in the first place and the role of legitimacy of 
norms.185 This problem, of course, is not unique to international 
law. Domestic legal systems sometimes struggle with 
compliance or non-compliance with decisions of legal or illegal 
tribunals.186 In those cases too, the line between what is law 
and what is not can be blurred. Clearly states look to a variety 
of concerns when selecting their course of action on the 
international plane.187
 
wrongful act of a State entails the international responsibility of that State, 
and thus gives rise to new international legal relations additional to those 
which existed before the act took place . . . .”). Thus responsibility is objective; 
it is not dependent on an assessor definitively characterizing an act as 
unlawful, and, impliedly, states cannot exclude it. See also id. at 54–57, art. 
12, cmts. (1), (5), (6), (11) (concluding that the origin or character of the 
international obligation—whether it is a treaty norm or customary 
international law, whether it is a bilateral or multilateral obligation, whether 
it is an obligation of conduct or result—is irrelevant to the question of whether 
the act is in conformity with it). For discussions of the duties incumbent upon 
states committing internationally wrongful acts see generally id. at 88–107, 
arts. 29,  30, 31, 34, 35, 36, 37, and their commentaries. 
 Certainly there may always be 
 185. See, e.g., LOUIS HENKIN, HOW NATIONS BEHAVE 47 (2d ed. 1979) (“It is 
probably the case that almost all nations observe almost all principles of 
international law and almost all of their obligations almost all of the time.”); 
ANDREW GUZMAN, HOW INTERNATIONAL LAW WORKS: A RATIONAL CHOICE 
THEORY 71–111 (2008) (arguing that states desire that their promises be 
credible); Shaffer, supra note 178, at 712-15 (discussing reputational costs of 
non-compliance); Jose E. Alvarez, Why Nations Behave, 19 MICH. J. INT’L L. 
303 (1998) (reviewing a new wave of compliance scholarship). 
 186. See, e.g., Servai, et al. v. Tamil Nadu, 2011 STPL (Web) 403 SC 1, ¶¶ 
16–17 (India) (Katju J.), available at http://www.stpl-india.in/SCJFiles/ 
2011_STPL(Web)_403_SC.pdf (holding that the traditional tribunals of “khap 
panchayats” were “illegal” “kangaroo courts” and that their “decrees” 
encouraging honor killings were unlawful; ordering non-compliance by law 
enforcement officials).  
 187. See Othman v. Sec’y State For the Home Dep’t, (2007) No. SC/15/2005 
(S.I.A.C.), ¶ 296 (U.K.) (“States look not only to the legal status of 
international documents when deciding their behaviour but to the whole 
political context.”). 
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diplomatic consequences for non-compliance, which can operate 
as sufficient inducements to comply188 although that conclusion 
may be more problematic for human rights treaties.189
The authoritative classification of the act is often 
permitted through a number of dispute settlement 
mechanisms, including party-to-party negotiations without a 
disinterested third party. Negotiations, as opposed to “legal” (or 
“quasi-legal”) dispute settlement such as arbitration, do not 
clearly result in a legal classification of the acts as lawful or 
not, they simply settle the dispute, although they can 
potentially inform us of state opinio juris regarding acts of that 
type. The mere fact that an obligation may be settled only by 
negotiation does not mean that the obligation is, of necessity, 
not a legal one.
 However, 
failure to effect compliance does not necessarily render the 
classification as legally illegitimate or not correct. 
190
The problem with the objective (third-party) or subjective 
(negotiated) legal assessment standards is that legal legitimacy 
depends on whether there is a person to hear the tree fall in the 
woods, which is the precise problem to begin with. The answer 
to the tree falling in the woods question is that we cannot know 
 
 
 188. See Beth A. Simmons, Money and the Law: Why Comply with the 
Public International Law of Money?, 25 YALE J. INT'L L. 323, 356–57 (2000) 
(finding reasons for compliance to include reputational consequences); HUMAN 
RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 13 (concluding that assurances do not have 
sufficient inducements to comply with human rights obligations). That is not 
to say that there are no consequences when diplomatic enforcement is the only 
available mode. See, e.g., Katherine R. Hawkins, The Promises of Torturers: 
Diplomatic Assurances and the Legality of Rendition, 20 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 
213, 241 (2006) (reporting on the suspension of funding for Egypt’s intelligence 
services after diplomatic assurances against torture were violated and the 
change in policy against extraditing or rendering suspects to Syria following 
the Maher Arar incident) (citing Dana Priest, CIA's Assurances on Transferred 
Suspects Doubted; Prisoners Say Countries Break No-Torture Pledges, WASH. 
POST, Mar. 17, 2005, at A1); Dana Priest & Barton Gellman, U.S. Decries 
Abuse But Defends Interrogations, WASH. POST, Dec. 26, 2002, at A1. 
 189. See HENKIN, supra note 185, at 235 (“The forces that induce 
compliance with other law ... do not pertain equally to the law of human 
rights.”); Oona Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?, 111 
YALE L.J. 1935, 1938 (2002) (“[T]he major engines of compliance that exist in 
other areas of international law are for the most part absent in the area of 
human rights.”). 
 190. Crawford, supra note 184, at 34–35, art. 2, cmts. (1)–(3) (finding that 
the conditions for responsibility are only attribution of the act to the state and 
that the act be a breach of international law, without provision for the nature 
and role of a third-party assessor); id. at 87, art. 28, cmt. (2) (finding that any 
unlawful conduct that results in responsibility of the state, impliedly, 
regardless of any or the existence of dispute settlement mechanism, requires 
cessation and reparation). 
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the answer.191 A party that violates an MOU is potentially in 
violation and responsible to the other party, and only to the 
other party. Had Qatar and Bahrain never taken their dispute 
to the ICJ, we would not know whether the minutes constituted 
a treaty, and perhaps neither would the ICJ as a theoretical 
matter. Whether an agreement is legally binding or not is only 
addressed by a third-party when the principle parties disagree 
as to its legal effect.192
 
 191. In this context the socio-legal studies of Malinowski and the early 
Hawthorne studies are particularly illuminating. Sociology has long identified 
and attempted to account for the “Hawthorne” or “observer” effect of the 
researcher on the behavior of the researched. See generally, e.g., BRONISLAW 
MALINOWSKI, CRIME AND CUSTOM IN SAVAGE SOCIETY (1926) (characterizing 
observer forces in the “primitive” law of  indigenous cultures); HENRY A. 
LANDSBERGER, HAWTHORNE REVISITED (1958) (conducting a reevaluation of 
the conclusions of the Hawthorne studies, as well as the works of its advocates 
and critics); Debra Steele-Johnson et al., Goal Orientation and Task Demand 
Effects on Motivation, Affect, and Performance, 85 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 724 
(2000) (analyzing goal orientation and task demands on motivation, affect, and 
performance); Lyle Yorks & David A. Whitsett, Hawthorne, Topeka, and the 
Issue of Science Versus Advocacy in Organizational Behavior, 10 ACAD. MGMT. 
REV. 21 (1985) (summarizing the Hawthorne and Topeka studies, and the role 
of observers in reporting outcomes); Richard H. Franke & James D. Kaul, The 
Hawthorne  Experiments: First Statistical Interpretation, 43 AM. SOC. REV. 
623 (1978) (providing statistical study of the Hawthorne studies, analysis of 
which revealed increased worker output simply due to the presence of 
observers); Alex Carey, The Hawthorne Studies: A Radical Criticism, 32 AM. 
SOC. REV. 403 (1967) (finding significant deficiencies in the basic hypothesis of 
the Hawthorne studies). Occasionally, courts also take note of the observer 
effect when assessing evidence of a norm. See, e.g., In re Estate of Apachee, 4 
Nav. R. 178, 180 (W.R. Dist. Ct. Oct. 11, 1983) (holding that for proving a 
Native American customary norm, the court should not seek evidence from 
anthologists and ethnologists, but rather the tribal members themselves, 
although this practice does not entirely resolve the observer problem). 
 When the parties submitted the dispute 
for definitive settlement by the ICJ, they agreed that the 
decision of the Court constituted their reality, not their own 
self-assessment or mutual negotiations. It was only through the 
dispute settlement process, by claiming that an instrument 
provides for legal rights, that the binding nature of those rights 
is realized. If one state with a right to complain does not claim 
a violation, then we do not know whether there was a violation 
or not, although we can guess. This is all the more difficult in 
 192. See, e.g., Herbert Bernstein & Joachim Zekoll, The Gentleman’s 
Agreement in Legal Theory and in Modern Practice: United States, 46 AM. J. 
COMP. L. SUPP. 87, 88 (1998) Although speaking of non-legally binding 
commercial agreements, Bernstein and Zekoll argue: 
It is extremely difficult to determine, with any degree of certainty, 
how widespread the use of permanent 'no-law’ agreements is in actual 
American business practice. ... [N]o such agreement will ever surface 
in a court of law unless the parties differ as to its effect. Id. 
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international law where parties may not seek to enforce their 
claims due to a variety of political concerns of diplomacy.193
4. Private Law Analogies 
  
Before reaching a conclusion on diplomatic assurances and 
the law of treaties, we should once again consider analogies 
with private law specifically in the context of intent to create 
legal relations. Admittedly private law does not necessarily 
suffer the international law problem of erecting such a large 
additional burden separating legal classification from the 
available modes of enforcement.194
 
 193. See, e.g., Alzery v. Sweden, Commc’n No. 1416/2005, ¶ 4.11, U.N. 
Doc.CCPR/C/88/D/1416/2005 (Human Rights Comm., Nov. 10, 2006) (noting 
Sweden’s diplomatic reasons for not interfering with an Egyptian national 
detained in Egypt); Youssef v. Home Office, [2004] EWHC 1884 (QB), 
HQ03X03052 [18] (Eng.) (citing the UK Prime Minister’s letter to the Home 
Office requesting that terms of assurances be narrowed for diplomatic reasons) 
 But it does reflect some of 
Diplomats are often quite candid that their top priority is to ensure 
friendly relations with other states, sometimes at the expense of 
confronting governments about possible human rights violations, 
including about breaches of pre-agreed diplomatic assurances. For 
example, when the former Swedish Ambassador to Egypt was asked 
why he let five weeks lapse before visiting two Egyptians expelled in 
December 2001 from Stockholm to Cairo following diplomatic 
assurances, he replied that the Swedes could not have visited the men 
immediately because that would have signaled a lack of trust in the 
Egyptian authorities. . . . Inter-state dynamics at the diplomatic level 
are by their very nature delicate, and diplomats often invoke the need 
for “caution” and “discretion” in diplomatic representations and 
negotiations. As a result, serious human rights issues—even those 
involving the absolute prohibition against torture—are often 
subordinated to diplomatic concerns. . . . Blair’s Private Secretary 
detailed those concerns in an April 1999 letter to the Home Office 
stating, ‘[W]e are in danger of being excessive in our demands of the 
Egyptians . . . why [do] we need all the assurances proposed by the 
F[oreign] C[ommonwealth] O[ffice] and Home Office Legal advisers. 
Can we not narrow down the list of assurances we require?’; 
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 13 (alteration in original) (citations 
omitted) (citing former Swedish Ambassador to Egypt’s statement: “What do 
you think [would] have happened if I had come rushing in after four or five 
days and demanded to see those people? It had been to signal from the start 
that we don’t trust you Egyptians.”) 
 194. Although the American experience of Andrew Jackson’s, probably 
apocryphal, statement in reaction to the judgment of the Supreme Court in 
Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1832), does come to mind as an exception: 
“John Marshall has made his decision, now let him enforce it!” The modern 
case of Labsi in Slovakia could be another example where the executive 
appears to have ignored the judgment of the Supreme Court. See Labsi v. 
Slovakia, Statement of Facts, Eur. Ct. H.R., Appl. No. 33809/08 ¶ 3 (Jun. 8, 
2010) (noting that the Slovakian Executive expelled Labsi despite a stay 
entered by the Slovakian Constitutional Court), the case is pending as of this 
publication). 
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the same debates over the relevance of intent in forming of a 
contract.195
A particularly relevant example within domestic contract 
law is the treatment of agreements that are variously termed 
“letters of intent” (“LOIs”) or, unfortunately, “memoranda of 
understanding” (“MOUs”). LOIs and MOUs are often entered 
into between corporations, usually as a preliminary stage in 
negotiations over purchases, mergers and acquisitions. These 
agreements often include express language that they are not 
legally binding. Nevertheless, they also often provide for legal 
rights and obligations.
 Again, care should be given in drawing private law 
analogies, but here the analogy is particular helpful because 
the same questions are at issue in a highly similar context. 
Furthermore, both sides of the analogy, the national legal 
system and the international legal system, share a common 
feature, which is that all agreements are concluded within and 
submitted to the legal system, and it is the system that 
determines whether the parties concluded a legally binding 
agreement based on, inter alia, whether there is an agreement, 
whether the parties had the requisite objective intentions, etc. 
196 In the case of Venture v. Zenith,197
 
 195. For the “objective” school, see SAMUEL WILLISTON, THE LAW OF 
CONTRACTS § 21 (1st ed. 1920) (citing Davison v. Holden, 10 A. 515 (Conn. 
1887) and Wellington v. Apthorp, 13 N.E. 10 (Mass. 1887) (summarizing the 
law related to the non-necessity of intent in formation of contracts). However 
it is interesting to note that in one of the cases that Williston cites, namely 
Wellington, the court probed the question of intent: “[W]hether it appears 
there was a promise by the defendant’s testator sufficiently definite to be 
enforced, and made with the understanding and intention that she would be 
legally bound thereby.” id. at 13 (emphasis added). For the “intent” school, see 
GUENTHER TREITEL, THE LAW OF CONTRACT 149 (10th ed. 1999) (“An 
agreement, though supported by consideration, is not binding as a contract if 
it was made without any intention of creating legal relations.”) (footnote 
omitted); WILLIAM REYNELL ANSON, PRINCIPLES OF THE ENGLISH LAW OF 
CONTRACT AND OF AGENCY IN ITS RELATION TO CONTRACT pt. 2, at 11 (11th 
ed. 1906) (including intent as part of the first element of a legal contract). An 
interesting middle ground is Sulzbach v. Town of Jefferson, 155 N.W.2d 921, 
923 (N.D. 1968) (“It is not necessary that the parties are conscious of the legal 
relationship which their words or acts give rise to, but it is essential that the 
acts manifesting assent shall be done intentionally.”) The court appears to 
hold that it is not the intent to have a legally bound result that is at stake, but 
that the acts that result in the binding contract are done intentionally. Lastly, 
some courts have held that the legally-binding nature of the agreement could 
even be auto-interpretive, further justifying the analogy with international 
law. See, e.g., Empro Mfg. Co. v. Ball-Co Mfg., 870 F.2d 423, 425 (7th Cir. 
1989) (Easterbrook, J.) (citations omitted) (“Parties may decide for themselves 
whether the results of preliminary negotiations bind them . . . .”). 
 one 
 196. Courts have adopted one of two perspectives for dealing with these 
kinds of preliminary agreements. Either the agreement is seen as legally 
binding but the court needs to supply the missing terms, or the court holds 
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corporation sent the other a non-binding LOI that included a 
paragraph providing that the parties must negotiate in good 
faith regarding a potential purchase agreement and excluding 
the parties’ right to negotiate with other parties. Eventually 
when the negotiations broke down, the buyer sued. Judge 
Posner found that the LOI “established a binding agreement to 
negotiate in good faith toward the formation of a contract of 
sale”198
Damages for breach of an agreement to negotiate may be, although 
they are unlikely to be, the same as the damages for breach of the 
final contract that the parties would have signed had it not been for 
the defendant’s bad faith. If, quite apart from any bad faith, the 
negotiations would have broken down, the party led on by the other 
party’s bad faith to persist in futile negotiations can recover only his 
reliance damages—the expenses he incurred by being misled, in 
violation of the parties’ agreement to negotiate in good faith, into 
continuing to negotiate futilely. But if the plaintiff can prove that had 
it not been for the defendant’s bad faith the parties would have made 
a final contract, then the loss of the benefit of the contract is a 
consequence of the defendant’s bad faith, and, provided that it is a 
foreseeable consequence, the defendant is liable for that loss—liable, 
that is, for the plaintiff’s consequential damages.
 and regarding damages as follows: 
199
This conclusion does not mean that the parties are easily 
able to claim damages, since the corporation would need to 
prove what the terms of the final agreement would have been 
but for the bad faith.
  
200
 
that there is no agreement aside from the obligation to continue negotiating 
the agreement in good faith. See E. Allan Farnsworth, Precontractual Liability 
and Preliminary Agreements: Fair Dealing and Failed Negotiations, 87 
COLUM. L. REV. 217, 249–55 (1987) (presenting two types of negotiating 
agreements; one where the parties agree to be bound, and the other where 
they do not); Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass’n of Am. v. Tribune Co., 670 F. 
Supp. 491, 498–99 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (finding that in order to determine if a 
preliminary agreement is binding, the court must look to the intent of the 
parties). 
 Significantly for our purposes, Posner 
 197. See Venture Assoc. Corp. v. Zenith Data Sys. Corp., 96 F.3d 275 (7th 
Cir. 1996). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 21 (1981) 
(“Neither real nor apparent intention that a promise be legally binding is 
essential to the formation of a contract . . . .”). But see Balfour v. Balfour, 
[1919] 2 K.B. 571, 578 (U.K.) (requiring intent to be bound); Baird Textile 
Holdings Ltd v. Marks & Spencer plc, [2001] EWCA (Civ) 274 (Mance L.J.) 
(searching for certainty as evidence of intent); United Nations Convention on 
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, art 14(1), Apr. 11, 1980, 1489 
U.N.T.S. 3, (entered into force Jan. 1, 1988) (“A proposal for concluding a 
contract addressed to one or more specific persons constitutes an offer if it . . .  
indicates the intention of the offeror to be bound in case of acceptance.”). 
 198. Venture Assoc., 96 F.3d at 277 (emphasis added). 
 199. Id. at 278. 
 200. Insofar as we might apply this rule of international law, we might 
note that many cases brought at international law result only in a declaratory 
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concluded that that problem “goes to the practicality of the 
remedy, not the principle of it.”201 This holding seems to affirm 
the distinction between legal classification and remedy. This 
approach has been followed in other jurisdictions,202 though 
others have clearly rejected it.203
In Logan v. Sivers, the Oregon Court of Appeals found that 
there are four types of LOIs.
 
204 The first is a binding contract in 
which all terms are agreed and written, despite it being titled 
an “LOI”. The second is a binding agreement in which some 
terms are not entirely settled and the court will move to settle 
them and render the agreement effective. The third is a 
generally non-binding contract where certain provisions may 
nonetheless still be binding, such as the obligation to negotiate 
in good faith. The last is a completely non-binding agreement in 
which the parties have clearly and deliberately excluded any 
binding legal obligation.205
Where the parties have expressly manifested their intent 
 
 
judgment. See generally, e.g., Statute of the International Court of Justice, ch. 
III, June 26, 1945, 1 U.N.T.S. 16, 59 Stat. 1055 (outlining the general 
procedure the ICJ follows in administering judgments). But see generally 
ICSID , supra notes 99–100 (noting ICSID cases where declaratory judgments 
were not given). 
 201. Venture Assoc., 96 F. 3d at 279. 
 202. See, e.g., Vestar Dev. II, L.L.C. v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 249 F.3d 958 
(9th Cir. 2001) (leaving open the question of expectation damages for breaches 
of agreements to negotiate); Coal Cliff Collieries Pty. Ltd. v. Sijehama Pty. 
Ltd., (1991) 24 NSWLR 1, 40–41 (Supreme Court) (Austl.) (finding a binding 
agreement to negotiate possible, though not present on the facts); Hillas & Co. 
Ltd. v. Arcos Ltd., [1932] UKHL 2, [1932] Ll. L. Rep. 359 (H.L.) (appeal taken 
from Eng.) (holding that where there is consideration, a promise to negotiate 
in good faith is a legally binding agreement). 
 203. See, e.g., Walford v. Miles, [1992] 2 A.C. 128, 136-38 (H.L.) (appeal 
taken from Eng.) (reaching the opposite conclusion in a more modern case 
than Hillas). Other jurisdictions rejecting this rule include some American 
ones. See, e.g., Goodstein Constr. Corp. v. City of N.Y., 604 N.E.2d 1356, 1362 
(N.Y. 1992) (rejecting claims for lost profits based only on agreement to 
negotiate). Cf. PECL, supra note 82, art. 2:101: Conditions for the Conclusion 
of a Contract (“(1) A contract is concluded if: (a) the parties intend to be legally 
bound, and (b) they reach a sufficient agreement without any further 
requirement.”). 
 204. Logan v. D.W. Sivers Co., 141 P. 3d 589, 593–95 (Or. Ct. App. 2006 
aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 169 P.3d 1255, 1258–59 (Or. 2007)) (enforcing 
certain terms in an otherwise “non-binding” LOI). 
 205. See also Jarvis Interiors Ltd v. Galliard Homes, [2000] CLC 411 (A.C.) 
(Lindsay J.) (finding in a document entitled “Contract Preliminaries” that: (a) 
there could be no contract unless and until there was a deed between the 
parties—without which the agreement was equivalently “subject to contract” 
and (b) nothing that occurred afterwards overtook that—including the 
“handshake agreement” which was itself subject to a formal contract being 
entered into). 
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to be bound in certain terms, the court will find the provisions 
enforceable. This conclusion also holds for “if–then” contracts, 
where a binding contract is conditional only upon performance, 
remaining non-binding prior to the performance.206 In Logan, 
the particular language was the “[s]eller agrees to be bound to 
provide the required due diligence documents within the time 
required to comply with the [n]on-[s]olicitation 
provision . . . .”207
These cases demonstrate that, in private law, parties may 
elect to agree on non-legally binding terms, but the language 
doing so must be express, and terms capable of creating legally 
binding obligations may still do so, even if the overall document 
purports to be non-binding. There is no a priori instrument 
that is binding or not in its entirety: each case must be 
analyzed on its own merits, and each term analyzed on its own 
merits.
 Where that intent was clearly expressed and 
the terms were definite, the court found the obligation binding. 
208 The role of intent is in looking for what the parties, 
objectively, intended to agree upon.209 What governs is the 
terms the parties intended to agree on.210 That the parties may 
have contemplated that there would be a final contract after 
the conclusion of the LOI is not determinative of the legal value 
of an LOI if the LOI clearly expresses agreed-upon terms.211
 
 206. In these cases, there is a non-binding document that imposes binding 
obligations only if the other party performs. See, e.g., British Steel Corp. v. 
Cleveland Bridge & Eng’g Co., [1984] 1 All E.R. 504 (Q.B.) (Robert Goff J.) 
(Eng.) (finding quantum meruit for plaintiff for work performed in expectation 
of a contract); Baird Textile Holdings Ltd. v. Marks & Spencer Plc, [2001] 
EWCA (Civ) 274 ¶ 6 (Mance L.J.) (Eng.) (noting plaintiff’s allegations that if it 
performed certain conditions, defendant would be bound to an implied 
contract). 
 
The judge can look at all the surrounding circumstances to 
determine this intent, and not only at the language of the 
 207. D.W. Sivers Co., 141 P.3d at 591–92. 
 208. See Twintec Ltd. v. GSE Bldg. & Civil Eng’g Ltd., [2003] EWHC 605, 
[67] (Kirkham J.) (Eng.) (“There is no settled law on the meaning and effect of 
letters of intent. The court must decide each case on its facts.”). 
 209. Or perhaps an even stronger conclusion would be to look for intent to 
agree on language that expressed an objective intent to be bound. 
 210. See Harvey Shopfitters Ltd. v. ADI Ltd., [2003] EWCA (Civ) 1757 
(Eng.). The case reflects two principles. First, it is sufficient that the parties 
are agreed on all material and necessary terms. Id. at [9]. Second, the labels 
the parties attach to their documents are not determinative. Id. What matters 
is the intention of the parties to be gathered from all the relevant evidence 
including, so far as admissible, the factual matrix in which the documents in 
question were written. Id. 
 211. See, e.g., Westminster Bldg. Co. Ltd. v. Beckingham, [2004] EWHC 
(TCC) 138, [10]–[11] (Thornton J.) (Eng.) (finding a simple contract created by 
an LOI even where LOI stated another contract was to follow). 
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document.212  Furthermore, the expectations arising from a non-
legally binding agreement may be so difficult to prove that they 
cannot be recovered as a remedy, though reliance expenses may 
be recoverable.213
Therefore, LOIs and MOUs in the corporate world can be 
(1) Completely binding; (2) Partially binding – some terms are 
binding and some are not and the court may or may not move 
to fill gaps and render it effective; or (3) Completely non-
binding. For agreements that are completely binding, the 
parties have committed themselves to perform the obligations 
discussed. 
  
214 A partially binding agreement will have some 
portions that are non-binding and some portions that are 
binding. For example, there may be no obligation to negotiate 
to a final transaction, even as some clauses, such as 
confidentiality, exclusivity and good faith clauses, are binding. 
An agreement may specify stipulated damages for failure to 
complete the negotiation.215 An agreement may even contain 
terms, the binding force of which is contingent on practice. The 
last category of agreements, completely non-binding, has no 
legal effect whatsoever. Documents fall in this category where 
the parties’ intentions are purely speculative.216
 
 212. See, e.g., Hackwood Ltd. v. Areen Design Serv. Ltd., [2005] EWHC 
(TCC) 2322, [17] (Field J.) (Eng.) (finding it necessary to look at the “matrix of 
facts” in order to determine the terms of an interim contract). 
 
 213. See Vestar Dev. II, LLC v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 249 F.3d 958, 962 
(9th Cir. 2001) (finding that an exclusivity provision in a clearly non-legally 
binding LOI was enforceable, resulting in a damages award for reliance 
expenses but not expectation expenses). 
 214. See Allen Wilson Shopfitters v. Buckingham, [2005] EWHC (TCC) 
1165, [12]–[17] (Coulson J.) (Eng.) (using language of obligation in the contract 
to discern legal obligations from LOI);  Eugena Ltd. v. Gelande Corp. Ltd., 
[2004] EWHC (QB) 3273, [104], [108] (Hegarty J.) (Eng.) (noting obligations to 
perform based on LOI); Hall & Tawse S. Ltd. v. Ivory Gate Ltd., [1997] EWHC 
(TCC) 358, [34] (Eng.) (determining the obligations of work to be done from an 
LOI). 
 215. See, e.g., Copeland v. Baskin Robbins U.S.A., 117 Cal.Rptr.2d 875, 
882–84 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (holding that the LOI was not binding but 
nonetheless did constitute an obligation to negotiate, with the possibilities of 
reliance damages where that obligation is breached); Schwanbeck v. Fed.-
Mogul Corp., 592 N.E.2d 1289, 1291 n.2, 1292–93 (Mass. 1992) (citing an LOI 
stating  “this letter is not intended to create, nor do you or we presently have 
any binding legal obligation whatever” yet the next paragraph stating 
“[h]owever, it is our intention, and we understand, your intention immediately 
to proceed in good faith in the negotiation of such binding definitive agreement 
. . . .” and finding that the second obligation was binding even though the LOI 
generally was not). 
 216. See, e.g., Stephen Donald Architects Ltd. v. King, [2003] EWHC (TCC) 
1867, [67]–[68] (Seymour J.) (Eng.) (finding that the evidence as to the 
agreement was far too vague to base a clear obligation on). 
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5. Conclusion on the Law of Treaties 
It appears that NewCenturySchlbkof the question. Either 
states come before and are the masters of the law, or states 
come after and are the slaves. Either subjective intent governs 
in the final analysis or objective agreed terms do. Either those 
objective terms are truly objective or simply the imposition of 
value by a third-party adjudicator. 
These questions bring up the issue of whether legal or non-
legal relations is the normal, default situation. We can begin 
this inquiry with a hypothetical: could, two states agree to 
exclude the entirety of their bilateral relations from 
international law? Partly, yes. They could merge into a new 
state, thus transforming their international inter se relations 
into domestic constitutional legal relations.217
Our usual means of interpreting international law point in 
differing directions for resolving this problem. The state 
practice and opinio juris seems vague and confusing. It is clear 
where disputes are not legally enforced or submitted to binding 
third-party arbitration, suggesting, though not conclusively 
that they are legal, but lacking effective enforcement. The 
drafting history of the Vienna Convention is unclear, but 
appears to show that the ILC and delegates to the Vienna 
Conference understood that intent is not an aspect of the 
“governed by international law” element, rendering all 
agreements, where they are agreements, governed by either 
international or domestic law. Private law analogies, on the 
 They could not, 
however, excuse themselves from any erga omnes obligations or 
human rights obligations. Setting aside those exceptional 
situations, it does not appear objectionable that two states 
might agree to have non-legal relations between themselves on 
a wide range of topics.  
 
 217. See, e.g., Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 518–19 (1832) (describing 
the fusion of the Cherokee Nation with the United States—although 
admittedly it is unclear whether the Native American tribes were states in the 
sense of international law in the first place); Land and Maritime Boundary 
(Cameroon v. Nigeria; Eq. Guinea intervening), Judgment, 2002 I.C.J. 303, ¶¶ 
200–09 (Oct. 10) (discussing “treaty” relations between Great Britain and the 
“Kings and Chiefs of Old Calabar” to determine legal rights to fusion of state 
territories). See also Reservation Entered by the German Democratic Republic 
(GDR) to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Apr. 18, 1961, 500 
U.N.T.S. 95 (entered into force Apr. 24, 1964) (on Feb. 2, 1973 to articles 11(1), 
48, and 50 to which the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) objected on Sept. 
5, 1974, although permitting the convention to enter into force between the 
two states notwithstanding the objection. 856 U.N.T.S. 321. The current 
status of these communications remains unclear following the absorption of 
the GDR by the FRG. 
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other hand, suggest that even in a legal system where the 
actors are individuals beholden to a hierarchical, coercive legal 
authority with mandatory enforcement powers, the actors are 
still free to conclude non-legally binding agreements; however, 
the agreements will be carefully examined and the legally 
binding portions will be severed from the non-legally binding 
ones. In this process, there may be a presumption that 
communications be legally binding, rather than not, but this 
question will be addressed in more detail below. Surely states 
would have the same freedom to treaty or not in the 
international legal system. 
The ILC (Koskenniemi more precisely) wisely concluded 
that lex specialis is always in the eye of the beholder.218
How do we cut this Gordian knot? It is important to 
recognize that in all of these hypotheticals, the states are able 
to adopt such a non-binding agreement because the law permits 
them to do so, not as an inherent aspect of their sovereignty, at 
least insofar as the legal system is concerned. The reason for 
this conclusion is the premise that international law is law 
made between equal sovereigns, who, in acting in their 
sovereignty, reflect and develop international law in a 
symbiotic relationship. After all, states would not even be 
sovereign equals without that conclusion already being a legal 
postulate. We all know that neither the chicken nor the egg 
came first. The two exist together, one necessitating the other 
and the two evolving together in parallel. This analogy comes 
closest to describing the relationship between state sovereignty 
 If we 
adopt the perspective that the international system, in as much 
as it is a system, is one based on law, then we must conclude 
that the lex specialis in the hypothetical above is the non-legal 
relations on particular topics; the lex generalis is that relations 
are governed by international law. If, on the other hand, we 
adopt the perspective that law is the creation of states acting in 
their sovereign capacity, then we might conclude that the lex 
generalis is the Hobbesian world of power and the lex specialis 
is relations governed by international law. This understanding 
of which condition is the lex specialis and which the lex 
generalis then plays a role in our understanding of whether 
there is a presumption in favor of non-legal or legal relations.  
 
 218. See Martti Koskenniemi, Fragmentation of International Law: 
Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International 
Law: Rep. of the Study Group of the International Law Commission, 11, ¶ 8, 
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.682 (Apr. 13, 2006) (discussing the legal pluralism of 
international law). 
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and international law. Each reaffirms the other. This author 
proposes to find a way forward by choosing to see international 
law as permeating international relations because states 
appear to have chosen that the law should do so. Where they 
purport to excuse certain obligations from the law, they use 
legal structures, legal devices, legal language and legal 
argument to accomplish this end. If a claim for enforcement of 
an instrument without mandatory third-party dispute 
settlement mechanisms was lodged at the ICJ, the court would 
be prohibited from entertaining it, not because the agreement 
was not existing in the international legal system, but because 
the agreement does exist in the international legal system, and 
that system provides that the Court shall not have jurisdiction 
to hear the case. It is only by operation of the law that the 
sovereign right to exclude legal effect can be realized. At the 
very least, the agreement in a non-binding document that the 
document is non-binding, is itself binding, otherwise the 
document might be binding. 
Therefore, this author understands that there must be an 
implied exception to the Vienna Convention permitting states 
to exempt certain communications and understandings from 
enforcement and legal accountability. This exception must be 
narrowly construed—where legally binding aspects of the 
communication can be severed from the non-legally binding 
ones—and there is likely a presumption that communications 
are legally binding. There appears to be a widespread 
agreement among scholars of international law, including those 
along the spectrum of positive and natural law, that there is a 
presumption that agreements between and among states will 
be governed by international law rather than politics.219
 
 219. See, e.g., Lauterpacht, supra note 
 Given 
81, at 125, ¶ 11. 
While in the sphere of private law the informality and variety of 
private arrangements may permit an inquiry into the question 
whether the nature of the promise is such as to create legal rights and 
obligations, it is believed that with regard to formal international 
compacts such intention must be implied from the fact of the 
formality of the instrument unless there is cogent and conclusive 
evidence to the contrary. Undoubtedly, the legal rights and 
obligations do not extend further than is warranted by the terms of 
the treaty. The fact that the instrument is a treaty does not imply an 
intention of the parties to endow it with the fullest possible measure 
of effectiveness. They may intend its effectiveness to be drastically 
limited. But, subject to that consideration which must be evidenced 
by the terms of the treaty and any other available evidence, the 
guiding assumption is that the instrument creates legal rights and 
obligations. Any measure of discretion and freedom of appreciation, 
however wide, which it leaves to the parties must be exercised in 
accordance with the legal principle of good faith. Although the parties 
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the track record of the ICJ in holding that most of the 
instruments that were challenged before as not being treaties 
were found to have been treaties, we might guess that the ICJ 
agrees with this presumption. In addition, this presumption is 
borne out in state practice. Drafters of treaties never appear to 
trouble themselves to expressly state when an instrument is 
 
may have intended a treaty to mean little, no assumption is 
permissible that they intended it to mean nothing and that the 
instrument concluded in the form of a treaty—with the concomitant 
solemnity, formality, publicity and constitutional and other 
safeguards—is not a treaty. 
See also Kelvin Widdows, What Is An Agreement in International Law?, BRIT. 
Y.B. INT’L L. 117, 142 (1979) (finding intention of the parties critical to 
understanding a treaty’s binding nature); 22 Code. Fed. Reg. §181.2(a) (US) 
(a) General.  
The following criteria are to be applied in deciding whether any 
undertaking, oral agreement, document, or set of documents, 
including an exchange of notes or of correspondence, constitutes an 
international agreement . . . .  
 
(1) Identity and intention of the parties. A party to an international 
agreement must be a state, a state agency, or an intergovernmental 
organization. The parties must intend their undertaking to be legally 
binding, and not merely of political or personal effect. Documents 
intended to have political or moral weight, but not intended to be 
legally binding, are not international agreements. An example of the 
latter is the Final Act of the Helsinki Conference on Cooperation and 
Security in Europe. In addition, the parties must intend their 
undertaking to be governed by international law, although this intent 
need not be manifested by a third party dispute settlement 
mechanism or any express reference to international law. In the 
absence of any provision in the arrangement with respect to 
governing law, it will be presumed to be governed by international 
law. This presumption may be overcome by clear evidence, in the 
negotiating history of the agreement or otherwise, that the parties 
intended the arrangement to be governed by another legal system. 
Arrangements governed solely by the law of the United States, or one 
of the states or jurisdictions thereof, or by the law of any foreign 
state, are not international agreements for these purposes. For 
example, a foreign military sales loan agreement governed in its 
entirety by U.S. law is not an international agreement. (emphasis 
added).  
Cf. OSCAR SCHACHTER, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 98 
(1991) (“[T]he designation by the parties that their agreement is a treaty or 
international agreement should be accepted as conclusive evidence that a legal 
relationship is intended. . . . [However,] [s]tates are entirely free to decide that 
they do not wish to be bound legally by a particular instrument or 
declaration.”); Oscar Schachter, The Twilight Existence of Nonbinding 
International Agreement, 71 AM. J. INT’L L. 296, 297 (1977) (arguing that the 
presumption is the reverse—against legal obligations—at least where 
indefinite principles are being declared); J.E.S. Fawcett, The Legal Character 
of International Agreements, 30 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 381, 400 (1953) 
(“[I]nternational agreements are to be presumed not to create legal relations 
unless the parties expressly or impliedly so declare”). 
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legally binding.220 They only take pains to state the legal value 
of the document where it is purportedly non-legally binding. 
This practice suggests that states feel a need to rebut 
something when reaching agreements that might be 
misunderstood as binding and it appears that silence is meant 
to be understood as establishing a legal obligation. This 
exception is also not dependent on the existence of enforcement 
or third-party legal qualification of the acts, but could be 
informed by them. International law is only partly formalized, 
so law professors and other commentators are invited to offer 
their legal classifications of acts, recognizing that they could be 
wrong, but that submitted classifications might contribute to 
the meaningful, inter se legal assessment. That inter se 
assessment might include binding, third-party assessment, but 
simply by its being assessed by a third-party does not mean it 
is not inter se.221
Based on the foregoing, this author proposes the following 
analytical framework. An agreement between states could be 
non-binding, partly binding or fully binding in international 
law. In all three cases, it will not be such because it is removed 
from law but because of law. Terms within agreements will be 
legally binding where the parties clearly reached agreement 
(including agreement that the remainder of the instrument is 
non-binding), and will be non-binding where they did not. Since 
there is not necessarily a judge in international dispute 
settlement, the aggrieved party may interpret the law and 
sustain a claim itself. This classification of whether the terms 
of the understanding are binding will be done on a case-by-case 
analysis of the particular terms.  
  
A first possibility is that there might be an express 
statement of intent in the agreed text as to the legal effects of 
the instrument. For example, the U.S.-Israel Free Trade Area 
Agreement clearly states that its provisions are “not . . . legally-
binding”.222
 
 220. See, e.g., Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 
 Aust also refers to an instrument that is explicitly 
35; 
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, supra note 217; U.N. Charter; U. 
N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397; Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90. 
All of these agreements  are undoubtedly treaties, though none of them 
explicitly states they are meant to be binding. 
 221. Crawford, supra note 184, at 33, art. 1, cmt (4) (finding that 
responsibility is an essentially inter se relationship, aside from obligations 
erga omnes). 
 222. See Free Trade Area Agreement, Declaration on Trade in Services, 
U.S.-Isr., Apr. 22, 1985, 24 I.L.M. 653, 679 (providing in its preamble that the 
“principles set forth below shall not be legally-binding”). 
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titled the “Non-Legally Binding Authoritative Statement of 
Principles for a Global Consensus on the Management, 
Conservation and Sustainable Development of all Types of 
Forests”.223 The proposed MOU with Libya regarding military 
cooperation provides that “[T]his MOU does not include any 
provisions that entail commitments under International 
Law”.224
The question for this possibility would be how explicit 
would the provision need to be to be considered an express 
statement. The NATO-Russia Founding Act refers to “political 
commitments”
  
225 and the Stockholm Disarmament Declaration 
states that it embodies commitments that are “politically 
binding.”226 These examples do not explicitly exclude legally 
binding commitments which could exist in parallel with the 
political commitments. However, if we understand that all legal 
commitments are also political commitments, then expressly 
providing for the political ones implicitly excludes the legal 
ones. That being said, Hersch Lauterpacht argued that express 
designation of an agreement as “a declaration of policy” did not 
suffice to remove it from being a legal agreement.227
There could, of course, also be implied intent to establish 
whether commitments are legally binding or not. Subjective 
intent for an instrument to be legally binding (or not) is 
essentially impossible to prove.
 
Apparently, the designation would need to be more specific 
than that example to succeed. 
228
 
 223. AUST, supra note 
 Instead, we must look for 
objective implied intent. And by “objective”, we mean the 
32, at 28 (citing U.N. Conference on Env't & Dev., 
Non-Legally Binding Authoritative Statement of Principles for a Global 
Consensus on the Management, Conservation and Sustainable Development of 
all Types of Forests, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.151/26 (Vol. III), Annex III (June 13, 
1992)).  
 224. U.S. Dept. of State, Cable 08–Tripoli–308 (Apr. 10, 2008), ¶ 3, § 9(2), 
available at http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/04/08TRIPOLI308.html. 
 225. See Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security, 
N.A.T.O.–Russ., May 27, 1997, 36 I.L. M. 1006. 
 226. See Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and 
Disarmament in Europe, Final Stockholm Document, art. 101, Sept. 19, 1986, 
26 I.L.M. 190, 195. 
 227. Lauterpacht, supra note 81, at 125, ¶ 8 (citing Declaration by the 
French Republic constituting an agreement on commercial policy and related 
matters, May 28, 1946, 1951 U.N.T.S. 84, 152) (“Neither is the legal nature of 
the instrument affected by its designation as a declaration of policy, especially 
if it is described as an agreement and if in other respects it imposes 
ascertainable obligations upon the parties.”). 
 228. See Widdows, supra note 219, at 121 (declaring such a search to lead 
to a tautology). 
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objective understanding of the parties to imply legal value, not 
our objective understanding. Therefore, we cannot rely on the 
individual parties’ subjective intent, but rather evidence of 
their objective intent: the words that they agreed to and the 
circumstances of the time, and the inferences we can draw from 
them.229
A variety of cues have been identified that supposedly 
track state practice in designating which agreements are 
treaties and which are not. The title of an agreement (“treaty” 
or “Memorandum of Understanding”) is suggestive, but not 
determinative.
 Insofar as international law is partly formalized, we, 
as scholars and commentators on the law, can at least submit 
our opinions on what objective intent is expressed, and to the 
degree that a dispute involving a third-party dispute resolution 
mechanism might be engaged, that arbiter might do the same. 
230 An agreement could speak in aspirational 
terms,231
 
 229. See Schachter, supra note 
 use the word “will” or “shall”, or employ “entry into 
219.  
 230. See Peace, in OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW (Vol. 1), pt. 2, § 586, 
at 1209 (Robert Jennings & Arthur Watts eds., 9th ed. 1992) (“[S]tates cannot 
avoid an instrument being a treaty merely by giving it a title suggesting 
otherwise”).  In Treaties in Force, the U.S. State Department has recorded 768 
documents which were entitled “Memorandum of Understanding” as treaties. 
See generally U.S. DEP’T STATE, TREATIES IN FORCE (2010) available at 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/143863.pdf.  
 231. See Second Report on the Law of Treaties, II Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 124–
25, ¶¶ 5–7, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/87  
In a sense these provisions, which leave for future agreement the 
determination of the extent of the substantive obligations of the 
parties, are no more than pacta de contrahendo. They are further 
weakened by qualifications such as that the amount of assistance 
shall be such as the Government in question shall authorize. 
Nevertheless, it would not be accurate to maintain that an 
instrument of that character is no more than a pious statement of 
intention as distinguished from an assumption of binding legal 
obligations. 
(citing, inter alia, Preliminary Agreement, U.S.-Czechoslov., July 11, 1942, 90 
U.N.T.S. 258 (relating to the principles applying to mutual aid in the 
prosecution of the war against aggression); Agreement, U.S.-Den., Apr. 27, 
1951, 94 U.N.T.S. 45 (regarding the defense of Greenland); Agreement, Den.-
Pol., Dec. 7, 1949, 81 U.N.T.S. 22 (concerning the exchange of commodities); 
Exchange of notes constituting an agreement regarding the placement of 
Netherlands agricultural workers in Luxembourg, Lux.-Neth., Aug. 17 & 25, 
1950, 81 U.N.T.S. 14; Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement, U.S.-Fr., Jan. 
27, 1950, 80 U.N.T.S. 172; Customs Regime between Germany and Austria 
(Protocol of Mar. 19, 1931), 1931 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 41 (Sept. 5).  Cf. Legal 
Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia 
(SW Afr.), Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory 
Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. 16, ¶ 114 (June 21)  
It has also been contended that the relevant Security Council 
resolutions are couched in exhortatory rather than mandatory 
language and that, therefore, they do not purport to impose any legal 
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force” language.232 However, again, the ICJ has ruled that 
terminology cannot alone be sufficient,233 and states have 
concurred.234 Lastly, the instrument could follow an “if-then” 
structure, further suggesting that a quid pro quo is envisioned. 
Whether an instrument is recorded or registered has been 
suggested as evidence that it is not a treaty,235
Turning to the content, where pre-existing obligations are 
additionally inserted and where states are under no obligation 
to restate them, they may be meaningful—i.e. creating new 
binding obligations between the parties regarding that 
obligation. If the obligation is already owed erga omnes, 
perhaps this implicit creation of a new obligation is less clear. 
 however, this 
author has argued above that failure to register – even a 
prohibition on registration – does not exclude binding effect. 
Even if the terms of an agreement generally were 
considered non-legally binding, we might find specific 
provisions within it that are severable and binding on their 
own, despite the fact that other aspects of the communication 
did not result in binding commitments. The most glaring 
example cited above is the binding nature of provisions in 
agreements ordering that the agreement itself is generally not 
binding. We should keep in mind that agreements are 
presumed to be generally binding and that non-binding aspects 
are generally the exception. This conclusion suggests that not 
 
duty on any State nor to affect legally any right of any State. The 
language of a resolution of the Security Council should be carefully 
analysed before a conclusion can be made as to its binding effect. In 
view of the nature of the powers under Article 25, the question 
whether they have been in fact exercised is to be determined in each 
case, having regard to the terms of the resolution to be interpreted, 
the discussions leading to it, the Charter provisions invoked and, in 
general, all circumstances that might assist in determining the legal 
consequences of the resolution of the Security Council. 
For an example of aspirational terms, see Organization of American States: 
Inter-American Convention Against Corruption, art. III, Mar. 29, 1996, 
reprinted in35 INT’L LEGAL MATERIALS 724 (“to consider the applicability of 
measures within their own institutional systems . . . .”). 
 232. Other terminology could include the verbs used (e.g. “will”, “shall”, 
etc.) and provisions (such as “entry into force”, “breach”, “termination”, etc.). 
AUST, supra note 32 at 27; Juris A. Lejnieks, The Nomenclature of Treaties: A 
Quantitative Analysis, 2 TEX. INT’L L.J. 175, 179 (1966). But see 22 C. F. R. § 
181.2(a)(5); AUST, supra note  32, at 27–32. 
 233. See Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions (Qatar v. Bahr.), 
1994 I.C.J. Reps. 112, 122 (July 1). 
 234. See AUST, supra note 32, at 32. 
 235. See U.N. Charter art. 102, para. 1 (“Every treaty and every 
international agreement entered into by any Member . . . shall as soon as 
possible be registered with the Secretariat and published by it.”). 
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only must agreements be analyzed assurance-by-assurance, but 
also obligation-by-obligation. There could be obligations of 
confidentiality, monitoring among other possibilities that could 
be legally binding even though the principle obligation(s) were 
not. Furthermore, the state expelling the person who then 
suffered mistreatment might attempt to claim reliance 
damages.  
Lastly, there is probably at least an obligation of good faith 
in complying with the non-binding obligations or at least good 
faith in continuing negotiations. This is a legal obligation.236
Lastly, where we find that the individual terms of the 
agreement are not governed by international law, we will want 
to also examine whether the terms are binding under domestic 
law. Where the parties are clear that the assurances do not 
create any legal obligations at all, then it is hard to deny them 
that force. We should conclude that there is no legal obligation.  
 In 
principle a state party should be able to maintain an 
international dispute over whether the other party pursued its 
obligations in good faith, though the obligation was not itself 
binding, although its inability to resolve the dispute through 
third-party adjudication might be limited. The difficulty in 
terms of remedies would be showing the situation the state (or 
its national) would have been in had the state acted in good 
faith. And in any event, that remedy would most likely be 
requested through diplomatic channels rather than third-party 
dispute resolution. 
6. Application to Diplomatic Assurances 
It has been submitted that in the practical application of 
assurances, the receiving state would simply not engage in the 
prohibited act because of the political repercussions. In the case 
of Canada and Egypt, the court in Mahjoub, discussed above, 
held that Egypt had “too much to lose”.237
 
 236. See Voting Procedure on Questions Relating to Reports and Petitions 
Concerning  Territory of South-West Africa, Advisory Opinion, 1955 I.C.J. 67, 
88, 99, 105, 119–20 (June 7) (separate opinion of Judge Klaestad) (separate 
opinion of Judge Lauterpacht). 
 Since the process by 
which Egypt would lose—i.e. being either legal or extra-legal—
was unclear, the legal nature of the assurances is thrown into 
doubt. In Othman, SIAC understood that Jordan would not 
jeopardize its bilateral relationship with the UK in such a 
 237. See Mahjoub v. Canada (Minister of Citizen and Immigration), [2006] 
4 F.C.R. 247, ¶ 61 (Can.). 
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way.238
Looking at the language of the UK MOUs, specifically 
those with Libya, Jordan, Lebanon, and Ethiopia we do not see 
any language that would suggest that the obligations assumed 
are anything but legally binding ones, but that is not to say 
that effective, legal enforcement mechanisms are contemplated. 
The titles of the instruments are all “Memorandum of 
Understanding” but the MOUs with Libya and Lebanon are 
“Concerning the Provision of Assurances in Respect of Persons 
Subject to Deportation”
 However, it is important to observe that whatever 
Jordan or Egypt lost, they would lose it through one of the 
agreed modes of peaceful settlement of international disputes, 
specifically, negotiations. Notwithstanding the multiple 
submission that the assurances were not legal, a negotiated 
settlement of a dispute and repercussions of non-compliance 
are not necessarily non-legal. 
239 whereas the MOU with Jordan is 
“Regulating the Provision of Undertakings in Respect of 
Specified Persons Prior to Deportation”.240 In the latter case, a 
stronger legal value is suggested, and the fact that the United 
Kingdom used a different title when it could have used the 
same title also suggests a change in intent, but that is merely 
indicative by the title. All three instruments then have a 
section entitled “Application and Scope”.241 The principle 
provision in this section uses very mandatory wording and 
states that “This arrangement will apply to any person 
accepted by the receiving state for admission to its territory 
following a written request by the sending state under the 
terms of this arrangement.”242
 
 238. See Othman v. Sec’y State Home Dep’t, Appeal No: SC/15/2005 
(S.I.A.C.) ¶ 279 (U.K.)  
 This section also contains a 
direction on the procedure for request of assurances, and 
requiring that the assurances be requested and issued in 
The agreement could not be enforced legally by the Appellant or by 
the UK Government but Mr Oakden said that he would be very 
surprised if the Jordanian Government decided not to respect it. 
Conversely, the parties were not approaching the MOU as if it were 
to be the basis for legal argument about narrowly defined obligations, 
which one or other could seek to get round. Commitment had been 
firm on both principle and practice. It was that firmness of 
commitment at all levels which had persuaded Mr Oakden that the 
MOU would work as intended. 
 239. U.K.–Leb. MOU, supra note 6; Libya–U.K. MOU, supra note 6. 
 240. U.K.–Jordan MOU, supra note 6. 
 241. U.K.–Jordan MOU, supra note 6; U.K.–Leb. MOU, supra note 6; 
Libya–U.K. MOU, supra note 6; U.K.–Eth. MOU, supra note  6. 
 242. U.K.–Jordan MOU, supra note 6. 
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promptly in writing.243 In the case of the MOU with Jordan, the 
instrument contemplates oral assurances, but still demands 
that they be eventually issued in writing before the expulsion 
can be affected. 244
Still in the Application and Scope section, the Libyan and 
Lebanese MOUs provide for compliance with human rights. 
The MOU with Jordan also provides for compliance with 
human rights, but strangely does so in the following section 
regarding “Understandings” rather than in the “Application 
and Scope” section. It is not entirely clear why this placement 
was used in this case and whether any change in meaning is 
intended. It could be that the imperative nature of the 
obligations as well as their nature as separate and independent 
obligations apart from the pre-existing obligations under 
international law is affected. For example, the language in the 
Jordanian MOU simply says that “[i]t is understood that the 
authorities of the United Kingdom and of Jordan will comply 
with their human rights obligations under international law 
regarding a person returned under this arrangement,”
   
245 
whereas the Libyan and Lebanese MOUs state that the parties 
“will comply with their human rights obligations under 
international law.”246 This latter language of “will comply” 
suggests an additional obligation more clearly than the former 
language of “understands that they will comply.” In any event, 
in all three MOUs, that language is followed by mandatory 
language about the application of certain assurances. The 
Libyan and Lebanese MOUs use somewhat less compelling 
language, though not necessarily non-binding language: “The 
assurances set out in the following paragraphs . . . will apply to 
such a person . . . .”247 while the Jordanian MOU characterizes 
the assurances as “conditions.”248
It was noted above that the Ethiopian, Libyan and 
 This latter usage suggests a 
greater sense of reliance on the assurances as a condition for 
the expulsion.  
 
 243. U.K.–Jordan MOU, supra note 6; Libya–U.K. MOU, supra note 6; 
U.K.–Eth. MOU, supra note 6. 
 244. U.K.–Jordan MOU, supra note 6. 
 245. Id. 
 246. U.K.–Eth. MOU, supra note  6; U.K.–Leb. MOU, supra note 6; Libya–
U.K. MOU, supra note 6.  
 247. U.K.–Leb. MOU, supra note 6; Libya–U.K. MOU , supra note 6. 
 248. U.K.–Jordan MOU, supra note 6 (“Where someone has been accepted 
under the terms of this arrangements, the conditions set out in the following 
paragraphs (numbered 1-9) will apply, together with any further specific 
assurances provided by the receiving state.”). 
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Lebanese MOUs provide for a monitoring body and that such a 
provision appears to be an additional one, therefore an 
agreement. The next question is whether this agreement is a 
legally binding one. The reasoning for including the monitoring 
body provision in the Libyan and Lebanese MOU “Application 
and Scope” section and in the Jordanian and Ethiopian MOU 
“Understandings” section, is unclear; however, the obligation is 
provided for in mandatory language.249
Then the agreements proceed to lay out several obligations 
on the states such as “will be brought promptly before a 
judge,”
  
250 “will be informed promptly . . . of any charge against 
him”251 etc.252
Lastly, the terms on withdrawal sound almost identical to 
those usually used in treaties, in this case, that either party 
may withdraw by giving six months notice. However, what is 
particularly interesting, and what reaffirms that these are 
legally binding obligations, is that the MOUs provide for 
surviving obligations: “Where one or other government 
withdraws from the arrangement, the terms of this 
arrangement will continue to apply to anyone who has been 
returned in accordance with its provisions.”
 Firstly, they are already existing obligations 
under international law, so arguing that they are not binding 
here is a bit difficult. It is strange to imagine that a state would 
agree to non-binding obligations to perform tasks that are 
otherwise binding. Surely, where a state agrees to something, 
and we have already concluded that there is an agreement to 
do the task, it would agree to do it with the same legal 
compulsion. We can consider the presumption in favor of 
binding agreements to buttress this argument. Secondly, even 
if we were tempted to see the agreements as non-binding, 
though still otherwise binding under general international law, 
we should follow that temptation since the obligations were 
expressed in mandatory language once again. 
253
 
 249. E.g., typical language is in the Libya–U.K. MOU, supra note  
 It is difficult to 
6: 
An independent body (“monitoring body”) will be nominated by both 
sides to monitor the implementation of the assurances given under 
this Memorandum, including any specific assurances, by the receiving 
state. The responsibilities of the monitoring body will include 
monitoring the return of, and any detention, trial or imprisonment of, 
the person. The monitoring body will report to both sides. 
See also U.K.–Jordan MOU, supra note  6, at Understanding 4; U.K.–Leb. 
MOU, supra note  6; U.K.–Eth. MOU, supra note  6. 
 250. U.K.–Jordan MOU, supra note  6, at Understanding 2. 
 251. Id. at Understanding 3. 
 252. Id. at Understanding 4–8. 
 253. Id. at Withdrawal. 
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interpret this document as anything but a legally binding 
agreement. 
In U.K. practice, the MOUs are supplemented by specific 
assurances in each case. These instruments are also difficult to 
locate, however in the case of RB before the House of Lords, the 
specific assurances were publicized and the House made a point 
to argue that the person subject to expulsion must be informed 
of the assurances in his case.254 The assurance stated that  the 
person at issue “will enjoy the following rights, assurances and 
guarantees as provided by the Constitution and the national 
laws currently in force concerning human rights: . . .”255 This 
provision does not expressly refer to international human 
rights, but appears to transform domestic obligations into 
international ones. The House did not appear to consider these 
legal obligations, although it did not reach a decision on that 
point, but instead simply observed that the assurances were 
meant to be followed.256
Turning to an example of Canadian-Egyptian practice, the 
precise text of the assurances in the Mahjoub case is difficult to 
locate, but the Canadian court did refer to them in its 
judgment:  
 
Egypt had given assurances to Canada that Mr. Mahjoub would not 
be tortured upon his return, in the form of two diplomatic notes and a 
letter from Major General Omar M. Soliman, GIS Chief. The delegate 
 
 254. See RB (Algeria) et al. v. Sec’y State Home Dep’t, [2010] UKHL 10, 
[2009] 110 (H.L.) ¶ 102 (U.K.)  
[W]e wish to make one point clear, which emerged more clearly 
during the substantive appeals. It is our view that the SSHD cannot 
rely on any substantive assurance unless it is put into the open. . . . 
[T]he key documents or conversations relied on to show that an 
Appellant’s return would not breach the UK’s international 
obligations or put him at risk of a death sentence or death penalty 
have to be in the open evidence. SIAC could not put weight on 
assurances which the giver was not prepared to make public; they 
would otherwise be deniable, or open to later misunderstanding; the 
fact of a breach would not be known to the public and the pressure 
which that might yield would be reduced. They must be available to 
be tested and recorded. 
 255. See id. ¶ 25 (including “the right to appear before a court . . .”, “receive 
free legal aid”; “presumed to be innocent . . .”; “right to notify a relative”; “right 
to be examined by a doctor”; “right to appear before a court”; and right to 
“human dignity”). 
 256. See id. ¶ 192 
The arrangements with Algeria were negotiated at the highest level 
and it was plain to the Algerian authorities that what the United 
Kingdom required was an assurance which would enable it to 
comply with its obligations under article 3. On the other hand, the 
assurances had to be expressed in language which would respect 
the dignity of a sovereign state. 
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reviewed the trustworthiness of the assurances “as to their nature, 
their content as well as precedents and incentives with regards to the 
Egyptian government”. She gave little weight to the letter in view of 
its unofficial nature. However, she did accord considerable weight to 
the diplomatic notes as they constituted “part of the official record of 
bilateral relations between Canada and Egypt”. She decided that 
Egypt would not torture Mr. Mahjoub after officially denying it would, 
concluding it had too much to lose in the event it reneged on its 
guarantee. 
257
The court is not entirely clear what legal value it believes 
the assurances have. On the one hand, they are “part of the 
official record of bilateral relations” and despite the letter being 
“unofficial,” the assurances were not, suggesting that they were 
“official,” whatever that means. On the other hand, they are 
enforceable only to the degree that Egypt had “too much to 
lose.” We are left wondering what Egypt would lose if it failed 
to comply and whether it would lose whatever it might lose 
through legal or extra-legal process. 
 
Another text of assurances between Egypt and Sweden was 
revealed in Alzery v. Sweden before the Human Rights 
Committee: 
On 12 December 2001, a senior official of the Swedish Ministry for 
Foreign Affairs met with a representative of the Egyptian 
government. . . . The state secretary of the Swedish Ministry for 
Foreign Affairs presented an Aide-Mémoire to the official which read:  
“It is the understanding of the Government of the Kingdom of 
Sweden that [the author and another individual] will be awarded 
a fair trial in the Arab Republic of Egypt. It is further the 
understanding of the Government of the Kingdom of Sweden that 
these persons will not be subjected to inhuman treatment or 
punishment of any kind by any authority of the Arab Republic of 
Egypt and further that they will not be sentenced to death or if 
such a sentence has been imposed that it will not be executed by 
any competent authority of the Arab Republic of Egypt. Finally, it 
is the understanding of the Government of the Kingdom of 
Sweden that the wife and children of [another individual] will not 
in any way be persecuted or harassed by any authority of the 
Arab Republic of Egypt.”  
 
. . . The Egyptian Government responded in writing: “We herewith 
assert our full understanding to all items of this memoire, concerning 
the way of treatment upon repatriate from your government, with full 
respect to their personal and human rights. This will be done 
according to what the Egyptian constitution and law stipulates.” In 
oral discussions with representatives from the Egyptian government, 
the Swedish Government also requested that the Embassy would be 
allowed to attend the trial. The author states that it remains unclear 
 
 257. See Mahjoub v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 
[2006] 4 F.C.R. 247, ¶ 61 (Can.). 
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what other kind of follow-up mechanisms were discussed and decided 
upon prior to the expulsion. While the Swedish Government had since 
indicated that there had been discussions about the right to visit the 
author in prison, this remained unconfirmed. . . .
258
The Human Rights Committee found the assurances not to 
have been sufficient because  
 
the assurances procured contained no mechanism for monitoring of 
their enforcement. Nor were any arrangements made outside the text 
of the assurances themselves which would have provided for effective 
implementation. The visits by the State party’s ambassador and staff 
commenced five weeks after the return, neglecting altogether a period 
of maximum exposure to risk of harm. . . .
259
It is unclear whether the Committee believed that the 
monitoring and enforcement mechanism would need to simply 
exist or would need to constitute a legally binding obligation. In 
any event, the committee clearly believed that an additional 
commitment, not a mere restatement of existing obligations, 
would need to be made to render the assurances effective. This 
agreement appears to be a mere “piece of paper.”
 
260
One court has found that diplomatic assurances along 
these very lines are treaties, the European Court. In Babar 
Ahmad v. United Kingdom, the Court held: 
 
It is true that these assurances have been given by the United States 
Government to the United Kingdom Government and not to the 
applicants. On this basis, Amnesty International has observed in its 
report that there is no mechanism by which the applicants could 
enforce the assurances which have been given. However, in the 
Court’s view that would only be relevant if it were established that 
there was a real risk of a breach of those assurances. It is the 
President of the United States who would be responsible for any 
designation as enemy combatants and it has not been alleged that 
those responsible for the prosecution of the applicants would wish to 
 
 258. See Alzery v. Sweden, Comm. No. 1416/2005, ¶¶ 3.6–3.7, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/88/D/1416/2005 (Human Rights Comm. Nov. 10, 2006). 
 259. See id. ¶ 11.5. See also Maksudov, et al. v. Kyrgystan, Comm. Nos. 
1461, 62, 76, 77 2006, ¶12.5, UN Doc. CCPR/C/93/D/1461, 1462, 1476 & 
1477/2006 (Human Rights Comm. July 30, 2008) (citing Alzery) 
. . . The procurement of assurances from the Uzbek General 
Prosecutor's Office, which, moreover, contained no concrete 
mechanism for their enforcement, was insufficient to protect 
against such risk. The Committee reiterates that at the very 
minimum, the assurances procured should contain such a 
monitoring mechanism and be safeguarded by arrangements made 
outside the text of the assurances themselves which would provide 
for their effective implementation. 
 260. Note that the oral communication about permitting attendance at the 
trial could never constitute a treaty since it is not written, but it could be 
classic example of binding oral promises if the expulsion relied on them. See 
infra Sec. III. 
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breach (or indeed be capable of breaching) the assurances by another 
means. Consequently, the only question is whether the President 
would breach the assurances which the United States Government 
have given. Whatever the breadth of the executive discretion enjoyed 
by the President in the prosecution of the United States 
Government’s counter-terrorism efforts, the Court is unable to accept 
that he, or any of his successors, would commit such a serious breach 
of his Government’s assurances to a extradition partner such as the 
United Kingdom; the United States’ long-term interest in honouring 
its extradition commitments alone would provide sufficient dissuasion 
from doing so.
261
While the real thrust of the passage is the enforceability of 
the assurances and the risk of prosecution in anything other 
than civilian courts, the Court appears to implicitly understand 
assurances to be legally binding, or at least potentially legally 
binding, though without enforcement mechanisms. Firstly, the 
Court repeatedly refers to “breach” of the assurances, a word 
that is more usually linked to a failure to comply with legally 
binding commitments. Secondly, and perhaps more 
significantly, the Court argues that the lack of an individual 
right to enforce the assurances is not relevant until and unless 
there is a “breach.” The fact that the Court highlights the lack 
of a breach as the only reason why an individual enforcement 
right is irrelevant suggests that if there was a breach, then the 
mechanism for enforcement of the assurances would be entirely 
relevant. But that issue presupposes that there is something to 
be enforced by the Court—a legal obligation. Since the Court 
jumps over this question, it suggests that the Court does not 
see it as an issue whether the assurances are legally binding—
they clearly are. 
 
The European Court stated that its assessment of 
diplomatic assurances included an assumption of good faith 
and suggested that the good faith assumption was based on the 
United States’ good human rights record.262
 
 261. See Ahmad v. United Kingdom, App. Nos. 24027/07, 11949/08 and 
36742/08, 51 Eur. H.R. Rep. SE6 , ¶ 108 (2010). But see Saadi v. Italy, App. 
No. 37201/06, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2008) (where the European found the assurances 
not legally binding). The inconsistent approach of the European might be 
indicative of the need for a case-by-case examination. 
 Good faith in 
fulfilling obligations is the same standard applied to 
international legal obligations. It is difficult to understand how 
the same standard would govern both political and legal 
commitments when legal commitments are supposed to have a 
 262. See Ahmad v. United Kingdom, App. No. 24027/07, 11949/08 and 
36742/08, 51 Eur. Ct. H.R. SE6, ¶ 105 (2010) (“it is appropriate that [a 
presumption of good faith] be applied to a requesting State which has a long 
history of respect for democracy, human rights and the rule of law . . . .”). 
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greater binding force. If the Court is correct that the 
assurances are to be judged by the good faith standard, then 
the Court may have been legalizing political commitments. 
This conclusion also suggests that it is possible to sever legal 
obligations from a mostly non-legally binding assurance. 
The prior European Court case is suggestive, but in a final 
case to examine, the Court is more explicit. In the case of 
Einhorn v. France, the U.S. State of Pennsylvania had 
requested the extradition of Ira Einhorn from France, and the 
French Government had received diplomatic assurances from 
the U.S. Embassy that Einhorn would be treated correctly upon 
return to the United States—, e.g. that he would receive a fair 
trial and that he would not face the death penalty. The Court 
held that the assurances amounted to treaties. 
13.  In a diplomatic note of 2 July 1998 to the French Government, 
the United States embassy stated: . . . 
[T]he U.S. Government provides its assurances that if the 
Government of France extradites Ira Einhorn to the United 
States to stand trial for murder in the Commonwealth of 
Pennsylvania, the death penalty will not be sought, imposed or 
executed against Ira Einhorn for this offense. The sworn affidavit 
of District Attorney Lynne Abraham, dated June 10, 1998, and an 
earlier assurance by Abraham sworn June 23, 1997, affirms that 
under Pennsylvania law it is legally impossible for a prosecutor 
to seek or a court on its own motion to impose [the] death penalty 
for murders committed in Pennsylvania prior to September 13, 
1978. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision, Commonwealth 
v. Truesdale, dated September 15, 1983, unequivocally prohibits 
the imposition of the death penalty for murders committed prior 
to the enactment of the Pennsylvania Death Penalty Statute on 
September 13, 1978. This decision binds all Pennsylvania courts, 
district attorneys and prosecutors regarding the imposition of the 
death penalty. . . .” 
Those assurances were reiterated in a diplomatic note of 24 
September 1999, in which it was also stated that the Supreme Court 
had held that laws enacted after a criminal judgment had been 
delivered, particularly where they might benefit the accused, were not 
inconsistent with the prohibition on ex post facto laws (see Collins v. 
Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37-1990), a fact which served to confirm the 
constitutionality of the 1998 Pennsylvania statute guaranteeing the 
applicant a new trial on his return to the United States. 
. . . . 
30. . . . The [French] Government added that even supposing a 
Pennsylvania court were to hold that the statute was 
unconstitutional, such a ruling could not call into question the 
validity and scope of the undertaking which the United States 
Federal Government had given France. The diplomatic assurances 
given to the French authorities came under the “executive 
agreements” defined in the Federal Constitution’s provisions 
concerning the executive. By Article VI, section 2, of the Federal 
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Constitution, such agreements were binding on the federal 
Government and the federal States, and in particular on the federal 
States’ courts, notwithstanding any indication to the contrary in the 
Federal Constitution or the legislation of any federal State. The 
precedents of the United States Supreme Court were consistent on 
that point (the Government cited United States v. Belmont, 301 US 
324 (1937), United States v. Pink, 315 US 203 (1941), and United 
States v. Rauscher, 119 US 407 (1886), from the latter of which it 
appeared, in particular, that anyone extradited to the United States 
was entitled to ask the federal or State courts to enforce those 
fundamental rules). . . .  
If, by some extraordinary chance, Mr Einhorn was unable to be 
retried in Pennsylvania, the Government considered “that he should, 
in principle, be released by the American authorities”. The “speciality 
rule” of international customary law – whereby the requesting State’s 
authorities were required to comply with the terms of an extradition 
order and were prohibited from taking any coercive measures against 
the extradited person other than those permitted by the order – 
precluded the applicant’s being kept in prison in order to serve the 
sentence that had been imposed on him in absentia in 1993.
263
The language of the assurance is the very kind that has 
featured in other assurances examined above, a re-statement of 
the existing law without provision for legal enforcement 
mechanisms, aside from diplomacy, accompanied by the 
mandatory language of “will not be sought” but failing to state 
the legal value of the assurance itself.
 
264 One difference here is 
that the restatement of law is only a restatement of municipal 
law, not international law, but for purposes of this analysis the 
distinction is not important because we are focusing on the 
value of assurance itself. The European Court concluded that 
the diplomatic assurances given by the United States 
amounted to an “executive agreement,” which is a municipal 
law classification for what is, under international law, a treaty. 
Because it was a treaty, the European Court held that the 
assurances were, quite simply, legally binding on the United 
States.265
 
 263. See Einhorn v. France, 2001-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 275, ¶¶ 13, 30 (2001). 
 This conclusion appears to be correct since the 
 264. Note that the assurance states that “[t]his decision binds all 
Pennsylvania courts, district attorneys and prosecutors regarding the 
imposition of the death penalty” but that that statement is not referring to the 
binding force of the assurances, rather the binding force of the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court precedent. Id. ¶ 13.  
 265. See Einhorn v. France, 2001-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 275, ¶ 30 (2001); See 
also Klein v. Russia, Judgment, Appl. No. 24268/08,Eur. Ct. H.R. (2010) 
(Kovler & Hajiyev, JJ., dissenting) (“The Court does not have valid reasons to 
foresee with any degree of certainty that Colombia would fail to comply with 
its obligations arising from international law (see, mutatis mutandis, Einhorn 
v. France (dec.), no. 71555/01, § 33, ECHR 2001-XI)”). It is unclear whether the 
dissenting judges believed that the obligations were binding on Russia under 
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language of the assurance was clear and unequivocal that 
something was being agreed to and that it was not exempting 
the pledge from international law. 
A final case study will be diplomatic assurances issued by 
Germany to South Africa in an extradition request. The specific 
case was later litigated in Harksen v. President of South Africa 
where Germany and South Africa did not have an extradition 
treaty in place so the proposed transfer would be solely 
pursuant to this exchange. In this case the communications 
read in part: 
. . .Germany . . . ask[s] for the extradition of the German citizen 
Jürgen Harksen . . . the Embassy would be most grateful if all items 
found at the time of Mr Harksen’s arrest could be handed over to the 
German prosecuting authorities as they could be judicial evidence . . . 
After extradition, the Embassy would appreciate information on the 
time Mr Harksen spent under arrest in South Africa for the required 
extradition. 
The Embassy would like to point out that the Federal Republic of 
Germany is prepared to extradite persons with similar criminal 
offences to South Africa if these persons do not have German 
citizenship and if German extradition laws are satisfied. 
The Embassy would like to assure that Mr Harksen will only be liable 
for punishment for offences for which extradition is sought and that 
no other proceedings may be introduced. 
The Embassy further assures the Department that Mr Harksen will 
not be extradited, transferred or deported to another country without 
the permission of the South African Government and that he may 
leave the Federal Republic of Germany after conclusion of the legal 
proceedings for which the extradition has been granted. 
The Embassy wishes to advise that in the case of sentencing by a 
German court Mr Harksen will not be punished for political, military 
or religious reasons and that the time of arrest in South Africa for 
extradition will be taken into account for a possible penalty. 
. . . . 
The Embassy should be most grateful for any co-operation in this 
matter and looks forward to hearing from the competent authorities 
in due course. 
266
The Constitutional Court concluded that the agreement 
was not a treaty because the promises were not seen to have 
been intended to be binding, largely because of the way non-
treaty-based extradition operates under South African domestic 
law, being a mere reply by the office of the President that the 
request is being forwarded to the appropriate agency for 
 
 
international law due to the assurances themselves or other sources (e.g. 
ICCPR, etc.) or both. 
 266. See Harksen v. President of the Republic of South Africa & Others 
1999 (A), aff’d 2000 (2) SA 1189 (CC), ¶ 19 (citing Diplomatic Note 96/94 (8 
Mar. 1994)), reprinted in 132 I.L.R. 529, 537 (S. Afr. (A) 1999). 
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processing.267
It is submitted that this conclusion was plainly wrong. This 
assurance is clearly issued between states and is made 
pursuant to extradition, an inter-state matter on the 
international plane, though it does involve some aspects of 
domestic law. In particular, Germany asks for South Africa to 
perform an act of transfer, although aspects of the transfer of 
evidence and information do not appear to be a mandatory part 
of the request.
  
268 Germany stated that at least some of the 
usual rules of extradition would apply to this ad hoc case of 
extradition: the rule of speciality,269 the rule prohibiting 
prosecution for political offenses,270
 
 267. Harksen v. President of the Republic of South Africa & Others, 1999 
(A), aff’d 2000 (2) S.A. 825 (CC)829 (S. Afr.), reprinted in 132 I.L.R. 529, 558 
(S. Afr. (A) 1999). 
 and the rule that Germany 
would not extradite him to another state subsequently. 
Germany then states that it would be “prepared” to reciprocally 
extradite persons, even though it does not have an extradition 
agreement with South Africa. We know that extradition 
treaties are treaties as such and this informal arrangement in 
lieu of an extradition treaty appears to embody most of the 
same requirements and conditions as an extradition treaty. 
Although several of the terms are worded in less mandatory 
terms, others are quite specific such as the application of the 
rule of speciality. Although it is not mentioned whether this 
agreement is legally binding or not, especially given the fact 
that extradition is normally conducted pursuant to a treaty, it 
would seem entirely reasonable for South Africa to consider 
Germany responsible if, for example, the accused was 
prosecuted for a political crime following extradition.  Although 
the agreement may have required action on the domestic 
plane— i.e. the domestic processing of an extradition request— 
the question is whether the agreement to trigger that domestic 
process was made on the international plane—i.e. the request 
is made by a foreign state, and can only be made by a foreign 
state, to another state for that state to render a person 
internationally with all the protections of international law. It 
 268. See Harksen v. President of the Republic of South Africa & Others 
1999 (A), aff’d 2000 (2) SA 1189 (CC), ¶ 19 (S. Afr.) (citing Diplomatic Note 
96/94 (8 Mar. 1994)), reprinted in 132 I.L.R. 529, 537 (S. Afr. (A) 1999) (“the 
Embassy would be most grateful” . . . “the Embassy would appreciate”) 
 269. See id. (“only be liable for punishment for offences for which 
extradition is sought”). 
 270. See id. (“will not be punished for political, military or religious 
reasons”). 
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matters not which government agency is fulfilling the 
obligation. 
The analysis of the foregoing instances of assurances has 
shown that the case-by-case analysis is correct. Some of the 
obligations assumed in assurances are legally binding and 
some are not, depending on the objective intent expressed. Note 
in addition that if the obligations regarding treatment of the 
expelled persons are not legal, then they are just “pieces of 
paper” documenting the bilateral relationship and difficult to 
base an expulsion on. If a state feels a need to request 
assurances, surely there is some concern about a risk of 
mistreatment.271
III. DIPLOMATIC ASSURANCES AS BINDING 
UNILATERAL STATEMENTS 
 If there is a risk that the person will be ill-
treated upon expulsion, then the court reviewing the expulsion, 
in assessing the fact of the likelihood of abuse, will have to 
consider that the receiving state was unwilling or unable to 
agree to legally binding commitments to treat the person 
humanely. This is already two strikes against expulsion. Where 
the evidence of a likelihood of mistreatment is exceptionally 
weak beyond those consideration, those non-legal assurances 
might suffice. Where there is any additional evidence pointing 
to a likelihood of mistreatment, however, it seems difficult to 
understand how the assessor of fact could conclude that mere 
“pieces of paper” and general unwillingness to agree to 
anything legal and binding, would suffice to establish the fact 
that the risk is too low to qualify for non-refoulement. 
Diplomatic assurances might also be legal obligations if 
they are binding unilateral statements. This analysis focuses 
on the legal force of the assurances after the person has been 
expelled by a state in reliance on them. Unilateral statements 
have consistently been held by the ICJ and PCIJ to create legal 
 
 271. See Independent Expert on the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms while Countering Terrorism, Report of the 
Independent Expert on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms while Countering Terrorism, transmitted by Note of the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2005/103, ¶ 56 (Feb. 7, 
2005) (by Robert K. Goldman) (“the mere fact that such assurances are sought 
is arguably a tacit admission by the sending State that the transferred person 
is indeed at risk of being tortured or ill-treated”); Commissioner for Human 
Rights, Report by Mr Alvaro Gil-Robles, Commissioner for Human Rights, on 
His Visit to Sweden, 21–23 April 2004, C.O.E. Doc. Comm. DH (2004) 13 (July 
8, 2004) (“[t]he weakness inherent in the practice of diplomatic assurances lies 
in the fact that where there is a need for such assurances, there is clearly an 
acknowledged risk of torture or ill-treatment.”). 
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obligations. These have included pledges to submit cases to the 
court’s jurisdiction272 but also pledges on matters of 
substance.273
It is well recognized that declarations made by way of unilateral acts, 
concerning legal or factual situations, may have the effect of creating 
legal obligations. Declarations of this kind may be, and often are, very 
specific. . . . An undertaking of this kind, if given publicly, and with 
an intent to be bound, even though not made within the context of 
international negotiations, is binding. In these circumstances, 
nothing in the nature of a quid pro quo nor any subsequent 
acceptance of the declaration, nor even any reply or reaction from 
other States, is required for the declaration to take effect. . . .
 The most articulate statement of the doctrine 
comes from the Nuclear Tests case, in which the ICJ stated: 
274
This text contemplates an intention to be bound. The Court 
continued to state, however, that “the intention is to be 
ascertained by interpretation of the act. When States make 
statements by which their freedom of action is to be limited, a 
restrictive interpretation is called for . . . .”
 
275 Thus, discovery of 
intent is limited to an examination of the text itself. Courts in 
other cases have acknowledged that diplomatic communication 
necessarily entails statements made in good faith—that is, with 
an intention that they be followed.276
 
 272. See Free Zones (Fr. v. Switz.), 1932 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 46 (June 7); 
Rights of Minorities in Upper Silesia (Minority Schools), 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) 
No. 15 (Apr. 26); German Interests in Upper Silesia, 1926 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 
7 (May 25); Mavrommatis, 1925 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 5 (Mar. 26). That being 
said, this author is mindful of the argument that submission of a dispute to 
the Court’s jurisdiction is a very special kind of agreement that may not be 
very helpful in supporting this argument. 
 After that consideration, 
 273. However, it must be conceded that the ICJ was not particularly clear 
about the role of reliance. In the Nuclear Tests cases, neither Australia nor 
New Zealand truly relied on the promises to its detriment in the usual sense of 
estoppel. The Court appeared to convert the type of reliance in estoppel to 
reliance on the international plane which is far more abstract. See Nuclear 
Tests Case (Austl. v. Fr.), 1974 I.C.J. 253, 267–68, ¶¶ 43–46 (Dec. 20). In fact, 
the Court later backed away from the reliance requirement in the Burkina 
Faso and Mali Frontier Dispute case. See Case Concerning the Frontier 
Dispute (Burk. Faso v. Mali), 1986 I.C.J. 554, 574, ¶ 40 (Dec. 22) (holding that 
the promise by France could only have been made as a binding promise 
unilaterally and so, since it was a unilateral statement, it should be 
understood to have been binding). If we follow this reasoning, then a far 
greater amount of diplomatic assurances would be swept into the legally 
binding category. 
 274. Nuclear Tests Case (Austl v. Fr.), 1974 I.C.J. 253, ¶ 43 (Dec. 20). 
 275. Id. ¶ 44. 
 276. See Ahmad, Aswat, Ahsan & Mustafa (Abu Hamza) v. United 
Kingdom, Partial Decision Admissibility, App. Nos. 24027/07, 11949/08 & 
36742/08, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 105 (2010)  
The Court recognises that, in extradition matters, Diplomatic Notes 
are a standard means for the requesting State to provide any 
2012] DIPLOMATIC ASSURANCES 341 
 
the analysis is simple: if the state limited its freedom of action, 
then it is bound.  
Moreover, the Court does not appear to require an 
intention to be legally bound, just an intention to be bound:  
When it is the intention of the State making the declaration that it 
should become bound according to its terms, that intention confers on 
the declaration the character of a legal undertaking, the State being 
thenceforth legally required to follow a course of conduct consistent 
with the declaration. 
277
The Court appears to exclude the possibility that a state can 
choose which obligations are legal and which obligations are 
not. 
 
The counsel for Australia submitted specifically that an 
“assurance” was not received from France. That the ICJ 
eventually found the unilateral statements to be binding, even 
though an “assurance” was not given,278 suggests that an 
“assurance” would have more legal gravity than a unilateral 
statement. The language used in the statements made by 
France was that “France will be in a position to pass on to the 
stage of underground explosions as soon as the series of tests 
planned for this summer is completed . . . .”279 “[t]hus the 
atmospheric tests which are soon to be carried out will, in the 
normal course of events, be the last of this type.”280
 
assurances which the requested State considers necessary for its 
consent to extradition. It also recognises that, in international 
relations, Diplomatic Notes carry a presumption of good faith. The 
Court considers that, in extradition cases, it is appropriate that that 
presumption be applied to a requesting State which has a long history 
of respect for democracy, human rights and the rule of law, and which 
has longstanding extradition arrangements with Contracting States. 
Consequently, the Court considers that it was appropriate for the 
High Court, in its judgment concerning the first and second 
applicants, to accord a presumption of good faith to the United States 
Government. 
 This 
language seems even less committal than the MOUs and 
assurances examined so far in this paper. Although the Court 
also observed that the statements were communicated both 
 277. Nuclear Tests Case (Austl v. Fr.),  1974 I.C.J. 253, ¶ 43 (Dec. 20). 
 278. See id. ¶ 32 
At the hearing . . . the Attorney-General of Australia made the 
following statement : 
You will recall that Australia has consistently stated it would 
welcome a French statement to the effect that no further 
atmospheric nuclear tests would be conducted. Indeed as the 
Court will remember such an assurance was sought of the French 
Government by the Australian Government by note dated 3 
January 1973, but no such assurance was given. . . . 
 279. Id. ¶ 34; see also id. ¶ 39. 
 280. Id. ¶ 35; see also id. ¶¶ 36–38. 
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publically and directly to other states, what it found to be 
crucial was that other states would be understood to rely on the 
statements.281
In the Einhorn case the European Court held that the 
assurances amounted to a treaty, but the Court also held that 
the assurances could alternatively amount to binding 
unilateral statements. France argued that the diplomatic 
assurances it had received were unilateral statements, legally 
binding under international law, citing the Nuclear Tests cases, 
inter alia.
  
282
30.  . . . The diplomatic notes could also be regarded in public 
international law as a unilateral international undertaking requiring 
the United States to fulfil the obligations it had entered into, failing 
which its international responsibility would be engaged; that position 
was established in the case-law of the International Court of Justice, 
and in particular in the “Nuclear Tests” judgment of 20 December 
1974 (New Zealand v. France, ICJ Reports 1974, §§ 45-63). The 
Government accordingly inferred that “inasmuch as the fulfilment of 
the obligation to afford Mr Einhorn the possibility of a new and fair 
trial [was] an essential prerequisite of his extradition, the French 
authorities [could not] seek additional guarantees in the event of such 
an obligation not being be fulfillable”.
 The Court agreed with this view and declared the 
application inadmissible, partly for this reason. 
283
France did not refer to the Vienna Convention in its 
argument in order to argue that the assurances amounted to a 
treaty, perhaps because neither France nor the United States 
was a party to the Convention. But it did argue that the 
Nuclear Tests standard operated to make the assurances 
legally binding because the individual was only extradited in 
reliance on the condition stated in the assurances 
 
Most of the cases examined in this paper, however, were 
decided prior to expulsion, meaning that the state had yet to 
fully rely on them. However, it is not clear that reliance, at 
least as understood in the municipal law of estoppel as reliance 
to one’s detriment, is a part of the international law of binding 
unilateral statements. If, indeed, reliance in this sense is not 
required, then diplomatic assurances are very good candidates 
to be legally binding from the moment of their issuance.  
 
 281. See id. ¶ 51 
In announcing that the 1974 series of atmospheric tests would be 
the last, the French Government conveyed to the world at large, 
including the Applicant, its intention effectively to terminate these 
tests. It was bound to assume that other States might take note of 
these statements and rely on their being effective. 
 282. Id. 
 283. Einhorn v. France, 2001-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 275,¶ 30 (2001). 
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If reliance in the stricter sense is required, then it is a 
matter of debate what actions amount to such reliance. 
Reaching an expulsion decision based on assurances might 
amount to reliance even prior physical expulsion. Or reliance 
might qualify as such only after the physical expulsion of the 
person to the receiving state. Without question, reliance to a 
detriment would exist when an expelled person is mistreated 
and the expelling state has potentially incurred state 
responsibility for failing to uphold its non-refoulement 
obligation.284
Even if reliance is required, and assurances only become 
legally binding at the moment of reliance, one can still find 
reliance in expulsion cases concluded on the basis of 
assurances. In the case of MSS v. Belgium and Greece
  
285
However, the Government pointed out that the order to leave the 
country had been issued based on the assurance that the applicant 
would not be sent back to Afghanistan without the merits of his 
complaints having been examined by the Greek authorities. 
Concerning access to the asylum procedure and the course of that 
procedure, the Government relied on the assurances given by the 
Greek authorities that they had finally accepted responsibility, and 
on the general information contained in the summary document 
drawn up by the Greek authorities . . . .
, in 
which extradition was concluded pursuant to assurances 
promising that an asylum status determination hearing would 
be conducted, the European Court held that:  
286
The fact that another state is placing its responsibility for 
compliance with non-refoulement and other obligations in the 
hands of another state when it expels a person on the basis of 
assurances constitutes reliance. If the state then commits acts 
that trigger the expelling state’s responsibility, even only 
potentially, then the expelling state has relied on the receiving 
state to its detriment. 
 
Taking this conservative view, after an expulsion is 
physically completed, reliance on the assurances is also 
complete, converting the assurances into a legal obligation to 
 
 284. This raises the difficult question of whether the assessment of the risk 
of mistreatment is an obligation of result or conduct. For the first, the 
eventual mistreatment would mean that the state did expel a person to a 
situation of risk of mistreatment, in the second, the eventual mistreatment 
would only contribute evidence to whether there was a risk at the time of the 
expulsion. It could be imagined that there might be no risk at the time of 
expulsion and that the risk only appeared after the person had been expelled, 
thus there was no violation of the non-refoulement obligation. 
 285. M.S.S. v. Belgium & Greece, Judgment, App. No. 30696/09, Eur. Ct. 
H.R. (2011). 
 286. Id. ¶ 328. 
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comply with what was pledged. Nevertheless, this conclusion 
might not operate to block an expulsion, because at the time a 
decision is being made there would not yet be reliance because 
the expulsion is not complete. 
IV. DIPLOMATIC ASSURANCES AS SUBSEQUENT 
PRACTICE 
A further way in which diplomatic assurances could 
operate to create legal effects is through the interpretative 
provisions of the Vienna Convention—in particular, the role of 
subsequent practice. 
The Vienna Convention provides a general rule of 
interpretation: “A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in 
accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms 
of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and 
purpose.”287
(a) any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all 
the parties in connection with the conclusion of the treaty;  
 The context of a treaty shall comprise the treaty’s 
preamble and annexes, and  
(b) any instrument which was made by one or more parties in 
connection with the conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other 
parties as an instrument related to the treaty.
288
Furthermore, the interpreter must take into consideration, 
along with the context, 
 
(a) any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the 
interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions; 
(b) any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which 
establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its 
interpretation; . . .
289
An MOU was examined in the Heathrow User Charges 
arbitration.
 
290 In that case, there was a treaty called “Bermuda 
2” and a subsequent Memorandum of Understanding of April 6, 
1983. There was a difference of opinion between the United 
States and the United Kingdom regarding the legally binding 
nature of the agreement: the United States contended that the 
MOU was legally binding291 and the United Kingdom denied 
it.292 The United States argued that the MOU satisfied the 
definition of treaty in the Vienna Convention,293
 
 287. Vienna Convention on Treaties, supra note 
 The United 
35, at art. 31(1). 
 288. Id. at art. 31(2). 
 289. Id. at art. 31(3). 
 290. See Heathrow Airport Arbitration Award, supra note 33. 
 291. See id. ¶ 6.2. 
 292. See id. ¶ 6.3. 
 293. See id. ¶¶ 6.2, 6.5. 
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Kingdom replied that “it was not to be taken as denying any 
legal effect whatsoever to the provisions of the MoU,” but that 
the “both parties to the MoU clearly expected and anticipated 
that the ‘understandings’ embodied in it would be honored . . . 
even if [the U.K. Government] did not regard them as 
amounting to treaty obligations in the strict sense.”294 The 
tribunal essentially accepted the position of the United 
Kingdom, holding that the MOU was not in itself a legally 
binding instrument, but that its terms were evidentiary for the 
interpretation of the initial Bermuda 2 agreement that was 
binding. In short, that the “MoU constitutes consensual 
subsequent practice of the Parties.”295
To apply the same reasoning to diplomatic assurances, it is 
necessary to identify the treaty that serves as the dock to which 
the subsequent practice of assurances might be moored. In the 
context of U.K. practice, one such possible type of treaty is an 
umbrella MOU under which individual assurances are given. If 
the umbrella MOU itself qualifies as a treaty, as this article 
has argued it might, then even if individual assurances fail to 
qualify as treaties themselves, they could still be considered 
subsequent practice under the binding MOU. 
  
Alternately, treaties that provide for the various non-
refoulement obligations296
V. CONCLUSION 
 might serve as the relevant treaty. 
The assurances issued to clarify and condition the risk of 
mistreatment, and serve to overcome the non-refoulement 
obligation, would then be binding insofar as they clarified the 
applicable treaty. This might then impose a legal obligation 
between the states to provide for monitoring treatment, and 
could even mean that where the treaty’s non-refoulement 
obligation has been overcome through the use of diplomatic 
assurances, that the receiving state incurs responsibility under 
the treaty where it violates the rights of the person, as per the 
sending state. 
Diplomatic assurances are potentially legally binding as 
treaties under the Vienna Convention, or, failing that, as 
binding unilateral statements, at least once the expelling state 
has relied on them. Applying the Vienna Convention and the 
doctrine of binding unilateral statements, to the language of 
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 295. See id. ¶ 6.7. 
 296.  E.g. the Refugee Convention, Torture Convention, etc. 
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representative MOUs and assurances, we find that such 
pledges appear to be binding, and in turn result in state 
responsibility when not honored. Even if both of those legal 
theories could be refuted, certain assurances would at least 
qualify as subsequent practice.  
That does not mean that states have either clear 
enforcement rights or clear enforcement mechanisms through 
legal dispute settlement. Nor does it meant that states will ever 
seek to enforce their rights outside of negotiation—seeking to 
enforce assurances through a claim of right would be perceived 
as exposing the claiming state to similar treatment, which is an 
option states may want to avoid. Nor does it mean that the 
assurances themselves are clear enough to be capable of 
assessing violations, except as to a generalized good faith in 
pursing vague ends, and here too, a state might be reluctant to 
claim a violation of good faith. 
In sum, there is no debate that diplomatic assurances are 
politically and diplomatically binding, but these do not 
constitute an alternate normative regime. They are merely 
types of peaceful international dispute settlement under 
international law. That these solutions to disputes can result in 
situations in which states may appear to excuse or forgive 
violations of the law does not mean that violations did not 
occur—the relevant state simply did not “press charges”. Nor 
do these dispute resolutions mean that the relevant state could 
not have pursued a legal claim. In the world of diplomacy, it 
would appear that there are agreements that do qualify as 
legally binding treaties but for which the parties tacitly 
understand not to invoke legal dispute settlement procedures. 
Such agreements are not political or diplomatic only, without 
legal force; it is just that their legally binding nature may not 
be tested. 
